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A B S T R A C T
A reliable communication platform is essential in disaster relief scenarios. Oth-erwise, an efficient coordination of the participating first response units cannot
be ensured. However, during a disaster relief operation, a large amount of data is
generated. Therefore, besides voice communication and the transmission of data such
as text messages or pictures, storage and retrieval services are required. As a result,
information such as medical data, a weather forecast, or data provided by other par-
ticipating units can be stored in the network. Yet, recent large scale incidents like the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean
in 2004, or small scale disasters like the explosions at the S.E. Fireworks company in
2000, have shown that centralized systems as cellular networks do not provide reliable
services in such a scenario. This may be either a result of the damaged infrastructure
due to the disaster or a result of high channel load, which has been observed after a
disaster.
As a result, a more reliable communication platform is required, which satisfies
the challenges introduced by a disaster relief scenario. This communication platform
must not be based on a predefined infrastructure and needs to be able to handle
the communication of mobile devices. Mobile Ad hoc networks are decentralized,
mobile systems that are able to build a network on demand without a predefined
infrastructure. Thus, those networks have been proposed by academia and industry to
be used as communication substrate for such a disaster relief scenario. However, those
Mobile Ad hoc Networks do not provide a storage and retrieval functionality. In this
thesis, we propose to build a Mobile Peer-to-Peer system as a combination of a Mobile
Ad hoc Network as underlay with a Peer-to-Peer overlay. While the Mobile Ad hoc
network serves as a communication infrastructure, the Peer-to-Peer overlay provides
the object storage and retrieval functionality. Yet, the underlay and the overlay have to
be adapted to meet the challenges introduced by the disaster relief scenario in order
to provide reliable and efficient services. To this end, Clustered Pastry, a new location
aware Mobile Peer-to-Peer system is developed in this thesis.
The Clustered Pastry system inherits all the characteristics of the underlying
architectures including multiple security issues. Therefore, an analysis of security
threats in Mobile Peer-to-Peer scenarios is provided in the second part of this thesis.
Known attacks against Mobile Ad hoc Networks and Peer-to-Peer networks are
surveyed. Moreover, existing security mechanisms are discussed in the light of Mobile
Peer-to-Peer scenarios in order to identify open security challenges. Based on those
security challenges, new security mechanisms are developed for our Clustered Pastry
system. Those mechanisms have to consider challenges introduced by the disaster
relief scenario and by the characteristics of the Clustered Pastry system.
In summary, this thesis develops Clustered Pastry, a Mobile Peer-to-Peer system
that can be deployed in disaster relief scenarios. Moreover, Clustered Pastry provides
robustness to the attacks that have been identified as open security challenges. Thus,
a reliable and secure storage and retrieval services can be provided by our new
Clustered Pastry system.

K U R Z FA S S U N G
Um eine effiziente Koordination der Einsatzkräfte in Katastrophenschutz-Szenarienzu ermöglichen ist eine zuverlässige Kommunikation essentiell. Neben der
Sprachkommunikation und der Übertragung von Daten in Form von z.B. Textnach-
richten oder Bildern, müssen weiterhin Daten im Netz gespeichert werden, die im
Laufe einer solchen Operation entstehen. Hierbei kann es sich um z.B. medizinische
Informationen, Wetterberichte, oder auch um Daten handeln, die von den Einsatz-
kräften vor Ort generiert wurden. Die Einsatzberichte diverser Katastrophen, wie der
Anschlag auf das World Trade Center im Jahr 2001, der Tsunami im Indischen Ozean
2004 oder auch kleinere Katastrophen wie die Explosion der Feuerwerkskörperfabrik
S.E. Fireworks in Enschede im Jahr 2000 haben gezeigt, dass oft die zentralisierte
Kommunikationsinfrastruktur des Einsatzgebietes, wie zum Beispiel zelluläre Netze,
nicht zuverlässig eingesetzt werden konnten. Dies resultierte entweder aus einer
Beschädigung der Infrastruktur durch die Katastrophe selbst oder durch einen stark
erhöhten Datenverkehr direkt nach der Katastrophe.
Als Folge dessen wird eine zuverlässigere Kommunikationsarchitektur benötigt, die
den Herausforderungen eines solchen Katastrophenschutz-Szenarios genügt. Diese
Kommunikationsarchitektur muss entsprechend den Einsatz mobiler Geräte unter-
stützen und unabhängig von einer bestehenden Infrastruktur operieren. Mobile Ad
hoc Netze sind dezentrale Netze, die dynamisch eine Kommunikationsinfrastruktur
zu generieren. Aufgrund dieser Eigenschaften wurden diese Netze in den letzten
Jahren im Rahmen diverser Forschungs- und Industrieprojekte mit dem Schwerpunkt
Kommunikation im Katastrophenschutz als potentielle Kommunikationsarchitektur
vorgestellt. Allerdings bieten Mobilen Ad hoc Netze keine Dienste an die ein direk-
tes Speichern und Verwalten von Daten ermöglichen. Entsprechend wird in dieser
Arbeit ein mobiles Peer-to-Peer System entwickelt, welches jene mobilen Ad hoc
Netze mit einem Peer-to-Peer Netz kombinieren. Hierbei wird das mobile Ad hoc
Netz als Kommunikationsinfrastruktur verwendet, auf der das Peer-to-Peer Dienste
zum Speichern von Daten anbietet. Durch die Kombination dieser beiden Systeme
entstehen allerdings neue Herausforderungen die berücksichtigt werden müssen um
ein zuverlässiges mobiles Peer-to-Peer System zu entwickeln. Aufbauend auf diesen
Herrausforderungen wurde in dieser Arbeit das Clustered Pastry mobile Peer-to-Peer
System entwickelt.
Clustered Pastry ist jedoch aufgrund der Charakteristiken der zugrundeliegenden
Architekturen anfällig gegen diverse Angriffe. Entsprechend wird im zweiten Teil
dieser Arbeit eine Sicherheitsanalyse des Clustered Pastry Systems durchgeführt. Da-
bei werden Schwachpunkte der zugrundeliegenden Systeme analysiert und mögliche
Gegenmaßnahmen aus verwandten Arbeiten unter Berücksichtigung des Szenarios
und der sich daraus ergebenden Herausforderungen diskutiert. Als Ergebnis wer-
den offene Problemstellungen im Themenbereich der Sicherheit mobiler Peer-to-Peer
Systeme identifiziert. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen dieser Analyse werden neue
Sicherheitsmechanismen für das Clustered Pastry System entwickelt. Hierbei muss
auf die Herausforderungen eingegangen werden die sowohl durch das Szenario
definiert werden als auch auf jene, die durch die Eigenschaften von Clustered Pastry
entstehen.
Zusammenfassend wird in dieser Arbeit ein neues Mobiles Peer-to-Peer System
entwickelt, welches den Anforderungen eines Katastrophenschutz Szenarios genügt.
Darüber hinaus bietet das resultierende System Robustheit gegen ausgewählte kriti-
sche Angriffe, um einen zuverlässigen Einsatz zu ermöglichen. Als Ergebnis dieser
Arbeit wird also ein zuverlässiges sicheres System vorgestellt, welches Daten dezentral
speichern und abrufen kann.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
»In creating, the only hard thing is to begin:
a grass blade’s no easier to make than an oak.«
— James Russell Lowell
1.1 motivation
Today, we live in a world where nearly all kind of information is readily available
when requested. Therefore, we are used to retrieve, e.g., the weather forecast, news, or
information about traffic jams on our way home whenever we require this information.
Due to the technological progress of the last decade, this data can also be accessed
in a mobile environment by using cellular networks. As a result, modern mobile
phones have evolved from voice communication units to devices that are capable of
exchanging multiple kinds of data.
Those cellular networks suffice to fulfill the challenges introduced by mundane
scenarios. However, those networks may be considered as unreliable in disaster relief
scenarios. As shown by recent incidents, cellular networks can be unavailable due
to damage introduced by a disaster [57] or as a result of high channel load [60].
However, a reliable communication platform that provides the first responding units
with services such as voice communication and that ensures an efficient distribution
of information is vital in disaster relief scenarios [27].
Due to these facts, several research projects have been conducted recently in or-
der to develop a reliable decentralized communication platform to ensure that first
responding units are able to coordinate themselves efficiently. Wireless, mobile net-
works based on a decentralized paradigm called Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET)
are a promising approach to provide a reliable communication infrastructure in
disaster relief scenarios. MANETs were harnessed by multiple projects as a solu-
tion for this challenge [57]. Besides their application in academia, MANETs were
further advertised by commercial projects like HiMoNN1 in order to ensure a reliable
communication of first responding units.
Although MANETs were proposed initially in the late 90’s of the previous century,
it is only in the last decade that first real world applications have been deployed as
part of DUMBO [57], the one laptop per child project2, and the German Freifunk3
initiative. MANETs provide a communication platform and enable a data transmission
between distant nodes. Yet, applications are required that operate on this platform in
order to provide services. This includes the storage and retrieval of data objects such
as text messages or pictures. As information may be vital in a disaster relief scenario
[109], the storage and distribution of data is essential to provide the first response
units data on causalities, the disaster site (e.g., status reports), or sensor information
1 http://himonn.iabg.de/
2 http://one.laptop.org/
3 http://start.freifunk.net/
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(e.g., smoke detectors alerts). Therefore, Mobile Peer-to-Peer (MP2P) systems have
been introduced recently. Those systems combine a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay with a
MANET underlay in order to ensure a completely decentralized storage of data in
the network.
In the last decade, MP2P systems have been developed for a large set of scenarios.
This includes military [105], vehicular [66] and disaster relief settings. However,
when considering disaster relief scenarios, the proposed MP2P systems have been
mostly developed based on harnessing notebooks or PDAs and do not consider
opportunities that have been provided by the new generation of mobile devices such
as smart phones. For example, multiple MP2P systems harness underlay mechanisms
in order to roughly estimate the geographical location of a node while most of today’s
mobile devices provide more precise mechanisms such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS). Other MP2P systems still require centralized entities in order to operate
efficiently. However, an MP2P system can benefit from using today’s technologies.
Moreover, security challenges in the context of MP2P systems have mostly been
neglected by now. The few security mechanisms that have been developed for MP2P
systems ensure, e.g., the privacy of the participants [43] or the authentication of
devices that join the network [112] [26]. Yet, the availability of the services provided
by an MP2P system is still an open security challenge. Even though, considering the
disaster relief scenario, robustness against maliciously behaving or faulty nodes is
vital in order to ensure the availability of the communication platform.
In summary, most existing MP2P systems that have been designed for disaster
relief scenarios do not consider opportunities provided by the new generation of
mobile devices. Thus, those architectures may provide better results when harnessing
technologies such as GPS. Moreover, security threats have mostly been neglected in
the context of MP2P scenarios. Yet, reliable and secure services are vital in the context
of disaster relief scenarios.
1.2 goals
The major objective of this thesis is to develop an MP2P system that harnesses state-
of-the-art technology like GPS to provide efficient and reliable storage and retrieval
services. Moreover, this system has to be robust against multiple types of attacks. As
a result, the following goals are addressed in this thesis.
• Developing a decentralized MP2P system that provides storage and retrieval op-
erations of small data items in a disaster relief scenario where no infrastructure
is available. We consider only disaster relief scenarios in this thesis, even though
the resulting architecture may also be used in the context of other scenarios.
• Analyzing security threats for MP2P due to maliciously behaving participants
and, in particular, routing attacks.
• Developing security mechanisms for MP2P system based on the results of the
survey of security threats.
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1.3 research challenges
The characteristics of an MP2P system satisfies the basic requirements introduced by
the disaster relief scenarios as mentioned in the motivation of this thesis. Yet, those
decentralized systems also introduce a new set of research challenges. Those are
mostly a result of the fusion of the underlying network types and are based on their
characteristics. These research challenges have to be addressed in order to ensure the
reliable usage of MP2P systems in disaster relief scenarios.
wireless underlay
Most P2P systems were developed in the context of a reliable underlay such as
the Internet. Therefore, the design of those systems was based on an underlay that
provides a high bandwidth, a mostly stable topology, and introduces a low fraction
of lost packets. Most of the P2P system algorithms such as the routing tables were
developed based on these assumptions. Yet, when introducing a mobile, wireless
underlay, those assumptions are not valid anymore. On the wireless channel, packets
may get lost as a result of collisions and, furthermore, the bandwidth is strongly
limited.
decentralized system
Both, P2P systems and MANETs are decentralized networks. This characteristic is
required to satisfy the challenges introduced by the disaster relief scenario. Moreover,
this characteristic also introduces new challenges for the resulting MP2P system. As
the MP2P system is completely decentralized, challenges arise that affect the basic
functionality of the network and as well the robustness of this system.
mobility of participants
Due to the disaster relief scenario, mobility of the participants has to be assumed.
As a result of the mobility of the devices, a dynamic topology has to be considered.
This affects the availability of the services provided by the P2P algorithm directly.
Furthermore, also data stored on nodes that leave the network due to mobility may
affect the availability of the provided services.
cooperation of participants
As no predefined infrastructure is available, routing functionality provided by partici-
pating nodes is required whenever a message has to be to delivered to its destination.
However, maliciously behaving nodes may exploit this fact in order to deny the
services provided by the MP2P system.
1.4 contributions
This thesis introduces a new location-aware MP2P system that has been developed
for disaster relief scenarios. This system is, moreover, robust against security threats,
which are introduced by the P2P lookup mechanism and the allocation of data objects.
The contribution of this thesis is organized in three major parts: The first part
focuses on developing an MP2P system suited for disaster relief scenarios. The second
part focuses on analyzing open security threats for this system. The last part provides
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security mechanisms that are developed in this thesis to meet the identified security
challenges.
developing a location aware mobile peer-to-peer system
Clustered Pastry as a location-aware MP2P system is the first contribution of this thesis.
This system combines a MANET underlay with a Distributed Hashtable (DHT) overlay
to provide storage and retrieval services in a mobile setting as required by our disaster
relief scenario. Moreover, we have to adapted these underlying systems to meet
the challenges that arise due to a wireless, mobile underlay. Additionally, multiple
mechanisms have been developed in order to ensure reliability and efficiency of this
MP2P system, including overlay routing tables that are updated based on information
gathered by the underlay and mechanisms that reduce the traffic generated by the
overlay.
analysis of security threats of mobile peer-to-peer systems
MP2P inherits the vulnerabilities to a large set of attacks from their underlying
systems. Therefore, security threats and, in particular, routing attacks for MP2P are
discussed and analyzed as part of this thesis. Furthermore, three routing attacks have
been discussed more precisely, as those attacks are capable to affect the availability of
the services provided by the MP2P system.
development of security mechanisms for mobile peer-to-peer systems
Security mechanisms for each of the identified threats will be developed for the
Clustered Pastry system in order to ensure robustness against the previously men-
tioned routing attacks. These mechanisms will be developed in the light of the
challenges and requirements that are introduced by an MP2P system.
• The first mechanism is an adapted replication mechanism that provides copies
of each object in order to ensure the availability of the services of the network.
This mechanism harnesses the highly structured characteristics of the overlay
and combines them with the location awareness of the underlay in order to
ensure an efficient distribution of the replicas.
• MP2P systems have to rely on benign behavior of other participants in order
to be able to locate a content provider. Thus, maliciously behaving nodes
may exploit this characteristic of the network and deny those lookup services.
Therefore, a security mechanism will be developed to monitor the lookup
mechanism of the MP2P system.
• In order to retrieve a data object in an MP2P system, the address of the content
provider has to be determined. Yet, a maliciously behaving node may exploit the
requesting node’s unawareness about the address of the content provider and
may pretend to be the content provider in order to deny this object. Therefore,
a mechanism will be developed to validate a content provider.
1.5 thesis structure
This thesis is structured in seven chapters:
1.5 thesis structure 5
After this first chapter, which introduces and motivates the topic of this thesis,
foundations and related work is surveyed in Chapter 2. Thus, information on MP2P
systems is provided as background information in the first part of the second chapter.
This includes an overview of the underlying architectures. Furthermore, MANET and
P2P systems are discussed in detail that are being used as a substrate to develop our
clustered MP2P system. Moreover, related work on MP2P is surveyed in the chapter.
Challenges of MP2P security and existing security mechanisms are discussed in the
second half of Chapter 2. Therefore, selected attacks on the underlying systems are
discussed. Existing mechanisms, preceded by related work, that ensure robustness
against those attacks, are surveyed as well.
In Chapter 3 we develop our Clustered Pastry system. In a first step, the challenges
introduced by the disaster relief scenario are discussed. Thereafter, the basic concepts
of the MP2P system are developed based on those challenges. During the course of the
chapter implementation details are provided. This includes the structure and update
functionality of the routing tables as well as mechanisms to increase the network’s
robustness and reduce the generated network traffic. The chapter concludes with a
comparison of Clustered Pastry against two MP2P systems that have been introduced
in related work, which share some characteristics with our system.
The resulting Clustered Pastry system is evaluated with regard to the performance
in disaster relief scenarios in Chapter 4. Therefore, different scenario settings are
introduced that are used to estimate the efficiency of Clustered Pastry. Those scenarios
are based on parameter settings, such as the number of nodes in the network, the
mobility model, or background traffic. Furthermore, recommended default values for
the parameters of our system are determined during this evaluation.
Chapter 5 discusses security threats for MP2P systems. Therefore, threats introduced
by the underlying systems are analyzed. Based on existing work in the area of network
security in MANET, P2P, and MP2P security, open challenges are identified. As a
result of this discussion, challenging attacks on the MP2P system are analyzed and
the impact of those attacks is evaluated at the end of the chapter.
Based on the security challenges analyzed in the Chapter 5, security mechanisms
are developed in Chapter 6. Therefore, challenges introduced by the characteristics of
MP2P system are analyzed in order to develop mechanisms that are adapted to the
needs of the scenario. At the end of the chapter, those mechanisms are evaluated and
compared to security mechanisms proposed by related work.
The last chapter summarizes the content and outcomes of this thesis. Furthermore,
the contributions of this thesis are compared to the goals introduced in this chapter.
The last chapter concludes with a discussion of future work that may be based on
this thesis.
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F O U N D AT I O N S A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
»Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow.
The important thing is not to stop questioning.«
— Albert Einstein
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the foundations as well as security threatsand solutions for MP2P systems. Furthermore, scientific work is reviewed that
is closely related to the topic of this thesis.
In the first part of this chapter, the general structure and the underlying architectures
of MP2P systems are introduced. Therefore, foundations of P2P and MANET protocols
are revisited in this chapter. Furthermore, related work in the field of MP2P systems
is reviewed. The second part of this chapter focuses on security threats that affect
the routing mechanisms of MP2P systems. Three prominent and harmful attacks
are introduced that affect the routing mechanism and the services provided by the
system. Furthermore, security mechanisms proposed by related work are surveyed
that increase the robustness of MP2P networks against those attacks.
2.1 network and communication systems
As a first step in developing a novel MP2P system, the underlying protocols and
the structure of the resulting MP2P network are discussed. In this section, models
are introduced that are used to design this system. Moreover, as MP2P systems
combine MANET with P2P networks, prominent existing protocols are surveyed in
the following subsections. Furthermore, related work on MP2P systems is introduced
at the end of this section.
2.1.1 Communication Models and Concepts
Network models are used to describe the structure of a network and the interaction
of the underlying protocols. Those models are used to reduce the complexity of the
resulting system. In this thesis two basic models are used: The layer model and the
concept of overlay networks.
The layer model classifies protocols based on their functionality. Thus, we use
this model to develop the new MP2P system and to define the functionality of the
deployed protocols. The concept of overlay networks in terms of building a network
on top of another network is used in multiple architectures including P2P systems.
Therefore, the overlay paradigm is also discussed in this section.
layer models
Today, most of the digital devices such as desktop computers, smart phones, note-
books, or even MP3 players are able to communicate with other devices. Therefore,
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Figure 1: Tanenbaum’s layer model
a vast amount of protocols are available and required to, e.g., handle connections,
retransmit packets, discover routes to the destination node, negotiate the transmission
rate, and so on. In order to reduce the complexity of the resulting protocol structure
of a node, layer models are used. Those models consist of a stack of layers, where
each layer provides specific services to the layer above. Therefore, protocols can be
assigned according to their functionality to a layer (or, in some cases, to multiple
layers). The topmost layer of the model is used as interface to the user and the lowest
layer is connected to the network. Every layer but the lowest layer communicates
with adjacent layers only. The lowest layer also may use the channel to communicate
with other nodes. In this thesis, the layer model of Tanenbaum [107] is used. This
model combines the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model [2] of the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization with the TCP/IP model [15] of the Internet
Engineering Task Force. As shown in Figure 1, Tanenbaum’s model consists of 5
layers. The lowest layer, the physical layer, handles the transmission of bits over the
channel. The data link layer manages the communication with adjacent nodes. This
includes flow control and framing of the transmitted data as well as error detection
and correction. Furthermore, the data link layer maintains the medium access control
and, therefore, determines when a node is allowed to send data over the channel.
Often, e.g., when transmitting data via the Internet, the destination node is not di-
rectly connected to the source node, but the data has to be forwarded by multiple
intermediate nodes or routers. Therefore, routing services provided by the network
layer protocols are required in order to discover a route to the destination node. The
fourth layer, the transport layer establishes and provides end-to-end communication
services for applications and further services like congestion control. The last layer,
the application layer includes multiple kinds of applications, e.g., electronic mail
services.
In some cases, information may be required at a particular layer, that can not be
provided by the surrounding but another layer. Therefore, cross-layer optimization is
used to provide feedback from layers beyond the virtual borders of the model.
overlay networks
Overlay networks add an addition layer of indirection to the layer model. Therefore,
the overlay is introduced as a virtual network that is built on top of an underlying
network, henceforth called the underlay. While the underlay provides the connectivity
between the participants of the networks, virtual links are harnessed by the overlay.
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Figure 2: Example for an overlay network
P2P networks are a prominent example for overlay networks. The P2P overlay
provides services, such as decentralized storage and retrieval of data objects, but
requires an underlay in order to establish routes between the participating peers.
In most cases, the Internet is used as the underlying network. However, not every
node in the underlying network has to participate in the overlay as well, as shown in
the example in Figure 2. Theoretically, a P2P overlay network can run on top of any
underlay that provides the required services.
2.1.2 Mobile Ad hoc Networks
MANETs are decentralized networks established spontaneously by nodes that com-
municate via a wireless channel. As the wireless transmission range of those nodes is
limited by the transmission power, the destination of a message may not be within the
direct transmission range of the sender. Therefore, intermediate nodes are required
that have to provide routing functionality on demand to forward a message to the
destination. The distance between the sender and the destination in MANETs is often
defined by the number of times a message is forwarded. This distance metric is also
called the hop distance. As a result of this definition, multi-hop communication is
assumed whenever a message has to be forwarded by at least a single intermediate
node.
As a result of this decentralized and distributed characteristics of these networks,
single points of failure can be avoided. Routing tasks of a node that leaves the
network unexpected, e.g., due to technical issues, can be performed by other nearby
nodes. Due to these characteristics, MANETs do not depend on a previously defined
infrastructure. Furthermore, in most scenarios a major part of the network nodes are
mobile. This results in a highly dynamic topology. Moreover, the bandwidth is strongly
limited due to the wireless channel shared with every node within transmission range.
Thus, adapted routing algorithms are required to address these challenges.
classification of protocols for mobile ad hoc networks
Several routing protocols for MANETs have been proposed in the recent years. These
protocols operate mostly on the network layer and are able to establish routes to
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Figure 3: Multi Point Relays selected by a node that uses the Optimized Link State
Routing protocol
nodes in the network. In this thesis, the MANET protocols are categorized according
to their routing characteristics into proactive, reactive, and hybrid approaches.
Proactive protocols maintain routes to every node in the network. As a result, valid
routes are readily available when required. Yet, periodic updates of the routing tables
are required, as otherwise the dynamic topology will result in stale routing table
entries. This results in traffic overhead that is generated by these update messages. The
Optimized Link State Routing protocol (OLSR) [21] is an often referenced example of
a proactive MANET routing protocol. Because of the special importance of the OLSR
protocol in this thesis, we will introduced this protocol in detail a few paragraphs
later.
In contrast to proactive approaches, reactive algorithms initiate a routing process
on demand only. As the topology in MANETs may change constantly due to node
mobility, routing overhead may be significantly reduced when a route discovery
is initiated only when a route is required. On the downside, establishing a route
on demand delays the data transmission. The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) [80] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [56] routing protocols are well-
known and often referenced reactive protocols for MANETs.
As a combination of reactive and proactive protocols, hybrid protocols combine the
characteristics of both. Routes to nodes that are within a specific distance to the source
are maintained proactively while routes to distant nodes are established on demand
only. The Zone Routing Protocol [41] is an example for a hybrid MANET protocol.
optimized link state routing protocol
The OLSR protocol is one of the few MANET algorithms that has not been evaluated
solely in the lab via simulation or an analytical approach. Instead, it has been validated
in multiple real world testbeds, e.g., in the DUMBO [57] or the Freifunk [1] project.
As mentioned before, OLSR is a proactive MANET routing protocol and, therefore,
updates the routing tables of each node periodically.
This protocol detects geographical neighbors by sending periodically hello messages.
Due to these messages, information regarding geographical neighbors can be obtained
and used to update the local routing table. Furthermore, information about the
detected neighbors is distributed by Topology Control (TC) messages in the network.
In order to reduce overhead generated by those routing table update messages, TC
messages are forwarded by selected nodes only. Therefore, each node defines a set of
geographical neighbors. This set of selected neighbors, called Multi Point Relay (MPR),
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has to provide a connection to every second hop neighbor of the node as shown in
Figure 3.
OLSR relies on a hop-based metric to estimate the distances between nodes and
to derive the routing tables. However, testbed evaluations of hop-based metrics
have shown that they are inefficient [70][38]. Therefore, the Expected Transmission
Count (ETX) [23] extension of OLSR was introduced. The routing path metric that is
used by the ETX extension also considers the maximum throughput of a link besides
the overall hop distance. Thus, routes established with the ETX metric are more
reliable.
2.1.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems
As mentioned before, P2P systems are overlay networks mostly based on the Internet
as underlying network. Due to the decentralized architecture, P2P systems are robust
against single node failures. Whenever a node leaves the network (either intentionally
or due to node failure), another peer is able to provide the leaving node’s functionality.
In contrast to the traditional centralized Client-Server architectures, the overall load is,
on average, equally distributed among all peers in the network. Yet, new challenges
arise due to the decentralized characteristics of P2P networks, for example, the
dynamic participation of peers in the network (churn) [104]. As each peer provides
content, these objects have to be redistributed when a content provider leaves the
network.
In recent years, multiple P2P architectures were introduced. Those can be catego-
rized into unstructured and structured architectures [103]. In the following paragraphs,
the characteristics of those architectures are discussed. Furthermore, a prominent and
efficient P2P system called Pastry is introduced at the end of this subsection.
unstructured peer-to-peer architectures
The unstructured architectures can be subdivided in centralized, pure, and hybrid P2P
architectures. The first generation of P2P systems were centralized P2P architectures.
They still required a central entity that coordinates the lookup functionality. Due to
this fact, those systems have some features and drawbacks of a Client-Server based
architecture. Every peer that wants to share content in terms of data objects with
other nodes in the network has to notify the central entity. Whenever another peer
requests this object, a lookup request is sent to this central entity. As the routing
table of the central entity maps content that is stored within the network to the
address of the content provider, the central entity responds to the request with the
address of the peer that has stored the requested object. As a result, the routing and
maintenance costs of the peers in the network are very low as compared to other P2P
architectures. Yet, the central entity has to provide a high amount of resources, as the
routing functionality has to be maintained and managed by this node. Furthermore,
this entity is a single point of failure as the lookup process relies on the centrally
maintained routing table. The most prominent example of a centralized P2P system is
Napster [103].
In order to provide completely decentralized services, pure P2P systems were
developed. Those systems do not require a central entity. Thus, pure P2P networks
have no single point of failure and each peer has to provide the same services and
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Figure 4: Structure of Peer-to-Peer architectures
is, therefore, treated equally. The lookup mechanisms of pure P2P systems are based
on flooding lookup requests. Therefore, lookups can be resolved even though the
address of the node that is responsible for the requested content is unknown. However,
the traffic overhead generated by the storage and retrieval of an object is increased
strongly due to the flooding based routing mechanism. Freenet [20] and Gnutella 0.4
[61] are examples of pure P2P architectures.
The third kind of unstructured P2P architectures are the hybrid P2P architectures.
Hybrid P2P systems combine the characteristics of both, pure and centralized P2P
systems. Some few nodes (super-peers) providing a high amount of resources, are used
to reduce the routing overhead. Every peer that joins the network is assigned to such
a super-peer. This super-peer is responsible for the node and has to store information
regarding the node’s address and the content provided by this node. During routing,
requests are not flooded through the whole network, but only sent to the super-peers.
As a result, this subset of nodes is able to provide information regarding the nodes
and the content stored in the network. The amount of requests that have to be sent is
reduced to the number of super-peers. Thus, the traffic is strongly reduced compared
to a pure P2P system. Examples for hybrid P2P architectures are Gnutella 0.6 [61],
KaZaA [59], or the location aware Globase.KOM [65].
structured peer-to-peer architectures
Structured P2P architectures (DHT) are completely decentralized. But in contrast to
pure P2P, no costly flooding-based lookup mechanism is used. Instead, DHTs harness
unique overlay identifiers to identify peers as well as objects that are stored in the
network. Due to these overlay identifiers, the virtual distance between two nodes
or an object and a node can be derived. The routing algorithms harness this virtual
distance between node identifiers during a lookup. The routing tables of the nodes
are highly structured and provide addresses of a well-defined sparse set of the nodes
and the according node identifiers only.
Lookups are used to resolve the overlay identifier to the Internet Protocol (IP)
address of a node. In most cases, only the destination identifier but not the network
address is known by the source. Due to this fact, the node has to check the routing
table for the identifier of the destination. If the address of the destination is found, the
lookup can be completed within a single overlay hop. Otherwise a request message
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is sent to a node with an identifier that is logically closer to the identifier of the
destination. This intermediate node has to check its own routing table to determine a
next hop node according to the routing algorithm to forward the message. Due to this
fact, the message is forwarded towards the destination identifier until the message is
received by the destination node. This destination node replies a response message to
the source to complete this lookup.
When a node provides content to the network, the object identifier of this new object
has to be generated in the first step (e.g., by hashing the object’s name). Thereafter, a
lookup for this object identifier is initiated. The reply message that has been received
as a result of this lookup includes the address of the node that is responsible for the
new object (root node). This root node either stores the new data object or a link to
the content provider. To retrieve an object, a node also has to initiate a lookup. The
resulting reply message provides the address of the root node of the requested object.
Thereafter, the source is able to download the requested object either from the root
node or the content provider directly.
Several DHTs have been developed in recent years. Those systems can be classified
according to the structure of their routing table. In the context of this thesis, three
basic structures are discussed. These are the ring, tree, and hypercube structure.
Ring based architectures distribute the node identifiers on a circular identifier-space.
Starting with the identifier that has the lowest numerical value on the top position,
the identifier is increased clockwise. Chord [102] is a prominent example for a ring
structured DHT. In Figure 4a, an example of the structure of a Chord routing table is
shown.
Tree structured architectures, like for example Tapestry [121], maintain a prefix-
based routing table. As shown in Figure 4b, each row i of a routing table provides
links to nodes with i matching prefix digits to the identifier of the owner of this
routing table. Whenever a lookup request is initiated or received by a node, the
identifier of the destination is compared with the node identifier. The length of the
matching prefix determines the row of the routing table where the address of the next
hop node is stored. Thus, both, the routing table size as well as the average required
number of hops during a lookup scales logarithmic to the network size.
Hypercube structured DHTs like the Content Addressable Network (CAN) [85] are
based on a d-dimensional identifier-space. Nodes are represented by an area within
this identifier-space as shown in Figure 4c. Objects are identified by a singular point
in the identifier-space and assigned to the node that is responsible for this area.
Furthermore, some P2P systems combine the algorithms of two architectures. Pastry
[88] for example is based on differently structured routing tables. One is tree-based
and the other ring structured.
pastry
Many MP2P systems (including the system that has been developed as part of this
thesis) are based on the Pastry DHT. Therefore, the structure and algorithms of this
P2P system is surveyed in the following paragraphs in detail.
The Pastry DHT, as introduced by Rowstron et al., is based on a hybrid architecture.
This P2P system has been developed for large scale scenarios with static nodes that
are connected via a wired underlay, e.g., the Internet. In order to provide an efficient
storage and retrieval service in these scenarios, the number of routing table entires
and the number of hops between source and destination are a logarithmic function of
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the number of overall nodes in the network. Each node and each object is identified by
a unique 128-bit overlay identifier. This identifer is used to define the virtual position
of the node in the overlay network. As a result, the routing algorithm is based on
the identifiers and their virtual location in the identifier-space. These identifiers are
represented by a sequence of digits that is defined by the parameter b. Each digit
is displayed as a value between 0 and 2b − 1. By default, the parameter b is set to
4 and, therefore, each digit is mapped to a hexadecimal value. Three routing tables
are maintained by Pastry. Each routing table maps the identifiers of a specific set of
nodes to the proper IP addresses.
The first routing table of Pastry is tree structured and provides links to nodes that
are logically distant. The functionality of this routing table is similar to Tapestry’s
routing table (as shown in Figure 4b). Each row contains 2b − 1 entries. The nth row
provides links to nodes that share n− 1 digits in the prefix and differ in the nth digit.
The parameter b defines how many entries are stored in the routing table per row.
As multiple nodes satisfy the requirement of each entry, a proximity metric is used
to determine the geographically closest node. Therefore, a ping message is sent to
each node that satisfies the requirements. Thereafter, the node with the lowest round
trip time of the ping message is stored at the routing table. The routing table is not
maintained proactively but on demand only. Whenever a node sends a message and
does not receive a response, the node, the message has been sent to, is assumed as
unavailable. Thereafter, this link is removed from the table and an update request is
sent to another node that is stored in the same row as the unavailable node. In the
case that no other link to a node is available in this row or no node within this row is
able to provide a link to a matching node, the request is sent to any other node that is
stored in the routing table.
The second routing table, the leaf set, stores the addresses of the virtual neighbors.
This routing table is ring structured. The leaf set is defined to a size of L nodes (per
default L = 2b). Half of the entries provide links to nodes with a numerically smaller
identifier and the other half provides links to nodes with numerically larger identifier
compared to the identifier of the leaf set owner. Similar to the routing table the leaf set
maintains the routing table entires on demand only. Whenever a leaf node does not
respond to a message, this node is assumed to be offline. If a stale entry is detected,
the virtual neighbors are notified. These neighbors reply with a message containing
their leaf set. Based on those leaf sets, the own local leaf set can be updated.
The neighborhood set is the third routing table maintained by Pastry. This table
stores links to nodes that are geographically close to the owner of the routing table.
Therefore, the proximity metric is used to determine the distance between the nodes.
Yet, this routing table is not used during the routing but can be used, e.g., to provide
a geographically close bootstrapping node when disconnected from the P2P network
(for further details on bootstrapping see also the last paragraph of this subsection).
In order to route a request to the destination, each node that receives this request
has to check the leaf set first. The leaf set can be harnessed to determine whether the
node itself or a virtual neighbor is the destination of this request. If so, a reply message
is sent to the source of the request or the request is forwarded to the destination node,
respectively. Otherwise the routing table is used to to determine a node that matches
the identifier of the destination by at least one more digit. Thereafter, the message is
forwarded to this node that is logically closer to the destination. The average number
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Figure 5: Mobile Peer-to-Peer structures
of hops (h) is logarithmic in the parameter b and the number of nodes in the network
(N) (see Function 2.1).
h = log2b(N) (2.1)
In order to join the network, the address of a Pastry node that participates in the
P2P network is required (the bootstrapping node). After generating the identifier of
the new node, a join message is routed via the bootstrapping node to the virtual
neighbors. The addresses of intermediate nodes that forward the join message are
used to fill the routing table. After the join request has arrived at the virtual neighbor,
the leaf set table is generated based on information provided by this neighbor.
2.1.4 Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
After discussing the foundations of the underlying networks, foundations on MP2P
architectures are provided in this section. Therefore, a classification of MP2P systems
is introduced and, furthermore, challenges are discussed. Based on this classification,
related work in the area of MP2P systems is discussed.
Several systems that combine MANET with P2P networks have been introduced
recently. Those systems can be classified according to the implementation of the P2P
algorithm into layered, integrated and cross-layered approaches as shown in Figure 5.
In the following, each of the approaches is described and related approaches are
discussed. Further details on the classification of MP2P systems can be found in our
survey [37].
layered mobile peer-to-peer systems
Layered MP2P architectures simply combine existing MANET with P2P systems.
As a result, underlay and overlay are strictly separated and, therefore, no direct
communication between the two underlying protocols is enabled, as shown in Figure
5b. However, most layered MP2P systems adapt the underlay and/or the overlay
system to meet the challenges that arise due to the combination of these architecture.
In particular, the traffic overhead that is generated by the overlay is reduced, due to
the limited bandwidth of the MANET underlay.
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Castro et al. proposed an MP2P system that is based on the Bamboo DHT [18].
The routing algorithm of this DHT is very similar to Pastry’s routing algorithm, but
differs in the maintenance of the routing tables. As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3, Pastry
updates the routing tables on demand only. However, Bamboo harnesses periodic
updates to provide fresh routing table entries. Castro et al. reduces the traffic that is
generated by the overlay by increasing the update intervals. Thus, this MP2P system
is able to operate despite the limited bandwidth of the MANET underlay.
Moreover, location awareness is used by several MP2P systems that have been pro-
posed in the last decade. Therefore, the geographical position of a node is considered
during the lookup. Thus, the traffic that is generated due to a lookup is reduced. The
PeerNet [34] MP2P system maps the identifier space of the overlay to specified zones
in the deployment area. Moreover, the mobility profile and history of the nodes is
used to map these nodes on these zones in order to define virtual residences. Highly
available proxies are required at these zones that provide information about the
location of the nodes that reside in this virtual area. Therefore, each node that leaves
its virtual residence has to notify the proxy and has to provide a mobility profile. This
mobility profile includes information that can be used to estimate the destination
of this node. Based on this mobility profile and due to the location aware underlay
routing mechanism, PeerNet is able to establish routes in a efficient way.
Millar et al. [74] proposed a landmarking-based, location aware MP2P system. The
landmarking system splits the namespace of the overlay identifier in equal sized zones
and defines a landmark node at each zone. This node periodically sends landmarking
messages. These messages are forwarded by each node within the landmarking
zone. Thus, nodes that are located at the boarder between two landmarking zones
receive the landmarking messages of both zones. Based on the hop count of the
received landmarking messages, those nodes decide to which landmarking zone they
belong. All nodes that are located in the same landmarking zone share the same
prefix of the overlay identifier. By changing the landmarking zones, those nodes
have to adapt their overlay identifier. As a result, virtual neighbors are located in the
same geographical area. Thus, a location aware routing is enabled, which results in
a reduced overhead during the routing. Moreover, Millar et al. use a Bamboo DHT
as overlay and, therefore, reduce the maintenance overhead by reducing the update
intervals.
integrated mobile peer-to-peer systems
Integrated MP2P systems combine the MANET and the P2P protocols at a single layer
as shown in Figure 5c. Thus, traffic overhead can be reduced as no separate routing
tables for the MANET and P2P system are required. Moreover, information provided
by the MANET protocol can be used by the P2P system.
The Scalable Source Routing [29] is an integrated MP2P system that is based on the
Chord DHT. Thus, the Scalable Source Routing system is ring structured. Yet, only
links to direct virtual and geographical neighbors are provided by the routing tables
of the MP2P system. Thus, whenever a lookup request is received, this request is
either forwarded to a geographical neighbor that is virtually closer to the destination
or to a virtual neighbor. This results in a strongly reduced traffic overhead that is
generated by the maintenance of the routing tables.
EKTA [84] and DPSR [52] are both based on the Pastry and integrate this DHT
at the network layer. Furthermore, both systems harnesses forwarded or overheard
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messages to update the routing tables. Thus, the maintenance overhead in terms of
traffic can be reduced. Both systems maintain a leaf set that provides multi-hop routes
to the virtual neighbors. Those routes are updated whenever a message to such a
node is forwarded or overheard.
cross layered mobile peer-to-peer systems
A cross-layered approach is a combines the benefits of the layered and integrated
architectures. Due to cross-layering, information provided by the network layer can
be used by the P2P system to, e.g., reduce traffic generated during the routing table
maintenance. Moreover, the underlying architectures do not have to be restructured
but only minor adaptations of the MANET and P2P protocols are required.
The cross-layered MADPastry [118] is based on the Pastry DHT and uses a similar
landmarking mechanism as proposed by Millar et al. [74]. Therefore, location aware
routing algorithm is harnessed in order to reduce the traffic generated by a lookup.
Moreover, the routing tables of MADPastry are truncated. Thus, the routing table is
used for the first overlay hop only. Thereafter, the leaf set is used to route the lookup
request. Moreover, both routing tables are maintained by cross-layer information
obtained from overheard messages. Thus, traffic overhead that is generated by the
routing table maintenance is strongly reduced.
challenges of mobile peer-to-peer systems
Both P2P and MANET systems share central characteristics. Combining them results
in a fully decentralized architecture that provides storage and retrieval functionality
in a mobile environment. However, MP2P systems introduce major challenges due
to the limited resources provided by the MANET underlay. As most DHTs were
developed in the context of a static underlay like the Internet, overlay systems have to
be adapted in order to match the requirements introduced by the mobile, wireless
underlay. Therefore, one challenge is the overhead generated by the overlay that has
to be reduced. This includes traffic due to routing table maintenance, the lookup and
the bootstrapping mechanism.
2.1.5 Summary of Related Work in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
In this section, foundations of communication models, MANET and P2P systems
have been provided. Furthermore, related work on MP2P systems as a combination
of MANET and P2P systems have been surveyed. MP2P systems are decentralized
mobile systems that inherit beneficial but also challenging characteristics of the
underlying architectures. Due to this fact, MANETs can not be simply combined
with a P2P overlay but adaptations are required to address these challenges. In the
recent years, multiple MP2P systems have been introduced. These systems can be
classified according to their implementation method of the overlay. Layered MP2P
systems as discussed in Section 2.1.4 allows only limited adaptations to meet the
challenges of MP2P systems. Integrated systems on the other hand require significant
modifications on the underlying architectures. Thus, it is not possible to adapt an
integrated approach to be used in combination with another underlay or overlay
protocol. However, cross-layered systems provide the benefits of integrated system
but can be easily deployed in combination with different protocols. Therefore, the
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cross-layered architecture is assumed as the most flexible and efficient structure for an
MP2P system and is used to develop a novel MP2P system in this thesis.
2.2 security in mobile peer-to-peer systems
Decentralized systems as MANET, P2P, or MP2P systems are vulnerable to a wide
range of malicious behavior. Therefore, security concerns have to be considered in
order to ensure that the system provides reliable and efficient services.
This section provides foundations of security goals. Those goals introduce basic
requirements that have to be fulfilled by every communication system in order to
ensure a secure and reliable communication [94] [25]. Security mechanisms proposed
by the related work as well as remaining security threats on MP2P systems are
discussed subsequently. As will be shown, routing attacks on the MP2P overlay
have been mostly neglected by now. Those attacks are able to affect the reliability of
the services provided by the system strongly and will thus be focus of the second
part of this thesis. However, even though only few related work regarding security
and robustness of the routing mechanism of MP2P systems exists, several security
mechanisms have been proposed for the underlying architectures. Hence, security
mechanisms were also surveyed that increase the network’s robustness against routing
attacks in the field of MANET and P2P systems.
2.2.1 Security Goals and Basic Definitions
General security requirements are often represented by three basic goals [94] known
as the CIA-triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). Those goals have to be satisfied
by every communication system in order to ensure a secure and reliable functionality.
Thus, these requirements are also relevant in the context of MP2P systems.
• Confidentiality: The security goal of confidentiality is satisfied if only those
nodes are able to access data or to use services that are authorized to perform
this task.
• Integrity: The requirements introduced by the integrity are satisfied when
neither data can be modified undetected nor unauthorized. Due to this fact,
tampered data can be detected. Furthermore, digital rights management is based
on data integrity.
• Availability: According to Schneier [94], »availability is about ensuring that an
attacker can’t prevent legitimate users from having reasonable access to their
system«. Though, the definition of »reasonable access« depends on the specific
scenario and application.
Besides these basic security goals, further goals have been introduced by, e.g., Eckert
[25]. The extended security goals provide more precise requirements and cover further
challenges that have not been considered by the CIA-triad as follows.
• Authentication: Each entity and each object has to be able to authenticate itself
by using a unique identifier. Due to this fact, a node or object can verify its own
claimed identity whenever requested (e.g., when a communication is initiated).
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• Non Repudiation: An entity should not be able to deny an operation previously
performed. This extended security goal is of particular importance in the area
of e-commerce.
• Privacy: Unauthorized entities should not be able to retrieve information that
could be used to identify, to observe, or to spy out an user of another entity.
This security goal does not ensure the reliable functionality of the system, but a
reasonable handling of the private data of users.
Beside the security goals, definitions have been established to describe a system’s
vulnerabilities, the probability and impact of malicious behavior, and the malicious
behavior itself. Thus, security threats, risks, and attacks have been defined by Eckert
[25] as follows.
• Threat: A threat is the result of the systems vulnerability that can be exploited
to affect the availability, confidentiality or integrity of the systems services.
• Risk: The risk is defined by the probability that a system is affected by malicious
behavior and the resulting effect on the system.
• Attack: Maliciously behaving participants may attack the system in order to
compromise the network. As a result, the attacker may access services or
the network itself without permission. Furthermore, data or services may be
modified, deleted, denied, or information about the other participants may be
extracted by means of this attack.
2.2.2 Survey of existing Mobile Peer-to-Peer Security Mechanisms
Even though several MP2P architectures have been developed in recent years, only
few mechanisms have been proposed to ensure the security and reliability of those
networks. In the following paragraphs, existing security mechanisms are surveyed
that have been developed in the context of MP2P scenarios.
The goal of the EU-funded PEPERS project [113] was to develop a platform to
support the design of secure MP2P applications. Therefore, a methodology was
introduced that identifies the weakness of a mobile application according to its
structure. Furthermore, mechanisms like a monitoring system that is able to detect
policy violation on the application layer were discussed within the scope of this
project [100]. However, the outcomes of this project can rather be seen as a guide that
provides hints on how to develop a secure MP2P application. Specific mechanisms that
increase the networks resilience against malicious behavior have not been developed.
Basic authentication mechanisms for MP2P have further been introduced. Cˇapkun
et al. [112] developed two different access control mechanisms for MP2P architectures.
In the first scenario, authentication via a offline certification authority was assumed.
For this reason, each node in the network is aware of the public keys of the other
participants. The second scenario was based on a decentralized approach. Each node
has to be authenticated via a face to face authentication. Thus, the authentication
is performed by the user of this device directly. Another approach introduced by
Fenkam et al. [26] uses a decentralized access control mechanism. Furthermore, an
admission control mechanism has been introduced by Manulis [71], that considers
privacy issues of the joining nodes.
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Beside privacy during admission control, privacy considerations during lookups
have been discussed in the related work. Han and Liu [43] introduced an algorithm
that ensures privacy for both the initiator and the responder of a lookup. In contrary
to approaches that have been proposed in the context of P2P, this approach is not
based on costly onion routing [33] but on Shamir’s Secret Sharing [97]. Based on this
approach, Tsai et al. introduced an improved approach that also ensures data integrity
protection [108].
Adapted replication mechanisms proposed by Mondal et al. [75] [76] are based on
super-peers which are assumed to have high battery power and processing capacity.
Those nodes may not move freely but have to stay within a specified geographical
area. All other nodes have to report future movement plans and required objects to
the super-peer as they assume that each node has a predefined schedule anyway.
In summary, few security mechanisms have been designed for MP2P systems
recently. Yet, routing attacks have been mostly neglected by the related work. Solely,
the proposed replication mechanisms can be used to improve the networks robustness
against those attacks. However, as routing attacks strongly affect the availability of the
services provided by the MP2P system, replication mechanisms alone do not suffice
to ensure reliable and robust services.
2.2.3 Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
Routing attacks have a high impact on the availability of the services provided by the
MP2P system. Even a limited number of malicious nodes may be able to deny a high
fraction of the network’s services. In the following paragraphs, the Incorrect Lookup
Routing Attack as introduced by [99] is revisited. This attack exploits the routing
algorithm of the overlay to attack the network and is, therefore, able to affect the
availability of the networks services.
In order to lookup an object or a node, DHTs have to rely on the benign behavior
of intermediate nodes. Those nodes have to forward the request message towards the
destination. Yet, a benign behavior of those intermediate nodes can not always be
assumed. The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack exploits this vulnerability of the DHTs
routing algorithm. Malicious nodes discard or redirect incoming route requests instead
of forwarding them. As a result, the routing mechanism of DHTs and, therefore, the
availability of objects stored in the network are affected by the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack.
Castro et al. [17] introduced an analytical model that describes the effects of
malicious nodes that drop packets on the efficiency of a recursive lookup mechanism.
The packet delivery ratio (σ) is based on the average number of hops (h) per request
and the fraction of malicious nodes (f) (as shown in Equation 2.2).
σ = (1− f)h (2.2)
For example, considering a setting composed of 100.000 nodes that are participating
in a Pastry DHT. The number of average hops (h) is a function of the overall number
of participants as discussed in Section 2.1.3 (see also Equation 2.1). As a result 4.15
hops are required on average to complete a lookup in this scenario. Furthermore,
we assume that 10% of the particpants behaves maliciously (f). As a result of the
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parameters of this setting, less than 65% of the lookups initiated can be completed
successfully according to Equation 2.2.
robustness against incorrect lookup routing attack
The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack strongly affects the routing algorithms and, there-
fore, the availability of the services provided by the DHT. Due to this fact, several
security mechanisms were proposed to increase the network robustness against this
attack.
By enabling the source node of a lookup to determine the route of the request
message directly, malicious behavior of intermediate nodes can be bypassed. Sit and
Morris [99] proposed an iterative routing mechanism that is based on this concept.
Whenever a request message is received by a node, this message must not be for-
warded to a node closer to the destination, but the node has to reply to the source
of this lookup. This reply message includes a set of next hop addresses that can be
used as next hop nodes. Thus, the source node is able to determine an adequate
next hop node and to direct the request to this node. As a result, intermediate nodes
that discard or redirect a request message can be detected easily. Whenever no reply
message or a reply message with a faulty set of addresses (according to the routing
algorithm) is received, malicious behavior can be assumed. Thereafter, the source
node is able to forward the request message to any other node that has been pro-
vided by the previous reply message in order to bypass the malicious node. On the
downside, overhead is generated due to the reply messages sent by intermediate
nodes. Furthermore, a transmission delay is introduced when the network is under
attack, as the source node has to wait for the reply messages for a specific amount
of time. In addition, overhead is generated as request messages have to be resent
whenever a malicious node drops a request. Several other security mechanisms have
been introduced in the recent years that are based on a similar approach. For example,
Myrmic [114] and Sechord [77] harness the source node of a lookup to coordinate
the routing of the request message and to detect misbehavior of intermediate nodes
during the lookup.
Another approach to improve the network robustness is to introduce redundancy
directly to the DHT’s routing mechanism. To this end, the redundant routing mechanism
has been proposed by Castro et al. [17]. When a lookup is initiated, the redundant
mechanism does not send a single request message, but sends multiple messages in
parallel over multiple routes. Due to this mechanism, the probability is increased that
at least a single request is received by the destination, yet overhead in terms of an
increased number of request messages per lookup is generated. In order to improve
the redundant routing algorithm, Srivatsa and Liu [101] analyzed the influence of
independent routing paths on the efficiency of this approach. As a result, disjoint
routes have been identified as an essential requirement for the reliability of this
approach. Otherwise, a single malicious node might be able to drop or misroute every
request in order to deny the lookup functionality. However, in most DHTs independent
routing paths cannot be guaranteed without a high effort. Other approaches, such as,
e.g., HALO [58] or Cyclone [6] are also based on a redundant routing mechanism.
Hildrum and Kubiatowicz [51] combined the redundant with the iterative routing
algorithm. As a result, a parallel and iterative routing mechanism has been introduced.
Each request is sent multiple times on parallel routes. Furthermore, instead of for-
warding the message directly, intermediate nodes have to send reply messages to
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the source. Those messages including a set of next hop nodes. The combination of
the redundant with the iterative routing algorithm results in an increased robustness
against the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Yet, the drawbacks regarding overhead
and delay of both underlying algorithms are inherited by this approach.
Reputation-based mechanisms have been developed to reduce the impact of the
Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Sánchez-Artigas et al. [91] combined the redundant
routing algorithm with a reputation system. The resulting resistant routing mechanism
sends a request message to the next hop node as well as messages to each of the n
neighbors of this node. Each of these nodes forwards the request again to a node
logically closer to destination node and to the n neighbors of that node. Due to this
fact, the request message is not only received by the destination node but also by
the n neighbors of this node. By storing replicas at those neighbors, this algorithm
provides a set of nodes that includes each root of the n replicas as well as the root
of the original object. The reputation system is used in order to reduce the overhead.
Each node in the network monitors the behavior of the virtual neighbors. Whenever
a node is detected as malicious node, this node is neglected during subsequent
lookups. Furthermore, the routing has to be coordinated as otherwise the traffic may
be strongly increased when neighbors forward a request to different nodes (e.g., as a
result of stale routing table entries). Therefore, an iterative approach can be used to
enable the source to coordinate the routing. However, as each node has to forward
n+ 1 request messages at each step of the routing, a high overhead is generated.
Further approaches harness reputation of routes and nodes to determine the most
reliable as routing path, e.g., the Higher-Reputated Neighbor Selection [92], the Exclusion
Routing Protocol [87]. Another routing mechanism harnesses social links to provide
more reliable lookups [73].
related topics in the area of mobile ad hoc networks
Also MANETs have to rely on intermediate nodes during routing and during data
transmission. Thus, similar routing attacks such as the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
can be performed on those networks. As a result, multiple security mechanisms have
been introduced in recent years that improve the robustness of P2P systems against
routing and forwarding attacks.
A very promising approach has been introduced by Marti et al. [72]. The WatchDog
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is able to detect routing attacks in MANETs. As-
suming bidirectional wireless links, each node in a wireless network receives every
message sent by their geographical neighbors. WatchDog harnesses those overheard
messages to detect misbehavior. After a node A has sent a message to an interme-
diate node B, this node has to forward the message towards destination. However,
a malicious node may either modify or drop the message. By using this intrusion
detection system, the sender of the message (node A) has to monitor each message
that is sent by the intermediate node B. Due to this fact, both cases of misbehavior
can be detected by node A. Whenever either no message has been forwarded within
a specific amount of time or the message differs from the initially sent message,
a malicious behavior can be assumed. Yet, when the message has been forwarded
correctly to node C, node B has to monitor node C unless this node is the destination
of the message.
Marti et al. proposed to use information regarding detected misbehaving nodes
during routing. Due to this reputation based routing mechanism, malicious nodes
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should be avoided. WatchDog has been evaluated in a testbed by Buchegger et al.
[16]. As a result, Buchegger et al. were able to show that WatchDog can be used
to detect maliciously behaving nodes in a real wold scenario. However, WatchDog
has been developed for MANETs only and therefore provides a reliable detection of
malicious nodes within the underlay. As the mechanism is based on IP address solely,
no detection of malicious behavior in the overlay can be provided.
2.2.4 Forged Lookup Replies
Besides dropping lookup requests, reply messages can also be forged by malicious
intermediate nodes. When a lookup for an object is initiated, the source of this lookup
is unaware of the root node’s overlay identifier. Castro et al. [17] introduced an attack
that exploits the unawareness of the source about the virtual distance between object
and root node. Therefore, each malicious node that is numerically closer to the overlay
identifier of the object than the source node itself is able to claim to be the root. As
a result, the malicious node is able forge a reply message. This message may either
include a faulty object or may claim that the requested object or service is not available
in the network. This affects the availability of the services and objects provided by the
system.
mechanisms for destination validation
Some few mechanisms have been proposed in the recent years that are able to detect
forged reply messages in P2P scenarios. The most promising approaches are surveyed
in the following paragraphs.
In order to validate received reply messages, Castro et al. [17] proposed the Routing
Failure Test. Castro assumes that the node identifiers are equally distributed in the
identifier space. Therefore, and due to the overall low number of maliciously behaving
nodes, the Routing Failure Test is able to detect a forged reply message. This promising
approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.5.
Wang et al. introduced the DHT routing mechanism Myrmic [114]. Myrmic harness
certificates to certify the identifier-space, a node maintains. Due to those certificates,
forged lookup messages can be simply detected. Yet, in order to provide those certifi-
cates, a Neighborhood Authority is required. Whenever this entity is not available,
new nodes cannot join the network.
An other approach introduced by Ganesh and Zaho [30] stores certificates of
nodes that are participating in the DHT at so called proof managers. Whenever
malicious behavior is assumed, the proof manager of the determined destination node
is contacted in order to receive the information whether or not the node has behaved
maliciously. This approach introduces overhead whenever a node either joins the
network and certifies itself at the according proof manager and whenever a malicious
behavior is assumed.
2.2.5 Storage and Retrieval Attack
Even after a successfully completed routing process, a lookup may still fail due to a
maliciously behaving root node. This node may perform a Storage and Retrieval Attack
[99] and deny the access to the requested object. As it is hard to distinguish between
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unavailable and denied objects during a lookup, most P2P systems are not inherently
able to detect this attack. The efficiency of this attack depends directly on the fraction
of malicious nodes, since in the general case objects are equally distributed on the
nodes in the network.
The impact of the Storage and Retrieval Attack can be strongly reduced by distributing
copies of each object (replicas) in the network. As a result of the object replication, an
object can only be denied when the root of the object as well as each root of every
replica behaves maliciously. However, several approaches were introduced in recent
years providing replicas to MANET and DHT networks. In the following, the most
prominent approaches for replicas are introduced.
replica distribution in peer-to-peer systems
Replication mechanisms developed for DHTs are highly structured but mostly un-
aware of the geographical location of the distributed replicas. Basic mechanisms as
proposed by Castro et al. [17] or Rowstron et al. [89] store replicas at the virtual
neighbors of the root node. This is further used by several previously mentioned
mechanisms, e.g., Sánchez-Artigas et al.’s resistant routing. Other replication mech-
anisms distribute the replicas within the identifier space according to a specific
algorithm. Harvesf and Blough [48] [49] proposed to distribute the replicas equally
in the overlay. This results in disjoint routing paths for each of the replicas in, e.g.,
tree-based architectures. A similar approach has further been introduced by Ghodsi et
al. [32]. Also few location aware replication mechanisms such as replica enumeration
[10] were proposed, which distributes replicas in the network. Whenever an object
has to be downloaded, probes are sent in order to determine the replica that is located
geographically close to the requesting node.
replica distribution in mobile ad hoc networks
Replication mechanisms developed for MANETs often harness the structure of the
underlay to distribute replicas. Therefore, a basic awareness of the geographical
location of replicas is harnessed to optimize the replication mechanism. Hara [44]
proposed a MANET replication mechanism that harness the access frequency of
objects to allocate a replicas and to determine the number of required replicas.
This approach has been introduced in order to prevent data loss due to network
partitioning and to improve the network performance. The mechanism that has
been initially proposed by Hara neglected the update functionality of the replicas.
Therefore, Hara proposed a static update function in [45] and a dynamic update
function in [46]. Furthermore, Hara et al. [47] optimized the metrics by including the
correlation of the objects. In order to ensure that a replica in a MANET is within a
specific distance to each node in the network, Tamori et al. [106] proposed a replica
distribution scheme which is based on a fixed distance between two replicas of
the same object. The distance is defined by the hop count. A similar approach was
proposed by [55]. Most of the replication mechanisms developed for MANETs are
unstructured and often require a flooding based mechanism to distribute new objects.
Yet, some few replication schemes are controlled at the application layer, e.g., the
mechanism proposed by Bellavista et al. [12] [13]. This approach uses a replication
manager that was selected in a decentralized way, which coordinates the replication
mechanism. Yet, overhead is introduced due to the selection of a manager and the
management of replicas.
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2.2.6 Summary Related Work in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Security
In this section, basic definitions and goals in the area of network security have been
provided. These foundations can be regarded as universally valid and, therefore, have
to be considered in MP2P scenarios.
Few mechanisms have already been proposed to increase an MP2P system’s ro-
bustness against a wide range of different attacks. Yet, routing attacks that affect the
availability of objects and services have not been investigated by now. However, a high
availability is an essential requirement for MP2P systems, especially when considering
scenarios such as disaster relief. Therefore, three prominent routing attacks have been
discussed in this section that are able to negatively affect the networks functionality
strongly.
The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack has been introduced as major threat to the
lookup mechanism. As a result of this attack, request messages are discarded or
redirected. The second attack introduced in this chapter is based on forging reply
messages. As a result, the source node either receives a faulty object or no object at
all. The last attack, discussed in this section is based on a malicious root node. This
root node denies the requested object. Moreover, security mechanisms proposed for
P2P systems and MANETs have been surveyed.
However, it is unclear whether these mechanisms satisfy the requirements of an
MP2P system. Therefore, these mechanisms have to be reviewed in the light of MP2P
scenarios. If the findings of this review indicate that the existing mechanisms do not
suffice to ensure a robust MP2P system, novel security mechanisms are required that
are adapted to the challenges introduced by the MP2P scenario.

3
A C L U S T E R E D M O B I L E P E E R - T O - P E E R A R C H I T E C T U R E
»I begin with an idea and then it becomes something else.«
— Pablo Picasso
Nowadays, most mobile communication devices, e.g., smart phones, are able tocommunicate with each other via an 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks
(WLAN) standard. Furthermore, those devices are generally able to locate their
geographical position by using the Global Positioning System (GPS). Due to this
technical progress, location-aware decentralized mobile communication architectures
are enabled.
MP2P systems are based on these technologies. These systems operate in a de-
centralized manner and do not have to rely on a predefined infrastructure. Due
to these characteristics and as they enable a mobile, wireless communication, those
systems may be used in wide range of application scenarios. This includes challenging
scenarios as disaster relief, where the previously mentioned characteristics are highly
required. The MP2P system can be used as a communication platform and is able to
provide storage and retrieval services.
In the previous chapter, related work and basic foundations have been discussed.
The results have shown that even though multiple MP2P systems have been developed
in recent years, only few harness location awareness. Furthermore, existing approaches
either require central entities to manage node mobility or are based on a landmarking
system (see also Chapter 2.1.4).
In this chapter, Clustered Pastry an clustered, location aware MP2P system is
introduced that has been developed in the context of this thesis [39]. First, challenges
that have to be considered in a disaster relief scenario are introduced in the first part
of this chapter. Thereafter, the underlying concepts and the resulting structure of our
system are discussed in detail. Based on these details, the algorithms and components
of the MP2P system are defined. Once, those basic components have been selected, the
implementation details of the previously introduced concept are described extensively.
This chapter concludes with a summary of our Clustered Pastry’s system’s structure
and a discussion of the benefits of this system.
3.1 scenario
The first step in designing our Cluster Pastry system is to outline the application
scenario and the resulting challenges. The findings of this analysis can be used to
develop a novel concept that is adapted to the needs and requirements of a mobile,
wireless, and decentralized MP2P system.
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3.1.1 Disaster Relief Scenario
In this thesis we focuses on communication in disaster relief scenarios. A disaster
is defined by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) of the United
Nations as follows:
»A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread
human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of
the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.«
— ISDR [54]
As disasters »exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using
its own resources«, external help in terms of emergency services is required. These
emergency services include first responding units.
As the coordination of these units at a disaster site is essential, a reliable commu-
nication platform is required [109]. This includes, beyond voice communication, the
distribution and availability of information [22] as data about the affected area, maps
[27] or medical issues [19]. Furthermore, the amount of data, which is gathered during
a relief operation, increases vastly [27]. Therefore, a reliable storage mechanism is
required in order to ensure the availability of this information.
In most disaster relief scenarios, multiple organizations such as, firefighters, medical
units or the police have to cooperate[109]. As a result of this situation, a communica-
tion beyond the boundaries of these different agencies is required [9]. Furthermore,
a mission report of a recent large scale disaster [22] indicates that an easy to de-
ploy on demand communication platform may be beneficial to ensure a reliable
communication already in the first hours of the relief operation.
Due to the scenario, we have to assume that at least a part of the participating units
are mobile [8]. Therefore, the communication system has to cope with mobile devices.
Moreover, when considering a worst case scenario, a disaster may result in a strongly
damaged disaster site. Therefore, the infrastructure (including the communication
infrastructure) of this affected area may be damaged or completely destroyed. In
any case, the functionality of the wireless infrastructure based systems as cellular
networks cannot be assumed [60]. As the first responding units have to operate at the
disaster site, they may be affected as well by rough environment that has resulted
due to the disaster. As a result, the communication devices may get damaged. Thus,
single points of failure must be avoided as otherwise the communication platform
may be unusable when only a few devices get damaged.
Due to this scenario, a system is required that satisfies multiple requirements.
This includes mobile, robust, decentralized, and infrastructureless characteristics.
Moreover, this system has to be available on demand.
3.2 concept of our mobile peer-to-peer system
These requirements can be met by a combination of a MANET underlay and a P2P
overlay. Both architectures are completely decentralized and are, therefore, able to
operate on demand as they are not based on a predefined infrastructure. Furthermore,
both systems are able to provide functionality even when single node fails. By
combining those two systems, an MP2P system is built. This system inherits the
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benefits of both underlying systems and, due to the MANET underlay, is further
completely mobile. In summary, an MP2P system suffice the requirements introduced
by the previously discussed disaster relief scenario.
However, the MANET underlay and the P2P overlay were not developed to be
used as a combined system. Thus, new challenges arise and, therefore, the resulting
system has to be adapted in order to operate efficiently. These challenges as well as
an adapted design concept to overcome those challenges are discussed in the rest of
this section.
3.2.1 Challenges
Traditional P2P systems are based on a network of static nodes such as desktop PCs
that provide, e.g., file-sharing or text and voice-chat functionality. In most cases a
large amount of data like video files or audio streams are distributed among peers
in those networks. Furthermore, a large number of participants is assumed (more
than 10,000 nodes) that are distributed around the world and are connected via the
Internet. Due to these characteristics, the goals of static P2P systems are focused on
providing decentralized services, load balancing, network robustness, and enabling
network scalability.
However, most MP2P architectures were developed in the context of completely
different scenarios. When combined with a MANET, the number of participants is
strongly limited due to the characteristics of the underlay. Instead of hundreds of
thousand nodes, only a few hundred nodes are feasible due to bandwidth limitations
and the overhead generated as a result of the multi-hop communication. However,
scenarios considered in this thesis meet those limitations. First response scenarios are
limited in most cases to approximately a hundred [7] in medium scale and only rarely
up to a thousand participants in large scale scenarios such as the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center in New York [60]. Yet, not every unit is equipped with a com-
munication device. Furthermore, the deployment area is rather geographically small
compared to traditional P2P networks, which connect nodes around the world and
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provides services as file sharing [83] or video streaming [122]. As the first responding
teams operate within an area that is predefined by the disaster site, the deployment
area can be assumed as static. In addition, we have to assume mobile nodes such as
smartphones or notebooks instead of static desktop computers. However, the node
mobility depends on the specific characteristics of the scenario. While the average
node speed is high in vehicular networks, first responding scenarios introduce a
rather low node speed (when neglecting vehicles). Furthermore, we assume that it
is more likely that text files such as status reports or medical information or small
pictures of causalities are stored within an MP2P network due to the characteristics of
the scenario. As a result, the goals of MP2P architectures do not focus on scalability
issues or load balancing but rather on the availability of stored objects. However,
we assume that network robustness is even more important in the context of MP2P
systems as, due to the mobility and the wireless channel, network partitioning may
occur.
Furthermore, security challenges arise due to the combination of the underlying
systems. Those have to be solved in order to ensure that the networks services can
be provided in a reliable way. However, this topic will be discussed in depth in the
ensuing chapters.
3.2.2 Design Concept
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3 DHTs use unique identifiers to address nodes within
the overlay. Those identifiers are randomly generated. Thus, it can be ensured that
the identifiers of the nodes are distributed uniformly in the identifier space. This
provides on one hand robustness against lookup and retrieval attacks. The node
identifier also defines which objects a node has to maintain. When a node is able
to choose its own identifier, this node would also be able to choose the objects it is
responsible for. As a result, an object can be denied by a malicious node with little
effort. On the other hand, load balancing in the network is assured due to randomly
generated overlay identifiers. As long as the identifiers of nodes and objects are
uniformly distributed in the namespace, the traffic due to storage and retrieval of
objects is also uniformly distributed on nodes in the network. However, in the context
of MP2P systems, randomly, distributed node identifiers introduce several drawbacks.
On one hand, the virtual neighborhood of a node would be uniformly distributed
in the deployment area. As a result, update messages that are required to provide
fresh routes to the virtual neighbors have to be sent over multiple underlay hops
in medium and large scale scenarios. On the other hand, the traffic generated by a
lookup is affected whenever node identifiers are generated randomly in an MP2P
system. In order to complete a lookup successfully, intermediate nodes are required
to forward the request message to the destination. Due to randomly generated node
identifiers, those intermediate nodes are uniformly distributed in the deployment
area. Therefore, a request message may have to be sent across the deployment area
even when the destination is geographically close to the source of the lookup as
shown in Figure 6 on the previous page.
During a lookup, a request message is generated and forwarded according to
the DHT’s routing algorithm. As a result, the message is getting logically closer
to its destination with each hop. By harnessing the geographical position of the
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nodes during the generation of their identifiers, their geographical location can be
mapped on their virtual location in the namespace of the overlay identifier. As a
result, with each hop a lookup message is forwarded to a node that is logically
but also geographically closer to the destination. Therefore, the average number of
underlay hops per lookup can be strongly reduced. An example for this geographically
adapted lookup is shown in Figure 7. Furthermore, as all virtual neighbors are as
well geographical neighbors, the traffic generated due to the maintaining links to
those virtual neighbors (as required by several DHTs) is strongly reduced. However,
as mobile nodes were assumed, the node identifiers have to be adapted whenever a
node is moving in the deployment area. In order to adapt this approach to a mobile
scenario, it seems to be more promising to harness a geographical area instead of
the specific location of a node to define the overlay identifier. As long as the node
is within this area, the node identifier does not have to be adapted. Yet, as multiple
nodes may join the same geographical area, the node identifier must not be only a
function of the location but has to be a combination of a randomly generated and a
location based identifier. Each of those geographical areas are attached to a specific
virtual area within the identifier-namespace of the DHT. Those areas, that maps the
virtual structure of the overlay to the geographical area are henceforth called clusters.
As a result, nodes within such a cluster are both virtual as well as geographical
neighbors. Furthermore, the arrangement of the clusters is also crucial as adjacent
clusters have to be mapped to adjacent areas in the virtual namespace.
Due to the dynamic topology, it can be assumed that the routing tables of the MP2P
system become obsolete frequently. On demand updates as proposed by several DHTs
is, therefore, not feasible in the context of an MP2P scenario.
Thus, periodical routing tables updates are required to ensure the freshness of
the stored entries even in a highly dynamic scenario. Otherwise, a high fraction
of outdated routing table entires could affect the efficiency of the MP2P system.
Furthermore, to ensure the availability of objects even when single nodes leave the
network or are temporary unavailable due to the dynamic topology of the underlay,
replicas are required.
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3.3 underlying systems and architecture
Our Clustered Pastry system inherits the major characteristics of the underlying
protocols and algorithms. In particular, the MANET underlay and the P2P overlay
protocol have a strong influence on the resulting system, even though those underlying
protocols have to be adapted according to the requirements and challenges of the
decentralized mobile environment. Furthermore, the way of how to integrate those
protocols into the MP2P system has a major influence on the characteristics and the
efficiency of the resulting Clustered Pastry system.
In this section, merit and flaws of available underlying protocols are discussed. As
a result of this section, we define essential design components of our Clustered Pastry
system.
3.3.1 Mobile Ad hoc Underlay
The underlay enables the communication between the peers in the network. Therefore,
a MANET routing protocol is required to establish routes between participating
nodes. As stated before, a MANET underlay provides less resources in terms of
bandwidth compared to the traditional underlay of a P2P network (the Internet).
However, the available bandwidth as well as the reliability of the provided underlay
services depend partially on the underlay protocol (as shown by Seither et al. [95] in
an exemplary way). Due to this fact, the underlay routing protocol has a high impact
on the efficiency of the resulting Clustered Pastry system.
As discussed in Section 2.1.2 many MANET routing protocols have been developed
in the last decade. Most of those architectures have been evaluated theoretically or by
simulation only. As shown by [70] and [38] even the efficiency and reliability of well-
known protocols as AODV is degraded when used in realistic testbed environments
due to effects, that had been neglected by the simulator based evaluations. OLSR is
one of the few routing protocols that has been evaluated in real world scenarios. This
protocol has been used as communication substrate in a disaster management exercise
as part of the DUMBO [57] project and by the Freifunk network [1] to provide Internet
connectivity to households that are disconnected from the wired Internet. Especially
when used in combination with a link quality based metric as ETX [23], fairly reliable
transmissions can be achieved compared to hop based protocols as AODV. Yet, lost or
dropped messages have still to be considered due to the characteristics of the wireless
channel. Furthermore, due to the periodically sent hello messages, each node that uses
OLSR is aware of nodes that are within transmission range.
Therefore, OLSR ETX is used as underlay routing protocol for this novel Clustered
Pastry system. Yet, this system can be adapted with little effort to use other underlay
routing protocol including reactive protocols, e.g., AODV or DSR [56].
3.3.2 Peer-to-Peer Overlay
The overlay provides services as storing, retrieving, and maintaining objects in a
decentralized way. Due to the MANET underlay and the clustered structure of the
resulting Clustered Pastry system, the following three requirements arise for the
MP2P overlay. (I) The routing algorithm of the P2P system has to be adaptable to the
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location aware structure of the network. Otherwise, the MP2P system cannot benefit
from the geographical location of the participating nodes. Furthermore, (II) the traffic
generated by the overlay has to be minimized due to the bandwidth limitations of
the MANET underlay. This includes traffic introduced by the lookup mechanisms
as well as traffic due to routing table maintenance. Finally, we assume that each
node provides the same resources. Therefore, (III) no centralized or semi-centralized
entities are available in the MP2P network. In the following paragraphs, we determine
on which P2P system the overlay of our MP2P is based on.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, two basic P2P architectures, structured and unstruc-
tured, have been proposed that enable these services. Unstructured P2P systems can
further be classified according to their architecture in centralized, pure and hybrid
P2P systems. Centralized systems do not fit the requirements of our scenario as
they require a central entity, that has to be available in order to use the services
provided by the network. However, pure P2P systems do not require a predefined
infrastructure and, therefore, can also be deployed in mobile, decentralized scenarios,
e.g., disaster relief. As a result, they seem to be more promising when considering an
MP2P system. Yet, these approaches harness a flooding based routing mechanism.
This results in a high signaling overhead whenever a lookup is initiated [103]. Due
to the limited bandwidth introduced by the underlay, traffic overhead has to be
minimized. Therefore, pure P2P based overlays are not considered for developing an
MP2P system in this thesis. Considering hybrid P2P architectures, lookup request
messages have to be sent solely to the superpeers. As a result, no flooding is required
and, therefore, overhead induced by the lookup mechanism can be strongly reduced
[5]. Thus, hybrid systems satisfy most of the previously discussed requirements for
MP2P overlays. Yet, a structured system is preferred in the context of this thesis, as
DHTs neither have to rely on a costly flooding based routing mechanism, nor require
highly available semi-centralized entities as superpeers [103].
Most DHTs provide a similar functionality and are comparable in their basic
design as well. At the first glance, a CAN based overlay seems to be promising for a
geographically structured architecture. As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3 CAN is based
on a hypercube structure. By using a two dimensional namespace CAN could be
harnessed to map the geographical area directly on the virtual namespace. However,
this approach introduces several drawbacks. As nodes were not only mapped directly
to a point in the virtual space but also to an area, leaving or joining nodes would
also affect the node identifiers of adjacent nodes. Therefore, the required updates of
the overlay identifiers would result in additional traffic overhead. Furthermore, the
efficiency of a CAN system depends directly on the dimensions of the hypercube
structured namespace. A two dimensional CAN provides, therefore, only a strongly
limited efficiency.
The hybrid Pastry DHT on the other hand does not provide a direct mapping
of coordinates to overlay identifiers. Yet, this architecture can be adapted by using
geographical coordinations of a node during ID generation. In addition, Pastry
satisfies the three requirements discussed earlier and introduces multiple benefits, that
can be harnessed in order to develop an efficient location aware MP2P architecture.
• Pastry uses a prefix based routing algorithm. With each overlay hop, another
prefix digit is matched and, therefore, the virtual distance to destination is
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Figure 8: Layer model of the Clustered Pastry approach
reduced. This can be exploited to provide a location aware MP2P routing
mechanism as will be discussed in the following section.
• The parameter b specifies the size of Pastry’s routing tables. Therefore, the
number of routing table entries can be easily adapted to a specific scenario. Due
to this fact, the structure of the routing table does not have to be modified in
order to influence the number of routing table entries and the resulting traffic
due to update messages.
• Due to the structure of Pastry, no centralized or semi-centralized nodes are
required.
• Pastry maintains a leaf set that stores links to virtual neighbors. Those virtual
neighbors are crucial in order to provide reliable lookup services. In the con-
text of a location aware architecture, virtual neighbors are also geographical
neighbors. As a result, this routing table can be efficiently maintained with low
effort.
• Multiple MP2P systems have been developed recently that are based on Pastry.
As security mechanisms for the resulting MP2P system are developed in the
second part of this thesis, the probability is increased that those mechanisms
can be adapted to other MP2P systems that are based on Pastry.
As a result, we use Pastry as substrate to develop the overlay of our Clustered Pastry
system. However, the clustered design concept can also be used in the combination
with other overlay architectures.
3.3.3 Mobile Peer-to-Peer Architecture
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.4, three basic groups of MP2P systems exists (integrated,
layered, and cross-layered MP2P systems). Layered MP2P systems are limited in their
degree of adaptation to the challenges that arise when combining a MANET underlay
with a DHT overlay. The overlay is not able to benefit from the information that could
be provided by the underlay due to layering. Only minor modifications in the overlay
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may be applied in order to reduce the traffic overhead and to ensure the availability
of the provided services.
On the other hand, integrated MP2P systems combine the overlay and the underlay
protocols at a single layer. As a result, those MP2P systems are able to harness location
based or overheard information to improve their routing and update functionality.
Therefore, integrated MP2P systems are very efficient. Yet, due to the combination of
underlay and overlay at a single layer, the underlying protocols have to be strongly
adapted. Due to this fact, the algorithms of integrated MP2P systems can vary widely
regarding the implementation of the routing and lookup algorithm. Thus, mechanisms
that are developed to increase the robustness of a specific integrated system can
(mostly) not be deployed to increase the robustness of any other MP2P systems.
Therefore, this novel MP2P system is based on a cross-layered architecture. Due
to cross layering, the overlay benefits from information provided by the underlay.
Yet, overlay and underlay protocols are implemented at separate layers. As a result,
underlay and/or overlay protocols may be replaced by other protocols in order to
match the requirements of a specific scenario with little effort. Furthermore, security
mechanisms developed for a cross layered MP2P system can mostly be used in
combination with other MP2P systems.
In summary, a cross-layered architecture enables the overlay to exploit information
provided by the underlay. Furthermore, both of the underlying protocols can be
replaced when required by the scenario. Therefore, they combine the benefits of the
layered and integrated architectures. Due to this fact, we will develop our Clustered
Pastry system based on a cross-layered architecture.
3.3.4 Layer Model of the Clustered Mobile Peer-to-Peer Approach
After discussing the basic overlay and underlay protocols, that are used as underlying
architecture for our Clustered Pastry system, a basic layer model can be built. As
shown in Figure 8 the underlay is built on top of an 802.11 standard [3] that defines
both, the geographical as well as the data link layer. 802.11 is a set of standards that
is widely used for wireless communication and includes, e.g. 802.11g or 802.11n.
However, MP2P systems can be used as well in combination with other underlying
wireless technologies, e.g., Bluetoooth [14]. Furthermore, the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) [82] is used as transport layer protocol. UDP is a connectionless, message-
oriented protocol that does neither provide congestion control mechanisms nor
manages packet retransmissions. Therefore, this has to be handled at the application
layer by the MP2P system. Due to the layering concept discussed in previous section,
cross layering between the underlay (network layer) and the overlay (application layer)
is required.
3.4 structure of the clustered pastry system
Overlay identifiers are used to determine the virtual distance between the nodes in a
structured P2P network. This virtual distance is harnessed during the overlay routing
to select the next hop node. As a result, the overlay identifier assignment directly
affects the route of a request message. Therefore, the adapted identifier allocation
method as well as the influence of mobility on these overlay identifiers are discussed
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Figure 9: Clustering the deployment area in 2, 4 and 16 clusters
in the following section extensively. Furthermore, the structure of the overlay identifier
is introduced and discussed.
3.4.1 Clustering
As mobile nodes have to be considered in a disaster relief scenario, mapping the
overlay identifiers to the exact geographical position of a node introduces a major
challenge. Whenever a node is leaving its position due to mobility, the overlay
identifier has to be adapted. The resulting updates of routing tables and redistribution
of stored objects introduce a high traffic overhead. Therefore, it is more beneficial
to harness the rough area a node is located in for generating the overlay identifier.
This results in a static overlay identifier as long as the node is located in the same
geographical area, being called henceforth a cluster.
Pastry and, therefore, the novel MP2P system uses a prefix-based routing algorithm.
Therefore, the first significant digits of an overlay identifier do not only affect the
virtual position of a node in the namespace, but are also crucial for the systems
routing mechanism. Due to this fact, the prefixes of the overlay identifiers are used
to map a node to a cluster. Each node located in the same cluster has to provide
an overlay identifier with an equal prefix (defined by the cluster) and a randomly
generated suffix.
Considering a disaster relief scenario, it can be assumed that the size of the de-
ployment area is known to the technical operational command. Therefore, this area
can be split in multiple clusters as shown in Figure 9. These clusters may either be
generated automatically based on the deployment area or defined by the operational
command group according to the characteristics of the specific scenario. Furthermore,
the arrangement of these clusters is essential. Neighbor clusters have to provide a
similar prefix. For this reason, it can be assured that the location of the destination is
narrowed down with each hop. For example, consider a node with the prefix 1010
that initiates a routing for a node with the prefix 0000. The first overlay hop would at
least provide a node that matches the first digit. As shown in Figure 10, the whole
right half-plane of the deployment area can be neglected for the rest of this lookup
after this first hop. After the second hop, at least the first two digits have to match the
destination’s overlay identifier. Hence, the destination node has been narrowed down
to an area that is less or equal to a quarter of the deployment area. For this reason, we
assume that the location aware routing mechanism is able to provide efficient services
in terms hop distance and, therefore, traffic.
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Obviously, the structure of the clusters and the overall number of clusters affects the
MP2P systems routing mechanism and, therefore, the traffic introduced by a lookup.
Both of those characteristics are defined by two parameters, the number of clusters
per level (p) and the number of cluster levels (l). The clusters per level are defined by
the maximum value of the overlay identifiers digits. An identifier that is based on
binary digits would, e.g., result in two clusters per level. Hence, an identifier to the
base of four would result in four clusters per level, a hexadecimal identifier in sixteen
clusters per level and so on. As discussed in Section 2.1.3, the digit size and, therefore,
the number of clusters per level, is defined by the parameter b. On the other hand,
the number of cluster levels depends on the prefix size (sprefix_size) of the overlay
identifier. For each digit of the prefix, another level of clusters is introduced. Due to
this fact, the overall number of clusters (nclusters) is defined by the multiplication of
the number of clusters per level with the cluster level as shown in Equation 3.1. Both,
the parameter b as well as the prefix size further define the structure of the routing
table. Hence, the structure of this table correlates to the structure of the clusters.
nclusters = p ∗ l = 2b ∗ sprefix_size (3.1)
Considering the example shown in Figure 10, a scenario is assumed that is based
on a binary overlay identifier (b = 1) and a prefix size of four digits. In the middle of
this figure, the routing table of the node with the ID prefix 0000 is shown. On the left
side, the resulting number of clusters per level is illustrated. On the right side of this
figure, the resulting levels per cluster are shown. Due to the binary identifier digits,
each routing table row stores two entries only. As p is equal to the number of entries
in a table row, the basic cluster architecture is based on two clusters). According to
the 4 table rows, 4 levels of clusters are required. However, due to the structure of the
routing table, it is not required to provide links to every cluster (as will be discussed
in Section 3.5).
3.4.2 Overlay Identifier
Overlay identifiers are used by DHTs to identify nodes and objects that have been
uploaded to the network. In the following paragraphs, the overlay identifiers as
harnessed by Clustered Pastry are discussed in detail.
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overlay node identifier
Each node in the network is identified by a unique overlay identifier. These node
identifiers are composed of the cluster-based prefix and a randomly generated suffix.
As extensively discussed in the previous paragraph, the prefix is used to harness the
geographic location of a node to optimize the DHTs routing algorithm. The suffix
of the identifier is required to be able to address a specific node within a cluster. In
a worst case scenario, every node is located within the same cluster. Even in such a
scenario, it is essential that node identifiers are unique. Therefore, the size of the suffix
must be sufficient large in order to ensure a collision free distribution of identifiers.
Pastry uses overlay identifiers with a size of 128 bits by default. Thus, up to 2128
addresses are available and the probability that the identifiers of two nodes are equal
is quite low (e.g., less than 0.0001 % in a scenario with 1.000.000 peers). However,
those identifiers are included in every lookup request or update message. Therefore,
the identifier size has to be scaled down in order to reduce overhead generated by
those messages. Yet, the size of the overlay identifier has still to be large enough to
ensure a collision free distribution of overlay identifiers. Due to this fact, we defined
an overlay identifier with the overall size (including prefix and suffix) of 32 bits. As
we assume a decreased number of participants in our MP2P scenarios, the probability
of a collision is still below 0.005 % considering a scenario with 200 nodes, a suffix size
of 30 bits, and a prefix size of 2 bits.
Whenever a node leaves a cluster, the node identifier has to be adapted. Therefore,
at least the prefix of the node ID has to match the new cluster’s prefix. However, the
suffix itself may not be modified, but can be constant. Furthermore, the routing tables
of the node that has changed its identifier as well as the routing tables of those nodes
that have stored a link to this node have to be updated.
Clustered Pastry may further harness context awareness, when required. Therefore,
an extended identifier may be used in order to define the nodes affiliation. This
identifier adds further digits between the prefix and the suffix. Those digits can be
used to identify a peer as a member of, e.g., the firefighter or the ambulance. This
extended identifier can be used in combination with the prefix to send an anycast
request to a peer that is within a specific cluster and provides specific services. An
example scenario could include the detection of a nearby (within the same cluster)
ambulance when medical services are required. However, due to the affiliation based
extension of the node identifier, the overall size of this identifier may have to be
increased in order to prevent collisions.
overlay object identifier
Beside nodes, also objects are identified by unique 32 bit overlay identifiers. As
proposed by the Pastry DHT, object identifiers in Clustered Pastry are generated by
hashing the objects name. Each objects is, thereafter, stored at a node that is virtually
closest to the object identifier. However, in the Clustered Pastry system, an object
is always stored within the cluster that provides the same prefix than the object’s
identifier. Within this cluster, the node that is logically closest to the overlay identifier
has to maintain this object.
For example, we assume that an object with the identifier 10111 has to be stored in
the MP2P network and two nodes are available in the virtual neighborhood of the
objects identifier. Node A has the same prefix and has the identifier 10100. Node B
with the identifier 11000 is logically closer to the object but differs in the prefix. Due
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Figure 11: Node mobility and the resulting adaptation of identifiers with and without
threshold areas
to Pastry’s routing mechanism, the object would be stored at node B as this node is
the logically closest node to the object. Clustered Pastry stores this object at node
A as this node shares the same prefix and is the node that is logically closest to the
object in this cluster.
However, in order to harness location awareness, object identifiers may also use
the prefix of the cluster, they are attached to. For this reason, e.g., sensor information
about a specific area may be directly stored within this area as most probable this
information will be requested from a node within this cluster. Yet, we consider
the location awareness regarding the object’s position as optional. Therefore, this
functionality will not be evaluated within this thesis.
threshold area
Nodes have to adapt their overlay identifier whenever they leave and/or join a cluster.
Even though, those nodes do not leave nor join the network but are only changing
their cluster, the resulting effects on the network are similar to those resulting from
churn. Routing tables have to be updated that provide links to the changing node as
well as the routing table of this node itself. Furthermore, objects that are stored at
the node that is leaving a cluster have to be redistributed. Thus, traffic overhead is
generated whenever a node changes its cluster and, therefore, has to adapt the node
identifier. In order to minimize the resulting traffic overhead, the number of cluster
changes has to be minimized.
Due to mobility, nodes may alternate their cluster and, therefore, their overlay
identifier frequently when they move along the border of two clusters. This results
in an unnecessary traffic overhead as each node identifier may be valid for a very
short amount of time only. An example is shown in Figure 11 on the left side. A node
with the identifier 0100 moves toward and crosses the border. As a result, the node
identifier has to be adapted. While moving along the border, this node changes the
cluster two more times within a short amount of time, each resulting in overhead due
to adapting the node’s identifier, updating the routing tables, and the redistribution
of stored objects. In order to avoid such an unnecessary traffic overhead, threshold
areas are introduced. Whenever a node crosses the border between two clusters, this
node does not adapt its overlay identifier directly, but only when this node has also
crossed the border’s threshold area. As shown in the example on the right side of
Figure 11, this threshold area is arranged along the clusters border. Even though the
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node in this example crosses three times the border in a row, the identifier is only
adapted when this node leaves the threshold area. For this reason, cluster related
churn and the resulting traffic overhead can be reduced.
The size of these threshold areas depends on several parameters. On one hand, the
size of the clusters and the average node speed has to be considered when defining the
threshold area. When assuming highly dynamic scenarios, e.g., in vehicular networks,
large scale threshold areas are required. However, when these areas are too large,
nodes may lose the connection to their virtual neighbors. This may result in stale
leaf sets as these are updated via a direct connection to the virtual neighbors (as
discussed in the next subsection). Therefore, the upper bound of the threshold’s size
is defined by the transmission range of the networks participants. The specific size of
the threshold areas is defined and evaluated in Chapter 4.3.
3.5 routing in the clustered pastry system
The routing mechanism of an MP2P system is essential for the services provided
by the network. Furthermore, this mechanism has a strong impact on the traffic
introduced by the system including traffic due to maintenance and lookups. In this
section, the functionality of Clustered Pastry’s routing mechanism is introduced and
discussed. Furthermore, the required routing tables are discussed in detail and update
mechanisms are introduced.
3.5.1 Routing Tables
Clustered Pastry is based on a Pastry overlay and an OLSR protocol in the underlay.
Both of these underlying architectures require routing tables in order to provide
routing functionality.
The MANET protocol OLSR uses on a single routing table. This table provides
underlay routes to the nodes in the network. Pastry on the other hand is based on
three different routing tables (as discussed in Chapter 2.1.3). Those tables are used
to map overlay identifiers to underlay addresses. However, to meet the challenges
introduced by a mobile, decentralized scenario and due the clustered system, most
of these routing tables have to be adapted. As OLSR is not affected by the clustered
structure of the network at all, only Pastry’s routing tables have to be modified. In
the rest of this section, the required modifications on the overlay routing tables are
discussed.
routing table
Clustered Pastry’s routing table provides links to a set of nodes that are located within
different clusters. This table is prefix-based and tree structured, similar to the routing
table of Pastry (see also Chapter 2.1.3), and is structured as follows:
• Each row n of Clustered Pastry’s routing table provides links to nodes that match
on (n− 1)th prefixes but differ on the nth prefix.
• The number of rows in the routing table is equal to the size of the overlay
identifier’s prefix.
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Figure 12: Example for a virtual neighbor in a clustered environment
• Each column provides a link to nodes that shares the same (n− 1)th prefixes
but are located in different clusters. One entry of each column always refers to
the owner of the routing table.
• The number of required columns per row is defined by the clusters per level.
As a result of those characteristics, the structure and size of the routing table is closely
related to the structure of the clusters.
An example for the structure of a routing table of a node located in the cluster
with the prefix 0000 is shown in Figure 10. Due to the binary structure of the node
identifier, two entries per row are required. As a result of the prefix size of four digits,
four rows are stored within the routing table in this example.
leaf set
The leaf set provides links to nodes that are located in the virtual neighborhood of the
owner of this routing table. As the overlay identifiers are generated as a function of
the geographical position of the nodes, each node in the leaf set is also a geographical
neighbor. However, the ring topology of Pastry’s leaf set may not be beneficial to the
Clustered Pastry’s leaf set. Whenever the virtual neighbor is located within another
cluster, overhead is introduced as links to distant nodes have to be maintained. An
example for a worst case scenario is shown in Figure 12. The virtual neighbor of the
node 0000010 that is located in the upper left cluster is located on the lower right end
of the network. Due to this fact, routing to a virtual neighbor would result in sending
a message through the whole deployment area. Therefore, the structure of the leaf
set is modified to ensure that virtual neighbors are always located within the same
cluster. Furthermore, each cluster forms an own leaf set ring. This ring includes only
nodes that are located in the same cluster. In contrast to Pastry, the leaf set size is not
defined by a fixed parameter, but by the number of nodes in the cluster. As a result,
each node is aware of every other node that is located in the same cluster.
neighborhood set
Beside the leaf set and the routing table, Pastry also provides a table including nodes
that are geographically close. However, this neighborhood set set is not used during
routing. Yet, this set can be used after a node disconnects from the network to provide
a list of bootstrapping nodes. In the context of the Clustered Pastry system, no
neighborhood set is required, as the leaf set does not only provides links to nodes that
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parameter b 1 2 4
columns 2 4 16
Routing table rows 4 2 1
Routing table entries 4 6 15
Average hops 3.00 2.50 1.94
Table 1: The influence of parameter b on the routing table and the routing in a scenario
with 16 clusters
are logically but also geographically close. Therefore, functionality provided by the
neighborhood set can also be provided by the leaf set in a Clustered Pastry system. As the
leaf set is required by the routing mechanism and is able to provide the neighborhood
set’s functionality without introducing further overhead concerning routing table
updates, no neighborhood set is used in the Clustered Pastry system.
number of clusters per level
The number of Clusters per level, defined by the parameter b, strongly affects the
structure of the Clustered Pastry system, as previously discussed. Both, the structure
of the routing tables as well as the number and the arrangement of the clusters in the
network is defined by this parameter. Therefore, the value for the parameter b has to
be chosen wisely.
Pastry’s default value of the parameter b is four. This results in identifier digits
that are based on hexadecimal values. Furthermore, each routing table row provides
16 entries and when considering a Clustered Pastry system, the basic cluster rate
would be 16 clusters per level. However, this also results in 15 addresses per row that
have to be maintained frequently. Yet, considering a scenario with a low value of b,
the number of routing table entries per row and, therefore, the number of required
updates is reduced. However, as also the number of clusters per level is decreased, the
number of levels has to be increased in order to provide the same amount of overall
clusters. This result in an increased average number of overlay hops that are required
for a lookup.
An example for a setting with 16 clusters is shown in Table 1. As previously as-
sumed, the average number of hops is increased whenever the value of the parameter
b has been reduced. However, the number of overall entries, that are required to
provide a routing table in this setting is strongly reduced when using a low value of
b. As those entries have to be updated frequently, the overall traffic generated by a
low value of b is decreased compared to a scenario with a high value of b. Therefore,
and when considering that routing table entries have to be updated repeatedly per
minute while lookups are only initiated every few minutes, the advantages of a low
value of the parameter b outweigh the disadvantages.
In order to minimize the traffic due to routing table updates, Clustered Pastry’s
default value of the parameter b is set to two. As a result of this setting, the overlay
identifier is based on binary digits. Furthermore, the routing tables provide two
columns per row and two clusters are provided per level.
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3.5.2 Updating the Routing Tables
Whenever a node leaves or joins the MP2P network or a cluster, the routing tables
of this node as well as each routing table that provides a link to this node has to be
updated. However, update messages are sent by Pastry only when either a node has
joined the network or as a result of a failed lookup. Updating routing tables as a
part of the bootstrapping mechanism is required in order to provide a valid routing
table to the booting node and to update the leaf set of the virtual neighbors of this
node. Assuming a broken link whenever no reply to a request message is received
is reasonable in a wired network. As messages will be delivered with a very high
probability to the destination node when sent via a wired network, a lost message
mostly indicates that an intermediate node has left the network and, therefore, cannot
anymore be addressed. However, in wireless scenarios, messages may get lost due to
the characteristics of the wireless channel (e.g., as a result of collisions). Furthermore,
an on demand update mechanism as proposed by Pastry is not sufficient, when
considering an MP2P network with a highly dynamic topology. Otherwise, idle nodes
neither sent nor forwarded a message for an extended time interval would not be
able to detect broken links. This would result in stale routing tables and, therefore,
affect the availability of the networks storage and retrieval services. For this reason,
periodic updates are required in order to ensure fresh routes for Clustered Pastry’s
routing tables.
The leaf set is harnessed to determine the precise destination of a request message
during a lookup. Therefore, it is essential that the routing entries that are provided
by this table are valid. This can be assured by maintaining periodic updates. Due
to the clustered structure of the MP2P system, leaf set nodes are located within the
geographical neighborhood of a node. Based on this characteristic, underlay messages
are exploited to update the leaf set in a Clustered Pastry system. Hello messages
are sent periodically by the OLSR protocol in order to detect nodes that are within
transmission range (as mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2). Those messages can be extended
by appending leaf set information including the IP address, the overlay identifier, and
the lifetime of this dataset. Hence, update messages are broadcast every 2 seconds
by every node in the cluster. As a result, a fresh and reliable leaf set is ensured. Yet,
this update mechanism introduces an increased traffic overhead. This will further be
discussed in Chapter 3.5.3.
In order to provide valid routing table entries, each stored link has to be validated
via a periodically sent update message. Whenever a node receives such an update
message, the requested overlay identifier is compared to the own identifier. If these
identifiers match, a reply message is sent in order to validate this routing table entry.
Otherwise, the receiver’s routing table is used to provide a valid node for the requested
table entry. If available, the proposed entry is attached to the message that is replied
to the source node of this update request. However, if either no reply message is
received or the reply message does not contain a valid entry, a virtual neighbor of the
source node is harnessed to update this routing table entry.
Furthermore, the average lifetime of a routing table entry can be extended by har-
nessing the threshold areas. Whenever a node that is located within a threshold area
receives an update request, this node does not reply its own routing information but
the overlay identifier and IP address of another node in this cluster. This information
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can be easily retrieved by using the leaf set. Due to this mechanism, routing entries
that refer to nodes that may change their cluster soon are replaced automatically.
Another challenge is introduced by nodes that join the network at a cluster that is
still empty. Those nodes create their own routing tables by contacting a node that is
located in an adjacent cluster. As part of this bootstrapping procedure, at least the
routing tables of the bootstrapping node as well as the tables of the logically closest
neighbor are updated. However, all other nodes in the network are unaware of this
node. Yet, at least the nodes that are located in the logically closest cluster require
information about the booted node in order to provide routing services. Therefore,
information of newly detected nodes is also broadcast in the cluster via the hello
messages for a limited amount of time.
3.5.3 Reducing the Overhead Introduced by the Update Mechanism
Harnessing the OLSR hello messages to update the leaf set provides periodically
fresh links to virtual neighbors. Even though this is essential for a reliable lookup
mechanism, a high amount of traffic overhead is introduced due to this update
mechanism as each virtual neighbor within this cluster increases the size of the
hello message by 9 bytes. Therefore, we propose multiple mechanisms to reduce the
traffic overhead that has been introduced by the update mechanism in the following
paragraphs. These approaches are either based on adapting the update frequency or
reducing the data amount attached to each hello message.
adapting the update frequency of the leaf set
A straightforward approach to reduce the traffic overhead generated due to the leaf
set updates is based on reducing the update frequency of this routing table. However,
this update frequency depends on the OLSR neighbor detection mechanism and,
therefore, cannot be arbitrarily set. As a result, the leaf set update frequency can only
be raised to a multiple of the frequency of the hello messages. However, in order to
reduce the traffic overhead but also avoid a stale leaf set, the update frequency has to
be selected carefully.
reducing the size of the update messages
Besides reducing the update frequency, the data amount that is attached to the hello
message can also be minimized to reduce the traffic overhead. Either the size of the
data set (including IP address, the overlay identifier and the TTL) per leaf or the
number of attached sets can be reduced.
Each transmitted data set consists of the overlay identifier, the IP address, and
the TTL of a virtual neighbor. Those data sets bear redundancy, as the prefix of the
overlay identifier or the network identifier of the IP address. In order to update the
leaf set, each overlay identifier that is attached to the hello message has to share the
same prefix. As a result, it is sufficient to transmit the identifiers suffix only. On the
other hand, only a limited amount of nodes have to be assumed in an MP2P scenario.
Therefore, a class B IP network (up to 65,534 nodes) is more than sufficient to address
all peers in the network. Due to this fact, neither the leading bits nor the identifier
of the network are required to provide update functionality as every node is located
within the same network. Considering these optimizations, the size of each update
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data set can be reduced by 33 % to 6 bytes when assuming a prefix size of 1 byte.
Furthermore, the overall size of the data sets can be reduced by harnessing data
compression mechanisms. Yet, due to compression, single bit errors during the data
transmission over the lossy wireless channel would not affect a single update set but
in the worst case all sets that have been attached to this hello message. Therefore, no
compression mechainsims are considered in the context of this thesis.
On the other hand, the number of data sets that are attached to hello messages can
be reduced. This can either be done by considering only nodes that have recently
joined or left the cluster or by using gossiping mechanisms. Considering only nodes
for the leaf set update that have recently joined or left this cluster seems to be a
promising approach to reduce the overhead in the network. As only few nodes change
their cluster on average within the update interval, only few data sets have to be
broadcast. However, this approach has two major drawbacks. Nodes that join the
network are no longer able to build their leaf set based on received update messages
but have to contact a node in the cluster. On the other hand, messages may get lost in
a wireless network. Hence, a lost notification would result in outdated leaf sets. Even
worse, those stale leaf sets entries can only be updated with high effort. As a result, it
is not recommended to update the leaf set by only considering nodes that have left or
joined the cluster recently.
However, gossiping can be used to reduce the number of data sets that are transmit-
ted with each hello message. Gossiping is a mechanism often used in, e.g., MANETs
to reduce traffic introduced by the routing mechanism [120] [42] [28]. Whenever a
node receives a message that has to be forwarded via broadcasting, this message is
only transmitted with the probability p. As in most cases multiple nodes have to
broadcast this message that are within the same transmission range, the message is
still distributed efficiently. A similar mechanism can be harnessed in the context of
the MP2P system in order to reduce overhead generated by the update mechanism.
Whenever a hello message has to be sent, each data set is only attached to this message
with the probability p. Also a maximum number of nDS data sets per hello message
can be defined in order to minimize the traffic overhead. This approach is able to
adapt the traffic generated due to the update mechanism to the node density. In a
low density scenario when less than nDS nodes are located in a cluster, the whole
leaf set is attached to the hello message. Yet, in a scenario with high node density,
only a randomly selected fraction of the nodes in the leaf set is attached to the hello
message and hence the traffic generated by the update mechanism is limited. This
makes particular sense as overall traffic is increased in high density networks anyway.
Furthermore, in most cases low density networks provide sufficient bandwidth but
may suffer due to gossiping as the probability for stale routing tables increases when
only few nodes are within direct transmission range.
proximity metric
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Pastry harness a proximity metric when updating the
routing table. Due to the structure of this table, multiple nodes suffice the requirements
of each table’s entry. Therefore, this proximity metric is used to detect those nodes
that are geographically closest to the owner of the table. These nodes are thereafter
stored in the routing table.
This seems to be a promising approach also in the context of MP2P systems. The
proximity awareness of the routing tables would result in preferring links to nodes
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Figure 13: Preferred nodes in a scenario with proximity metric
that are geographically close. Therefore, the average number of underlay hops per
lookup could be reduced. Furthermore, the proximity of a node could be determined
more reliable by using cross layer information from the underlay.
However, the proximity metric introduces three major drawbacks to the Clustered
Pastry system. The proximity metric can be harnessed to (I) increase the impact of
several attacks as will be discussed in detail on Chapter 5.3.4. Furthermore, (II) traffic
overhead is introduced due to the proximity detection mechanism. And (III) the
average lifetime of an entry is reduced due to this metric.
Pastry’s proximity metric determines the distance to a node by harnessing the
round trip time of ICMP messages. Due to this fact, a ping message has to be sent
to each node that is considered as a routing table entry. This would result in high
overhead in a highly dynamic network as each node in the network would have to
contact a large set of nodes frequently.
Furthermore, each node, the routing table refers to, has to be located in a different
cluster. As a result, the nodes preferred by proximity metric would be located close
to the cluster boarder or at the threshold area. Due to this fact, routing table entries
would faster become obsolete. As shown in Figure 13 the node that is two hops away
from the routing table owner may be located geographically close to the cluster border.
Therefore, this node may leave its cluster soon and, as a result, the routing table entries
that refer to this node become obsolete.
Due to the drawbacks mentioned in the previous paragraphs, no proximity metric
is used in the context of our Clustered Pastry MP2P system. Whenever multiple nodes
are available that fulfill the requirements of the same table entry, the more recent link
is preferred.
3.5.4 Routing Algorithm
The routing algorithm of Clustered Pastry is similar to that of the Pastry DHT. But
as explained before they differ on the structure of the used routing tables. Clustered
Pastry’s routing table provides links to nodes that are located in other clusters and,
therefore, this table can only be used for inter-cluster routing. When a lookup request
has reached the cluster of the destination node, the leaf set is used for intra-cluster
routing.
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Based on these observations, the lookup mechanism works as follows: When a
lookup is initiated, the local leaf set has to determine whether the requesting node
or a virtual neighbor that is located in the same cluster is the destination of this
lookup. If so, the lookup is completed or can be completed with a single overlay hop,
respectively. Otherwise, the routing table is used to determine a node that matches
at least a digit more of the destinations prefix. Thereafter, the request is forwarded.
The next overlay hop node, which receives this request, also looks up its leaf set in
order to determine whether the destination of the request can be found within its
cluster. Otherwise, the request is, once again, forwarded to a node that matches at
least one more prefix digit of the destinations overlay identifier. This is repeated until
the request is received by the destination node.
However, as MP2P systems have to use a lossy wireless channel packets may get
lost during transmission as a result of, e.g., collisions. As the UDP transport layer
protocol does not support retransmissions, retransmissions have to be initiated and
handled by the application itself. In order to increase the reliability of the lookup
mechanism, acknowledge messages to the previous overlay hop are sent whenever a
request message is received by a node. However, when an acknowledge message is
not received within a specific time, it is assumed that the packet has been lost and the
message is retransmitted. Yet, each node is only allowed to retransmit a request twice.
Otherwise request messages would be flooded in the network whenever a node is
temporary unavailable and, therefore, unable to reply an acknowledge message.
3.6 nodes and objects
This section provides information on how nodes join and leave the network and
mechanisms used to store objects in the network. Also the resulting maintenance of
objects due to bootstrapping of nodes and churn is discussed.
3.6.1 Storing, maintaining and Retrieving Objects in a Mobile Peer-to-Peer Network
MP2P systems as considered in this thesis provide storage and retrieval services of
data objects. In this subsection, we describe the mechanisms that are required to store,
maintain, and retrieve objects in the network.
store and retrieve objects
In order to store an object in a Clustered Pastry MP2P network, the object overlay
identifier has to be generated in a first step. After the generation of a new object
identifier, a lookup for this novel object identifier is initiated by the node that provides
this object in order to determine the root node (the node that is logically closest to
the object). After receiving a reply message of the root, the object is transmitted and
stored at the root node. According to the replication mechanism, multiple other steps
may be necessary in order to distribute replicas in the network (as discussed in the
next paragraph and as well in Chapter 6.1).
In order to retrieve an object, the overlay identifier of the object has to be determined
by hashing the objects name. Based on this identifier a lookup for the root node is
initiated. After receiving a reply from this node, the object can be downloaded directly.
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basic replication
When objects are stored at a single node only, data may get lost when this node leaves
the network spontaneously. Therefore, a basic replication mechanism is required to
ensure that objects are available despite of node failure or unexpected leaving. As
a result, objects are replicated on the two direct virtual neighbors of the root node.
This approach is similar to the replication mechanism proposed by [89]. Yet, the
distribution of those replicas is handled by the root node and not by the node that
provides this data. As the root node and the roots of the replicas are within a single
cluster, overhead generated due to the distribution of the replication is low.
Each node is able to detect when a node leaves or joins the cluster due to the
periodically leaf set updates. When a node leaves a cluster, objects, and replicas that
were stored at this node have to be redistributed in this cluster. However, it cannot be
assumed that a node that leaves the network coordinates this redistribution of this
objects. Therefore, the virtual neighbors of the node that has left the cluster are used
to perform this task. In the first step, each of the virtual neighbors has to check the
locally stored objects and replicas. On one hand, for each object stored at a virtual
neighbor, a new replica has to be redistributed. On the other hand, objects have to be
redistributed when a root node leaves the network. Whenever a node joins a cluster,
the virtual neighbors have to check their storage for replicas and objects as well.
When this new node is logically closer to an object or at least closer as the roots of the
replicas, a copy of this object has to be stored at this new node.
When only few nodes are located within a cluster, the number of nodes may not
suffice to distribute all replicas of an object. Therefore, objects have to be replicated to
nodes in an adjacent cluster as well in such a scenario. Otherwise, objects may be lost
when all nodes would leave a cluster. However, those externally stored replicas have
to be stored within the cluster that is logically closest to the identifier of the object.
Furthermore, also two replicas have to be stored in the adjacent cluster in order to
ensure that these external replicas do not get lost due to nodes that leave the cluster.
Due to this replication mechanism it is ensured that no objects can get lost as a
result of node departure. Security related challenges for replication mechanisms will
further be discussed in Chapter 6.1.
3.6.2 Joining and Leaving the Mobile Peer-to-Peer Network
Whenever a node joins a DHT, the routing tables of this node as well as the tables
of each virtual neighbor has to be updated. Furthermore, nodes that leave the MP2P
network have to be handled by the network as well. In the following paragraphs
bootstrapping mechanisms of Clustered Pastry and the effects of node departure are
discussed.
bootstrapping
When a node wants to join the network, a bootstrapping node is required. This
bootstrapping node provides first routing table entries and further forwards the join
request to the virtual neighbors of this new node. As a result of this procedure the
new node is able to build its routing table. Furthermore, the routing tables of the
bootstrapping node and the virtual neighbor is updated. So far, the bootstrapping
mechanisms of the Clustered Pastry system is very similar to the mechanism used by
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Pastry. However, Pastry requires a predefined (e.g., defined by the user) bootstrapping
node while Clustered Pastry can harness the structure of the system in order to detect
an adequate bootstrapping node. Furthermore, traffic due to bootstrapping can be
reduced compared to the approach proposed by Pastry.
As the location aware approach combines the virtual with the geographical neigh-
borhood, the geographical neighbors can be used to boot nodes. As each node in the
network attach its node ID and leaf set information to the periodically broadcasted
hello messages of the underlay, neighbors that participate in the DHT can be identified
easily. As a result, the virtual neighbor of the new node can be reached within a
single overlay hop and no costly routing process is required. Due to this fact, only
little traffic overhead is introduced during bootstrapping.
leaving the network
In the best case scenario, nodes that leave the network are able to notify the virtual
neighbors and redistribute the locally stored objects in the cluster. However, this
cannot be assumed as nodes may crash, lose the connection to the network or
disconnect due to unexpected conditions from the MP2P network. As mentioned
earlier, replicas are stored at the virtual neighbors and, therefore, leaving nodes
will not result in lost objects. On the other hand, the previously proposed update
mechanisms of routing tables ensure that the provided entries are fresh and that
disconnected nodes are removed from the tables. Therefore, disconnecting nodes do
not affect the MP2P system strongly but will only introduce a low traffic overhead.
3.7 comparison of location aware mobile peer-to-peer systems
Out of the approaches discussed in the related work (see also Chapter 2.1.4) the
MADPastry [118] and PeerNet [34] MP2P systems are most closely related to our
approach. Therefore, they are compared in detail to Clustered Pastry in this section.
3.7.1 MADPastry
MADPastry and Clustered Pastry are both based on the Pastry DHT. Both systems
benefit from the location awareness of the peers. The geographical position of the
nodes is used in order to optimize the routing algorithm of the MP2P systems.
However, both systems differ in several ways.
The geographical groups formed by MADPastry are defined via a landmarking
mechanism. Within each group, a node is chosen as landmarking node. This node
is defined as the center of the cluster. Therefore, the geographical size and location
of a cluster defined by MADPastry is dynamic and depends on the mobility of
the landmarking node. As a result, the arrangements of these clusters cannot be
influenced by the system but depends on the location of the landmarking nodes only.
Furthermore, landmarking messages, which are required to assign nodes to their
clusters, have to be broadcasted periodically in the cluster. Thus, overhead is generated.
Moreover, those messages can be forged or manipulated by malicious nodes in order
to attack the network. As most mobile devices provide reliable positioning system as
GPS, landmarking mechanisms should be avoided.
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Furthermore, MADPastry’s routing table is truncated and provides only a single
row. Therefore, only the first overlay hop is provided by this table. Also, the leaf set is
strongly truncated and only small number of entries is maintained proactively. As a
result, the number of required hops increases strongly in scenarios with an increased
number of nodes.
In summary, MadPastry introduces benefits in scenarios where no deployment
area can be defined due to the dynamic cluster location. Yet, due to the strongly
truncated routing tables and the randomly distributed clusters in the deployment area,
the efficiency of the lookup mechanism is limited.
3.7.2 PeerNet
PeerNet is based on a modern positioning mechanism. Each node in the network
is assigned to the cluster in the network it is most likely to be encountered. For
this reason, nodes do not adapt their identifiers when leaving an area, but provide
information about their destination to their home cluster. Therefore, a proxy node is
required at each cluster that stores this information and that is forwarding received
requests to absent nodes when required. Those proxies have to be available all the
time and are not allowed to leave the cluster.
However, those highly available entities that provide such services cannot always
be assumed in the context of MP2P systems. Considering disaster relief scenarios, the
nodes destination may further be hard to predict. Thus, either nodes have to report
their current position to their proxy periodically or lookup messages may have to be
rerouted multiple times following the trace of the nodes in the networks.
Finally, PeerNet is based on recent technology as GPS and uses a location aware
routing algorithm. Yet, overlay identifiers are not adapted to the current location of
the nodes, but are mapped on specific predefined home areas. Furthermore, PeerNet
is based on assumptions as highly available proxies and the prediction of the nodes
mobility that may not be valid in a disaster relief scenario. Our Clustered Pastry
MP2P system also uses a GPS based location aware routing algorithm, but neither
proxies nor a prediction of the participants mobility is required.
3.8 chapter summary
In this chapter, the requirements of a communication infrastructure for a disaster
relief scenario have been discussed. Based on the outcomes of this discussion, major
challenges of this scenario as on demand usage or robustness have been outlined. As
MP2P systems match those requirements they are highly recommended to be used as
a communication substrate for disaster relief scenarios.
Therefore, our novel Clustered Pastry MP2P system has been introduced in the
second part of this chapter. This system combines a MANET underlay with a struc-
tured P2P overlay. In order to match the challenges introduced by the scenario a
location aware approach is used. Each node uses overlay identifiers that are adapted
to the geographical location of the node. Due to this matching of the geographical
position to the overlay identifier, a straight routing can be achieved. As a result of
this geographically structured routing algorithm, the efficiency of the MP2Ps lookup
mechanism can be strongly increased. Furthermore, a cross-layer is used to provide
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underlay information to the overlay. Due to this information, the routing tables of
the overlay can be maintained efficiently. Those routing tables have further been
adapted in order to reduce update overhead and to meet challenges introduced by
the scenarios.
After we have presented the Clustered Pastry MP2P system in this chapter, this
system will be evaluated in the following chapter. Therefore, the influences of metrics,
e.g., the number of participants and the mobility characteristics of the nodes have to
be considered.
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E VA L U AT I O N O F T H E C L U S T E R E D PA S T RY M O B I L E
P E E R - T O - P E E R S Y S T E M
»It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are.
If it doesn’t agree with experiment, it’s wrong«
— Richard P. Feynman
In the previous chapter we introduced Clustered Pastry, a MP2P system developedto operate in disaster relief scenarios. In this chapter a simulation based evaluation
is conducted to prove the effectiveness of this Clustered Pastry system.
First, the used simulator, implementation details of Clustered Pastry and the
default settings are briefly discussed. Thereafter, the evaluation of Clustered Pastry
is provided based on multiple settings in order to identify the strength but also the
limitations of our system.
4.1 evaluation settings and metrics
This section introduces the evaluation tools and settings that were harnessed to
analyze the efficiency of our Clustered Pastry system. In the first part of this section,
the goals and specific settings of the evaluation are discussed. Thereafter, we define a
set of metrics that are used to evaluate the efficiency of our Clustered Pastry system.
Furthermore, we introduce the evaluation methods as well as the default settings and
parameters.
4.1.1 Goals of the Evaluation
In the following paragraphs, we define the goals for the evaluation of our Clustered
Pastry system. We distinguish between three major goals: the efficiency of Clustered
Pastry compared to other MP2P systems, the evaluation of the optimization mecha-
nisms that have been developed for the Clustered Pastry system, and the analysis of
influences introduced by the disaster relief scenario.
comparison between clustered pastry and a layered approach
The first goal is to show the applicability of our Clustered Pastry system in a disaster
relief scenario. Therefore, we compare our system to a reference MP2P system. This
reference system is based on a layered MP2P architecture and, therefore, does not
benefit from cross-layer information, but uses the same underlay and overlay protocols
as Clustered Pastry. Due to this fact, an optimal comparability between the reference
MP2P systems and Clustered Pastry is achieved.
optimizing clustered pastry
Beyond comparing our system to other MP2P systems, our second goal is to validate
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the mechanisms that have been proposed in the previous chapter to stabilize and
optimize Clustered Pastry. Therefore, we will evaluate the impact of threshold areas
and determine the optimal size of those areas. Moreover, traffic reduction mechanisms
as proposed in Chapter 3.5.3 are analyzed.
In Chapter 3.4.2, threshold areas have been introduced. The influence of those areas
on the stability of the network and the traffic generated due to nodes that leave a
cluster has to be analyzed. As a result, the efficiency of this threshold area as well as
a best effort parameter for the size of these areas has to be determined.
Moreover, we introduced four mechanisms in the previous chapter that can be
used to reduce the traffic that is generated by the leaf set update mechanism. The
efficiency of those mechanisms and the influence on the Clustered Pastry systems
will be evaluated in the remainder of this chapter.
influences of the disaster relief scenario on clustered pastry
The third goal addresses influences of the disaster relief scenario. In particular, the
number of network participants, the node mobility, and the background traffic has to
be analyzed.
As defined by our scenario, we have to assume up to two hundred nodes that
participate in a disaster relief operation. Therefore, the scalability of the Clustered
Pastry system in settings considering the scenario specific amount of participants has
to be evaluated.
MP2P systems consist of mobile devices. Yet, the mobility of units in a disaster
relief scenario is not random but depends on a large list of characteristics including
the position and the duties of the specific unit. In order to ensure that Clustered
Pastry is able to provide services in a disaster relief scenario, it is essential to evaluate
our approach based on a realistic mobility model.
Beside the storage and retrieval services, other services may be provided by the
MANET substrate in a disaster relief scenario. As a result, background traffic may be
introduced by, e.g., voice communication. Therefore, we have to analyze the effects of
background traffic on the efficiency of our Clustered Pastry system.
4.1.2 Evaluation Metrics
It is essential to define the primary metrics that are used to analyze the results of
the simulations. Those metrics are used to determine the efficiency of the Clustered
Pastry MP2P system and to analyze the impact of the variation of parameters on
the reliability of this system. In the context of this evaluation we are using two basic
metrics, which are typically used in the related work to determine the efficiency of an
MP2P system (e.g. [118][29][18]). However, additional metrics are required to evaluate
specific settings. Those metrics will be introduced in the corresponding sections.
As the availability of the services of an MP2P network in a disaster relief scenario is
essential, the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) is used to determine the reliability of
our Clustered Pastry systems. This metric determines how reliable an MP2P network
operates regarding the retrieval and availability of data objects and, for this reason,
describes the usability of our Clustered Pastry system. This metric is determined by
comparing the number of initiated lookups with those that are completed successfully.
4.1 evaluation settings and metrics 55
Tier 3
Tier 2
Tier 1
Overlay
Bootstrap List
UDP
IP MANET Routing
WLAN
Routing Table
Cross-LayerMobility
2
1
3
Figure 14: Structure of the OMNeT implementation of Clustered Pastry
As mentioned before, bandwidth is strongly limited. Therefore, the traffic that is
introduced by the system (T ) may indicate the efficiency of our Clustered Pastry
system. We distinguish four traffic metrics in the context of this thesis.
The overlay traffic (Toverlay) includes traffic generated by updating the routing table
as well as traffic due to storing, retrieving, and maintaining objects in the network.
Yet, traffic introduced due to cross-layering is neglected. The cross-layer traffic (Tcross)
on the other hand displays traffic generated by the leaf set update mechanism and the
routing table updates provided by cross-layer information. The overall traffic (Toverall)
combines the overlay (Toverlay) with the cross-layer traffic (Tcross) and, therefore,
displays the total traffic that is introduced by the Clustered Pastry system to the
network. Yet, traffic generated by the OLSR ETX protocol itself is excluded. The
previously mentioned traffic metrics display different traffic characteristics of the
Clustered Pastry system in terms of transmitted data volumes. The fourth traffic
metric introduces the average number of underlay hops that are required to store
or lookup a message in the network (Thops). While the previous metrics indicate
overhead generated by the Clustered Pastry system, this last traffic metric is used to
show the efficiency of the geographical clustering in terms of the number of average
underlay hops.
4.1.3 Simulator Selection
A simulation enables the evaluation of complex systems with reasonable costs. More-
over, we are able to analyze the influences on the MP2P system in detail. A testbed-
based evaluation on the other hand is limited to either a small number of overall
nodes or a static setting of these nodes. Furthermore, background influences that
affect such an testbed a very hard to predict. Therefore, we validate the efficiency of
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our Clustered Pastry system by the means of simulation. However, the simulation
infrastructure that is harnessed for our evaluation has to be selected carefully. This
network simulator must be extensible and modular.
As a result of these requirements, the modular discrete event simulator OMNeT++
[111] is used to evaluate our Clustered Pastry approach. This object-oriented open
source simulator is well known and enables the simulation of a large set of com-
munication networks. The protocols, applications and components that have to be
simulated are implemented in C++. Network specifications and the interaction of
those protocols, applications, and components are defined via the Network Descrip-
tion language. Based on this simulation infrastructure, several frameworks have been
developed that enable the simulation of a wide range of different networks. Due to
this fact, frameworks based on the OMNeT++ simulator are used by both the MANET
as well as the P2P research community. Two of those frameworks are used in our
evaluation.
On one hand, we used the INET framework [4]. This framework provides imple-
mentations of MANET routing protocols including OLSR with and without the ETX
extension. Furthermore, basic applications such as simple traffic generators, mobility
models, models for wireless channels, transport layer, network layer, and link layer
protocols are included. Therefore, the basic underlay protocols that are required to
simulate our Clustered Pastry system can be provided by this framework.
On the other hand, our Clustered Pastry model is based on the OverSim [11]
framework. This framework is a collection of structured P2P systems and provides
implementations of P2P systems including, e.g., Chord, Pastry, and CAN. Also traffic
generators for P2P scenarios are introduced by this framework. Furthermore, abstract
models to simulate the behavior of wired underlay networks are available. However,
no mobile or wireless underlay is provided by the OverSim framework.
In order to implement the Clustered Pastry system, we had to combine the INET
with the OverSim framework. The resulting structure of protocols, applications, and
components that are used to simulate a Clustered Pastry node is shown in Figure 14.
The underlay (1) consists of an 802.11g WLAN interface, which includes physical
and link layer protocols. Furthermore, IP is used as network layer protocol. Also the
routing protocols of the MANET operate at the network layer. We adapted the OLSR
MANET protocol to attach update information of the overlay’s routing tables to the
periodically sent hello messages. The transport layer is the uppermost layer of the
underlay and uses UDP.
The DHT itself is implemented in the overlay (2). This includes the routing algorithm
of the structured P2P system as well as the routing tables. This overlay is further
linked with three optional tiers of applications. The application on the first tier is used
to store and maintain objects and replicas during our simulations. The second tier
implements a traffic generator. This traffic generator periodically triggers the storage
and lookup of objects in the MP2P system. The third and final tier is not used during
our simulations. We modified the routing algorithm, the structure and the update
mechanism of the routing tables, and the allocation of overlay identifiers of the Pastry
implementation provided by OverSim as discussed in the previous Chapter.
In order to enable functionalities as the leaf set updates via the underlay’s hello
messages, we implemented a cross layer (3) between the overlay and the MANET
routing mechanism. This cross-layer is also linked to the mobility component in order
to enable the location awareness and to the list of bootstrapping nodes to provide
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geographically close bootstrapping nodes. All other components are required either
by the underlay or overlay implementation.
4.1.4 Default Simulation Parameters
Next, we define the settings of Clustered Pastry’s parameters as used for the sim-
ulation based evaluation. Those default settings are used for each of the following
settings, except where otherwise specified.
The Clustered Pastry’s underlay is based on an OLSR ETX MANET protocol as
described in Section 3. Default parameters as defined by the OLSR Request for
Comments (RFC) 3626 [21] have been used during the evaluation. Furthermore, each
node uses a WLAN interface according to the 802.11g standard [3] and we assume an
average transmission range of about 200m.
The overlay lookup functionality is provided by the Clustered Pastry DHT. As
discussed in Chapter 3.5.1, the parameter b is set to 1, which results in two clusters
per level. The cluster level, on the other hand, is per default 2. Due to this fact,
settings with four clusters were simulated during our evaluation. Up to 50 objects
are provided by the nodes within the DHT. Those objects are distributed equally in
the namespace. Each object has a size of 2kbytes and a lifetime of 250s. Outdated
objects are discarded and replaced by a new one. Two replicas of each object are
generated and stored by the virtual neighbors as discussed in Chapter 3.6.1. After the
booting phase, a lookup for a randomly selected object is initiated every ten seconds
on average.
The deployment area is defined as the field, all first respond units are located at.
Thus, all nodes operate within the boundaries of this area. As a dense network is
assumed due to the scenario, a field size is chosen where, a connected network is
typically achieved, i.e., a route between an arbitrarily chosen pair of nodes can be
established with a high probability. Therefore, the Ad-hoc Network Simulator (ANSim)
[50] has been used to determine the size of the deployment area. This tool simulates
node mobility and derives the connectivity between nodes within the network as a
function of the node density and the average transmission range. The resulting area of
operation derived by ANSim when assuming a connection probability of about 99%
is shown in Table 5. Furthermore, the node mobility is defined by a random waypoint
model. This model has been implemented as part of the INET framework. Each
node moves with a maximum speed of 1m/s and changes its speed and direction
after a time period between 10s and 60s. Yet, in Chapter 4.6 a more realistic mobility
model for disaster relief scenarios [110] is used. Each simulation runs for 30 simulated
minutes. To indicate the deviations of the results of the different simulation runs,
confidence interval are displayed with a level of significance of 95%.
An overview of the used parameters is shown in Table 3. More details on the
simulators default settings have been attached to Appendix A.1.
4.2 comparing clustered pastry with a layered approach
In the previous chapter, our Clustered Pastry system has been discussed in depth.
Multiple modifications and adaptations of the underlying protocols have been in-
troduced in order to enable this system to operate efficiently in a decentralized and
58 evaluation of the clustered pastry mobile peer-to-peer system
Nodes Deployment area
25 500m x 500m
50 800m x 800m
75 900m x 900m
100 1100m x 1100m
150 1400m x 1400m
200 1550m x 1550m
Table 2: Number of nodes and deployment area
Basic parameters
Nodes 25 - 200 (default: 100)
Mobility model Random waypoint
Node speed 0-1 m/s
Initial node placement Equally distributed
Simulation time 30 minutes
Overlay parameters
Basic protocol Pastry
Routing algorithm semi-recursive
Leaf set size dynamic
ID size 32 bit
Parameter b 1
Request frequency 10 s (global)
Currently stored objects 50
Life time of Objects 250 s
Object size 2 kbyte
Underlay parameters
Basic protocol OLSR
Routing metric ETX
Transmission range 200m
Frequency hello messages 2 s
MP2P parameters
Threshold area 40m
Number of clusters 2 - 16 (default: 4)
Leaf set update frequency 2 s
Routing table update frequency 10 s
Lookup retransmissions 2
Table 3: Overview of parameters used in the simulations
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Basic layered Adapted layered Clustered Pastry
Size of leaf set 16 4 Nodes in Cluster
Routing table Rows Undefined Undefined 2
Size of Identifier 128 bit 32 bit 32 bit
Parameter b 4 2 1
Clusters (c) 1 1 2/4
Table 4: Settings of the different evaluated Mobile Peer-to-Peer systems
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Figure 15: Fraction of failed lookups in mobile Clustered Pastry and non-clustered
Pastry scenarios
mobile environment. In this section the Clustered Pastry system is compared with a
layered reference MP2P system in order to show the shortcomings of layered systems
and to highlight the benefits of Clustered Pastry as defined in our first goal. This
layered system consists of an OLSR based underlay that uses the ETX metric com-
bined with a Pastry overlay network. The layered approach is evaluated based on
two different sets of parameters. The first set uses the default parameters provided
by the DHT’s specifications and is hereinafter referred to as the basic layered setting.
The second set is adapted to the mobile, wireless scenario. Therefore, the leaf set size,
the parameter b, and the size of the overlay identifiers have been reduced. All these
modifications result in a reduction of the traffic introduced by the update mechanisms
of Pastry’s routing tables. This second set is hereinafter referred to as the adapted
layered setting. An overview of the overlay settings is shown in Table 4.
The evaluation of these scenarios is based on three basic metrics. As the availability
of the services provided by the MP2P system is essential, the fraction of failed lookups
(flookup) is used to determine the reliability of the MP2P systems. Furthermore, the
traffic that is introduced by the systems may indicate the efficiency of these approaches.
Therefore both, the average number of sent messages (Thops) and the resulting overall
traffic (Toverall) are monitored.
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4.2.1 Results of the Comparison of the Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
In the following paragraphs, the evaluation results of the Clustered Pastry system and
the reference model are discussed in detail. Based on the three previously mentioned
metrics, the benefits and flaws of both approaches are discussed.
fraction of failed lookups
As the availability of the lookup and retrieval services is essential, the fraction of
failed lookups is considered as the most important metric. The reference model based
on the previously introduced settings and the Clustered Pastry systems provide very
good results in small scale scenarios with 25 nodes, as shown in Figure 15. Only few
lookups are dropped in these scenarios, though the number of failed lookups based
on a adapted layered setting is twice as high compared to the Clustered Pastry and the
reference model with the basic layered setting. However, considering settings with an
increased number of nodes, the fraction of failed lookups is highly increased when
using the reference model. Even though the adapted layered settings provide better
results than the basic layered settings when considering more than 50 participating
nodes in the network, the fraction of failed lookups is unacceptably high. Though,
the cross-layered Clustered Pastry system provides reliable lookup operations even
beyond this number of participants.
Both the excellent results in small scale scenarios and the reduced availability in
settings with an increased number of nodes is a result of the structure of the routing
tables of the reference model and the resulting traffic generated during bootstrapping.
However, our Clustered Pastry system provides reliable results due to the location
aware lookup mechanism, the structure of routing tables, and update mechanisms.
traffic
Considering the basic layered setting of the reference model, 16 links to virtual neighbors
are provided by the leaf set and at least 15 links to nodes that are logically distant are
stored at the routing table. Due to this fact, most of the 25 nodes in small scale scenarios
can be reached within a single overlay hop. As only few peers are participating and
as no churn is simulated in this scenario, only few overhead is introduced due to the
building of these tables. However, the high amount of links that has to be provided by
the routing tables introduces a major drawback when increasing the number of nodes.
On one hand, the routing table has to provide multiple rows and, therefore, a higher
amount of entries when the number of nodes is increased. On the other hand, the leaf
set has to be updated whenever a node in the virtual neighborhood joins the network.
As a result, most nodes are not able to build their routing tables due to missing entries
before a timeout occurs. Therefore, these nodes are not able to bootstrap but initiate a
new bootstrapping a few seconds later. As a result, only 85% of all nodes in settings
with 50 nodes are able to boot when using a the reference MP2P system based on
a the basic layered settings. Even worse, when increasing the number of nodes to 75,
less than half of the nodes are able to successfully complete the bootstrapping and in
scenarios with 100 nodes even less nodes are able to join the network. This results in a
low availability of the stored objects in settings with the reference MP2P system based
on the basic layered settings as nodes and, therefore, objects stored at these nodes are
only temporary available. This can also be seen when considering the overall traffic
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Figure 16: Traffic induced by mobile Clustered Pastry and non-clustered Pastry sys-
tems
as shown in Figure 16 and, in particular, the overall number of messages as shown in
Figure 17 is strongly increased in large scale scenarios.
The reference model based on the basic layered setting performs worse regarding
the fraction of failed lookups in small scale scenarios, as fewer links are stored in
the routing tables and, therefore, most nodes cannot be reached within a single hop.
Yet, also less update messages are required to maintain the routing tables. Due to
this fact, this approach is able to perform better than the unadapted approach in
scenarios with an increased number of participating nodes. Yet, the results are also
strongly degrading when the number of nodes is increased beyond 50 nodes due to
the same reason. However, as shown in Figure 16, the overall traffic introduced by
this approach is very low compared to the Clustered Pastry system.
Despite the better results of in terms of a reduced fraction of failed lookups, traffic
introduced by the Clustered Pastry is higher compared to the reference model as
a result of the update mechanisms and the cluster based churn as discussed in the
previous chapter. Yet, messages are mostly being sent to geographical neighbors and,
therefore, can be transmitted more efficient in terms of a higher success ratio and a
reduced traffic overhead.
4.2.2 Summary of the Comparison of the Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
To sum it up, the reference model provides reliable results in small scale systems due
to the structure of the routing tables. Even though a higher traffic is introduced by
the Clustered Pastry system as a result of the periodic routing updates, more stable
results can be achieved. Due to this fact, we have shown that a cross-layered, cluster
based system is more efficient for mobile, decentralized scenarios than a layered
approach and, therefore, meet the first goal of this evaluation.
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Figure 17: Average number of messages sent by mobile Clustered Pastry and non-
clustered Pastry systems
4.3 evaluation of the threshold areas
To further investigate our Clustered Pastry system and the parameters, the threshold
areas as introduced in Chapter 3.4.2 are analyzed in detail. The evaluation of the
threshold area is further a requirement introduced by our second goal.
Whenever a node leaves or joins a cluster, all routing tables maintained by this
node itself and all routing tables that provides links to this node require an update.
As these updates result in traffic overhead, the number of cluster changes has to
be minimized. Threshold areas as introduced by Clustered Pastry may be used to
reduce the frequency of cluster changes in the network. However, those threshold
areas, which are used as a buffer between the clusters, may affect other characteristics
of our Clustered Pastry system as well.
In the following paragraphs, influences of the threshold areas on the Clustered
Pastry system are evaluated. Therefore, eight settings are considered that differ in
the size of the used threshold areas. In the first scenario, the size of the threshold
area is reduced to zero and, therefore, no threshold area has been used at all. In the
subsequent scenarios the size of the threshold area has been increased up to 300m.
For all other parameters, default settings as described in Chapter 4.1.4 were used.
The efficiency of the threshold areas is evaluated based on three parameters. As
the threshold areas were developed to reduce the overall number of nodes that leave
a cluster, the average number of nodes that leave a cluster is analyzed (fcluster).
This frequency affects the availability of nodes as well as the traffic generated by the
overlay network. This traffic introduced by the overlay (Toverlay) is analyzed in detail
as well. Traffic due to underlay and cross-layer communication is neglected in this
section, as this traffic is not affected due to cluster changes. Furthermore, the fraction
of failed lookups (flookup) is harnessed to determine the availability of the services
provided by the network.
4.3.1 Results of the Evaluation of the Threshold Areas
The threshold areas have been developed in order to stabilize the network and to
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(a) Frequency of Cluster Changes
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(c) Fraction of Failed Lookups
Figure 18: Effects of threshold areas on the Clustered Pastry system
reduce the traffic introduced by cluster based churn. In the following paragraphs we
evaluate those threshold areas and their impact on the Clustered Pastry system.
frequency of cluster changes
Due to the threshold area, nodes have to adapt their own identifier only when they are
passing the cluster border and the proper threshold area. As a result, the frequency
of cluster changes can be affected by the size of this area as shown in Figure 18a.
The number of nodes that leaves a cluster can be reduced by more than 10% by
introducing a threshold size of 40m.
traffic
This reduced frequency affects, moreover, the traffic generated by the overlay network.
As mentioned before, traffic is introduced whenever a node joins or leaves a cluster.
This overhead includes traffic that is generated by the redistribution of objects as well
as due to updating routing tables. When reducing the number of nodes that have to
change their cluster, this overlay traffic is reduced in an equal proportion as shown in
Figure 18b.
fraction of failed lookups
As previously mentioned, the availability of nodes is influenced by the frequency of
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Figure 19: Limitations of the threshold area
cluster changes as well. Nodes are unable to provide services for a short amount of
time while refreshing their routing tables after changing the cluster. However, those
updates can be performed efficiently due to the characteristics of the Clustered Pastry
system. Due to this fact, nodes are unavailable for about 0.95% of the overall simula-
tion time on average when considering settings without threshold areas. However,
this downtime can be reduced to 0.73% when using threshold areas with a size of at
least 40m.
On the downside, large threshold areas affect negatively the fraction of dropped
requests. As shown in Figure 18c, the fraction of dropped lookups increases in
scenarios using a large threshold area. As a result of increasing this area, nodes may
diverge from its own cluster without being forced to join another cluster. Thus, a
node may be disconnected from its own cluster as shown in Figure 19. This results in
stale routing tables, as no update messages can be received anymore. However, the
fraction of dropped lookups is only affected in scenarios with a threshold size that
exceeds 60m.
4.3.2 Summary of the Influence of Threshold Areas on the Clustered Pastry System
The threshold area is able to reduce the traffic introduced by the overlay network by
reducing the frequency of the cluster changes. Yet, large scale threshold areas further
affect the fraction of dropped lookups and, therefore, the availability of the services
provided by the Clustered Pastry system negatively. Even though settings with a
threshold size of 60m up to 150m provide still good results, single simulation runs
have shown that these settings may affect the reliability of the lookup mechanism
negatively. This may results in an increased fraction of failed lookups. Thus, we use a
threshold area with a size of 40m for our disaster relief scenarios in this thesis. Thus,
we were able to satisfy a requirement introduced by our second evaluation goal as we
have shown that threshold areas are able to reduce the overlay traffic and we were
able to provide a default parameter for the size of the threshold areas. However, in
settings that either differ strongly on the transmission range or the node’s speed, it
may be necessary to adapt the size of the threshold areas.
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Figure 20: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set update frequency
4.4 reducing the traffic generated by the leaf set update mechanism
The periodic updates of the leaf set are necessary to ensure fresh links to virtual
neighbors, but also generate a high amount of traffic as mentioned in the previous
chapter. About 80% of the traffic introduced due to the maintenance of the Clustered
Pastry system is generated by this update mechanism (considering a setting with
100 nodes and 4 clusters). Thus, reducing the size of the update messages or the
update frequency could strongly reduce the overall traffic load and, therefore, has
been defined as part of the second evaluation goal. However, reducing the traffic
should not be achieved at the expense of the freshness of the leaf set entries.
Three different approaches have been proposed in Chapter 3.5.3 to reduce the
traffic generated by the leaf sets update mechanism. In the following paragraphs,
the impact of those mechanisms is evaluated. Therefore, two metrics are used to
determine the efficiency of these approaches. Obviously, reducing traffic introduced
by the leaf set update mechanism affects the leaf set itself. As a faulty routing table has
an impact on the reliability of the routing algorithm, the fraction of failed lookups
(flookup) is used to determine the efficiency of this algorithm and the availability of
the networks services. The second metric that is used to evaluate the efficiency of the
proposed mechanisms is the traffic (T ) generated by the Clustered Pastry system. This
includes the overall traffic (Toverall) and, in particular, the cross-layer traffic (Tcross)
introduced by the leaf sets update mechanism.
4.4.1 Adapting the Leaf Set’s Update Frequency
As mentioned before, adapting the update frequency is a straight forward approach
to reduce the traffic generated by the leaf sets update mechanism. As those update
messages are coupled to the periodic hello messages of the OLSR protocol in the
underlay, the frequency cannot be chosen freely. These hello messages are sent every
two seconds to the geographical neighbors. Thus, the update frequency can be adapted
by attaching the leaf set update information to every fLS_updateth hello message only.
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As a result, the traffic generated by the update mechanism should be reduced by the
factor fLS_update. However, each node still attaches its own overlay identifier to each
of the hello messages.
In the following evaluation, the fL_update is increased from 1 to 15 resulting in
update intervals from 2s to 30s. Furthermore, settings with two and four clusters are
simulated. All other parameters are set to their default values as defined in Section
4.1.4.
4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation of the Adapted Leaf Set Update Frequency
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the evaluation results of the first traffic
reduction mechanism that has been developed in the scope of this thesis to reduce
the traffic generated by the leaf set update mechanism.
traffic
As shown in Figure 20, the traffic introduced by the leaf sets update mechanism
can be reduced by increasing the update frequency as assumed previously. As a
matter of course, this affects as well the overall traffic of our Clustered Pastry system.
Though, while the traffic generated by the update mechanism strongly decreases
when fLS_update is increased, the overall traffic does not decrease in the same
pace. This is on one hand a result of the increased number of required routing table
updates. As mentioned in Chapter 3.5.2, routing table updates are also propagated
via the data sets of hello messages for a strongly limited amount of time. Due to this
fact, reducing fLS_update also affects the freshness of the routing table entries. As a
result, routing table updates are more often triggered by the Clustered Pastry system.
Furthermore, rerouting of misrouted messages also introduces traffic overhead. For
example, assuming that the leaf set of a node is stale and a received lookup message
is not forwarded correctly to the destination node, but to a node that has recently left
the cluster. Mostly, this does not result in a failed lookup. It is more probable that this
’stray’ lookup message is once again forwarded to its destination cluster. Due to these
effects, increasing the update interval beyond 6s does not provide any reasonable
result regarding the reduction of the overall traffic. Only a marginal reduction of the
traffic can be achieved beyond this point, especially considering scenarios with two
clusters.
fraction of failed lookups
However, while increasing the update interval, the average fraction of failed lookups
is mostly stable until reaching a fLS_update of 3 (an update interval of 6s). Beyond this
point, the fraction of failed lookup increases due to the high fraction of stale routing
tables as shown in Figure 21. These results are analogous in simulations with two and
four clusters. However, the efficiency of scenarios with a higher number of clusters
is more stable when increasing fLS_update. As each node attaches its own overlay
identifier to every sent hello message, fresh routing table entries to geographical
neighbors are ensured. As a result, the leaf set of small scale clusters provides more
reliable links as most of those linked nodes are as well geographical neighbors.
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Figure 21: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set update frequency
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Figure 22: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set gossiping mechanism
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Figure 23: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set gossiping mechanism
4.4.3 Gossiping Mechanism for a Dynamic Number of Data Sets
Gossiping in terms of sending data only with a specific probability is wide spread
in wireless networks such as MANETs. Due to this fact, it is reasonable to harness
gossiping in order to reduce the traffic introduced by the update mechanism of
Clustered Pastry’s leaf set. We have discussed different gossiping based approaches in
the previous chapter that have to be evaluated in the following paragraphs.
The first approach attaches each data set only with a defined probability pgossip.
By reducing this probability, the overall traffic can be reduced. As the same update
messages are sent by each node in the cluster, the probability is quite high that a node
is able to extract the complete update information by accumulating the received data
sets.
In order to evaluate this first gossiping approach, the probability pgossip is varied
from 100% down to 10%. All other parameters are set to their default values as
defined in Section 4.1.4.
4.4.4 Results the Gossiping Mechanisms Based on a Dynamic Number of Data Sets
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the results of the evaluation of a gossiping
mechanism that is used to reduce traffic generated by the leaf set update mechanism.
This first gossiping approach is based on a fixed probability pgossip and a dynamic
number of data sets per hello message.
traffic
In Figure 23, the overall traffic and the update traffic of settings with 2 and 4 clusters
are displayed as a function of the sending probability of the data sets (pgossip). It
is shown that the reduction of the gossiping probability pgossip directly affects the
cross-layer traffic. The overall traffic can also be reduced by means of gossiping. Yet,
reducing pgossip below 30% results in an increased overall traffic due to the affects
of stale routing tables as discussed in the previous section.
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Figure 24: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set gossiping mechanism
fraction of failed lookups
The fraction of failed lookups is mostly constant when assuming a pgossip above 60%.
However, reducing gossiping probability pgossip below 60% negatively affects the
fraction of failed lookups as shown in Figure 22. Therefore, we propose a gossiping
probability of 60% when using this first gossipping approach.
4.4.5 Gossiping Mechanism Based on a Static Number of Data Sets
Our second gossiping approach is based on a static number of data sets per hello
message and a dynamic gossiping probability. We limit the number of data sets that
may be attached to each hello message (sus) in order to reduce the overall traffic. The
transmitted data sets are selected randomly. This approach results in very predictable
and homogeneous size of the hello messages and, therefore, the cross-layer traffic.
During this evaluation, we limit the number of data sets per hello message (sus)
to 5, 10, and 15. Once again, all other parameters are set to their default values (see
Chapter 4.1.4 for further details).
4.4.6 Results of the Gossiping Mechanisms Based on a Static Number of Data Sets
The second gossiping mechanism is based on a static number of data sets per periodic
hello message. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the results of the evaluation of
this mechanism.
traffic
This gossiping mechanism limits the number of attached data sets per hello message
directly. Therefore, this approach results in homogeneous cross-layer traffic in sce-
narios with two and four clusters as shown in Figure 24. Yet, the resulting overall
traffic differs strongly and is virtually constant. Due to stale routing tables, messages
have to be rerouted frequently in settings with a low sus. Thus, even though we were
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Figure 25: Evaluation results of the adapted leaf set gossiping mechanism
able to reduce the cross-layer traffic in these settings, new traffic is introduced at the
overlay and, therefore, in the overall traffic.
fraction of failed lookups
The scenarios with an increased number of clusters benefits from the small size of these
clusters. As a result, the fraction of failed lookups is much lower in scenarios with four
clusters compared to those using only two clusters as shown in Figure 25 especially
when limiting the data sets to five sets per hello message. Furthermore, settings with
two clusters and a small number of data sets per hello message strongly differ in the
resulting fraction of failed lookups as indicated by the confidence intervals. As only
few randomly selected data sets are transmitted per hello message, the reliability of
the system strongly depends on the specific data sets that are transmitted.
For example, let us assume a setting with 50 nodes, two clusters, and a sus of 5.
Node A has four geographical neighbors and receives their hello messages every two
seconds. In a worst case, all of those neighbors attach the very same five data sets to
their hello messages and each of those geographical neighbors is included in the data
sets of the other nodes. As a result, node A is only aware of six nodes in the leaf set
(five nodes due to the data sets and the node itself). Due to the two clusters and 50
participants in the network, we assume that on average 25 nodes are located in the leaf
set. Thus, node A is only aware of 24% of the nodes in the leaf set and, therefore, is in
most cases not able to route a message correctly. However, in a best case scenario, we
assume a node B also with four geographical neighbors. Each of these nodes sends
a hello message that includes 5 nodes, which are neither a geographical neighbor of
node B nor are included in the data sets of the other geographical neighbors. As a
result, node B receives 16 different data sets from it’s neighbors plus the identifiers of
the geographical neighbors that are included in each hello message. As a result, node
B is aware of 21 nodes (16 data sets, four virtual neighbors and node B itself) and
therefore 84% of all leaf set nodes are periodically updated. However, as the data sets
are selected randomly, the freshness of the routing table entries and, therefore, the
fraction of failed lookups strongly differs between two different simulation runs.
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Basic setting Optimized setting
Update interval of the data sets 2s 6s
Data set size 9 bytes 6 bytes
Table 5: Comparison of settings with an without the traffic reduction
4.4.7 Reduced hello Message Size
Each data entry in the hello message consists of an overlay identifier, an IP address, and
a time to live field. As mentioned in Chapter 3.5.3, the suffix of the overlay identifier
suffices to update the leaf set. Furthermore, as only a strongly limited amount of
participants are assumed in a disaster relief scenario, neither leading bits of the IP
address nor the identifier of the network are required to address a node. As a result,
the traffic generated due to the update mechanism of the leaf set can be reduced by
adapting the data sets. All other simulation parameters are set to their default values.
4.4.8 Results of the Reduced hello Message Size Evaluation
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the results of the simulation based evaluation
of the hello message size reduction.
traffic
When reducing the size of the data sets as discussed in Chapter 3.5.3, the cross-
layer traffic introduced due to the leaf set update mechanism can be reduced by
approximately 35%. Even more important, the overall traffic introduced by the MP2P
system is reduced by more than 22% when considering a scenario with 100 nodes
and 4 clusters.
fraction of failed lookups
The reduction of the hello message size does not affect the fraction of failed lookups.
Due to this fact, reducing the size of the data sets is a very efficient way to reduce the
overall traffic and can further be combined with any of the other mechanisms that
have been discussed in the previous paragraphs.
4.4.9 Summary of the Traffic Reduction Mechanisms
All four mechanisms are able to reduce the traffic introduced by the leaf set update
mechanism and, therefore, the overall traffic introduced by the Clustered Pastry
system. Yet, reducing the size of the data sets, which are attached to each hello
message, provides the best results when considering both, the resulting reduction in
traffic and the fraction of failed lookups. Furthermore, this mechanism can be easily
combined with any of the other three approaches.
Comparing the gossiping mechanisms with the adaptation of the update frequency
reveals that adapting the update frequency provides more reliable results. Comparing
the results of those three mechanisms shows that the best results can be achieved
by increasing the update interval to 6s. These reduction mechanisms are, therefore,
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Figure 26: Fraction of failed lookups as a function of the number of participants
used in the following scenarios and are assumed as default parameters for the leaf set
update mechanism.
4.5 scalability of the clustered pastry system
As defined by our third evaluation goal, we have to analyze the Clustered Pastry
system in the context of our disaster relief scenario. Therefore, the Clustered Pastry
approach has to provide reliable services in scenarios with up to a few hundred
nodes. In this section we analyze the scalability of Clustered Pastry and provide an
evaluation of scenarios with up to 200 nodes. Furthermore, we vary the number of
clusters in order to survey the impact of the cluster level on the efficiency of small
and large scale scenarios.
In order to evaluate those scenarios two of the basic metrics are harnessed to
analyze the influence of the number of participants on the reliability of the system:
The fraction of failed lookups (flookup) and the overall traffic (Toverall) introduced
by the Clustered Pastry system. Furthermore, the overall time (delay) required to
complete a lookup is used as third metric to evaluate the usability and stability of
the previously mentioned settings (t). In order to reduce the overall traffic, traffic
reduction mechanisms as proposed in the previous section are harnessed. All other
parameters are set to their default values.
4.5.1 Results of the Scalability Analysis of Clustered Pastry
Networks with an increased number of participants also introduce an increased
amount of traffic. However, in the following paragraphs we discuss the evaluation
results of scenarios with up to 200 nodes and analyze further the influence of the
number of clusters on the traffic and fraction of failed lookups.
fraction of failed lookups
In Figure 26 the fraction of failed lookup requests is shown as a function of the
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Figure 27: Cross layer and overall traffic of the Mobile Peer-to-Peer system as a
function of the number of participants
network size and the cluster level. Most results of the clustered approach provide
very good results with a loss rate of less than 5%. However, small scale scenarios with
less than 100 nodes that are based on a setting with sixteen clusters perform poorly
compared to systems with either 2 or 4 clusters. As a consequence of the increased
number of clusters, nodes have to changes their ID more often. Due to this fact, also
routing table entries become obsolete more often. This results in incorrectly routed
lookup requests and, therefore, in an increased fraction of failed lookup operations.
However, when the size of the network increases, the scenarios with a higher number
of clusters provide better results. Due to the high number of nodes that are located
in each cluster in large scale scenarios, a network with only two clusters cannot
operate efficiently. On one hand, a high overhead is introduced by the leaf set update
mechanism. On the other hand, the nodes of the leaf set are distributed over a large
area. Therefore, update messages that provide information about nodes that have left
or joined the network are delayed. This results in routing tables with incorrect entries.
Even when we increase the update frequency to 2 seconds and, therefore, reduce the
delay of the updates, no better results can be achieved as this increased update traffic
results in congestion.
traffic
Due to the traffic reduction mechanisms introduced in the previous section, the traffic
generated by the leaf set update mechanism has been strongly reduced. Yet, this
update mechanisms still introduces a considerable fraction of the overall traffic of the
Clustered Pastry system, especially when considering settings with a low clustering
level and a high number of nodes. However, this overhead and, therefore, the overall
traffic can be reduced by increasing the clustering level as shown in Figure 27. Yet,
contrary to this expectation, the results of a scenario with 200 nodes and two clusters
reveal a low traffic due to the update mechanism. As mentioned in the previous
paragraph, large scale scenarios with a Clustered Pastry system that uses only a very
limited number of clusters results in stale leaf set tables. Due to this fact, the data sets
that are attached to the hello messages include only a subset of the nodes that are
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Figure 28: Overall delay of the lookup functionality as a function of the number of
participants
located in the corresponding cluster. This results in a traffic reduction but also in a
strongly increased fraction of failed lookups. On the other hand, small scale scenarios
with a high cluster level introduce a relative high overall traffic. This is the result
of the high number of cluster changes and the resulting traffic due to cluster based
churn.
delay
The delay as shown in Figure 28 displays the average time required to successfully
perform a lookup for an object. However, besides a metric for the usability of the
system, the delay can also be harnessed to identify congested networks. Considering
delay as a metric for the usability of a system is a straight forward approach as a
system has to provide results in a reasonable amount of time. However, as most of
our evaluation results provide a delay of less than three seconds, usability in terms of
delay is not an issue for our Clustered Pastry system. Moreover, we use the delay as
an indicator for congestion in the network. This is quite obvious when considering
the scenario with 2 clusters and 200 nodes. In this scenario, the delay is strongly
increased above 13 seconds due to the congestion introduced by the large clusters.
However, in all other scenarios, we assume a low traffic load as the system is able to
provide a reasonable delay for the lookup services.
4.5.2 Summary of the Scalability Analysis of Clustered Pastry
In this section, the scalability of the Clustered Pastry system has been evaluated. To
sum the results up, our Clustered Pastry system is able to operate in small scale
scenarios as well as in scenarios with 200 nodes as required by the first part of our
third evaluation goal. Furthermore, we have shown that the clustering level can be
used to adapt the system to the networks size and, therefore, to increase the efficiency
of the system.
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Figure 29: Preferred nodes in a scenario with proximity metric
4.6 influence of disaster relief mobility model on the clustered pas-
try system
The mobility of the participating nodes is one of the major challenges introduced
by MP2P scenarios. The node mobility results in a dynamic topology and affects,
therefore, the lifetime of routing table entries in the overlay and underlay. By now,
only a basic mobility model based on a randomly generated mobility pattern has
been used for the evaluation of our Clustered Pastry system. In this section a more
complex mobility model is used to evaluate our Clustered Pastry system as required
by our third evaluation goal.
Aschenbruck et al. [110] developed BonnMotion as a framework that provides a
set of realistic mobility models including a model for disaster relief scenarios. This
model split the deployment area in several areas, e.g., the incident site, the causalities
treatment area, or the transport zone. A specific number of nodes are assigned to each
of these areas. The mobility pattern of the nodes is derived according to these areas
and observations made by Aschenbruck et al. at disaster sites. Yet, this mobility model
is far more complex than the Random Waypoint model that has been previously used
to derive the nodes mobility. Therefore, only medium sized scenarios with about 50
nodes can be simulated with a reasonable effort (simulation run-time below a month).
In order to evaluate our approach based on the disaster relief mobility model, we
analyze the characteristics and outcomes of the simulations with the BonnMotion
mobility model. Therefore, we analyze the number of cluster changes (tcluster), the
fraction of failed lookups (flookup) and the overall traffic (Toverall) generated by the
Clustered Pastry system. The settings of the evaluation are based on the scenarios
proposed by Aschenbruck et al. as shown in Figure 29.
4.6.1 Results of the Influence of Mobility on the Mobile Peer-to-Peer System
The BonnMotion disaster relief mobility model provides realistic mobility pattern of
first responding units. In the following paragraphs we discuss the evaluation results
of a setting that combines this mobility model with our Clustered Pastry system.
frequency of cluster changes
The outcomes of the medium scale scenarios exhibit even slightly better results
compared to scenarios based on the random waypoint model. Due to the mapping of
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the nodes to specific disaster site areas, it is ensured that at least a fraction of these
nodes do not leave the area they are assigned to. As those areas are mostly located in
a single cluster, those nodes do not change their cluster. As a result, the number of
cluster changes can be reduced by more than 50% when compared to a scenario that
is based on the random waypoint model.
traffic and fraction of failed lookups
This also affects, on one hand, the overall traffic and, on the other hand, the fraction of
failed lookups. Due to the reduced number of nodes, that change their cluster, traffic
due to routing table updates is reduced. As a result, the overall traffic can be reduced
by 8%. Both, the reduced number of cluster changes and the traffic reduction, further
improve the probability to complete a lookup operation successfully. Therefore, the
fraction of failed lookups is reduced to nearly 1%.
4.6.2 Summary of the Influence of Disaster Relief Mobility Model on Clustered Pastry
Considering a more realistic mobility model as provided by Aschenbruck et al.,
introduces participating nodes that are confined in their mobility to predefined areas.
This results in a more stable network and reduces both, the fraction of failed lookups
and the overall traffic generated by the MP2P system. Due to these facts, we assume
that Clustered Pastry is able to handle the mobility patterns, which are introduced by
disaster relief scenarios as required by our evaluation goal.
Moreover, the evaluated settings based on the BonnMotion disaster relief mobility
model provides even better results as the random waypoint model. Thus, we assume
that results evaluated based on a random waypoint model are at least comparable to
results based on the disaster relief mobility model.
4.7 influence of the traffic on the clustered pastry system
In the previous scenarios, we used a fixed object size of 2kB. Even though this size
would suffice to enable a storage of text based data and small pictures, we evaluate
scenarios in this section with an increased object size with up to 15kB. Furthermore,
all scenarios evaluated so far assumed that no other traffic is transmitted within the
network. Yet, the MANET underlay may as well be used to transmit any other kind
of data, e.g., for text messaging or voice communication. Therefore, we introduce
background traffic in this section.
The background traffic is generated by using a basic UDP traffic generator as
provided by the INET framework of OMNeT++. As a result, data packets with a size
of 2kB are periodically sent by each node to a randomly selected node in the network.
In order to increase the overall background traffic, the message interval is reduced.
These scenarios are evaluated by using the basic metrics, the fraction of failed lookups
(flookup) and the overall traffic (Toverall) generated by our Clustered Pastry system.
All parameters of Clustered Pastry are set to their default values.
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Figure 30: Influence of the object size on the traffic generated by Clustered Pastry
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(a) Fraction of Failed Lookups
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(b) Traffic
Figure 31: Impact of background traffic on Clustered Pastry
4.7.1 Results of the Increased Data Object Size
Increasing the object size obviously affects the traffic generated by the MP2P system.
Though, the traffic increases by nearly 70% when increasing the objects size to 15kB
as shown in Figure 30, the fraction of failed lookups is not affected. However, a size
of 15kB should most probable suffice the requirements of our scenario as we assume
that only text files and small sized pictures are stored with in the network in our
scenarios.
4.7.2 Results of the Effects of Background Traffic
Background traffic like voice communication or text chatting may be introduced in
disaster relief scenarios [57]. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the simulation
results of settings with background traffic.
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fraction of failed lookups
Background traffic, introduced by other applications as voice transmission or text
chatting affects the MP2P system due to the limited bandwidth. However, the fraction
of failed lookup operations is only affected when a high background traffic is intro-
duced as shown in Figure 31a. The reliability of the lookup mechanism of Clustered
Pastry degrades only when the UDP messages are sent in an interval of less than two
seconds.
traffic
Even when the background traffic is only sent twice a minute, the resulting traffic is
almost equal to the overall traffic introduced by the Clustered Pastry system. When
we consider that the Clustered Pastry is able to operate efficiently as long as the
background interval equal or larger than two seconds, the overall traffic, which is
transmitted via the MANET communication substrate is more than 16 times higher
than the traffic of Clustered Pastry.
4.7.3 Summary of the Influence of Traffic on Clustered Pastry
As shown in this section, Clustered Pastry is also able to operate with objects of
an increased size. Furthermore, a considerable amount of background traffic can be
introduced without reducing the efficiency of the Clustered Pastry system. Due to
this fact, we assume that other applications that generate a reasonable traffic can be
used in parallel to our Clustered Pastry system as required by our last evaluation
goal.
4.8 chapter summary
In the previous chapter, we have introduced Clustered Pastry, a new cluster-based
MP2P system that is based on a combination of a MANET and a DHT. As shown, this
system is suited to provide reliable lookup functionality even when nodes are mobile
and the topology is dynamic. In this chapter, we have evaluated and validated the
efficiency of Clustered Pastry in a set of different scenarios.
We defined three major goals in the first part of this chapter that have to be satisfied
in order to validate the efficiency of our Cluster Pastry system: The comparison of
Clustered Pastry with a layered approach, the optimization of the algorithms of our
Clustered Pastry system, and analyzing the impact of disaster relief specific settings
on the Clustered Pastry system.
As a result of this evaluation, we were able to prove that our cross layered, clustered
approach provides more reliable results than a basic layered approach that combines
a DHT overlay with a MANET underlay. While the layered approach was not able to
provide reasonable results in scenarios with more than 50 nodes, Clustered Pastry
provides a reliable lookup services also in large scale scenarios with 100 nodes.
Furthermore, we were able to show the efficiency of a set of traffic reduction
mechanisms that were introduced in the previous chapter. In the overlay, threshold
areas can be used to reduce the effects of cluster related churn. As a result, the traffic
generated by the overlay could be reduced by 10%. Beyond overlay traffic, we were
able to reduce cross-layer traffic and, in particular, traffic introduced by the leaf set
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update mchanism. By adapting the update frequency and the size of the update
messages, we reduced the traffic generated by the leaf set updates to nearly 40%.
In this section we have further evaluated the efficiency of our approach considering
specifications introduced by our disaster relief scenario. This includes the number
of participating nodes, and background traffic introduced by other applications. As
outcome of this evaluations we have shown that Clustered Pastry is able to operate
in settings with 200 nodes. We were able to improve the efficiency of our system
by adapting the number of clusters to the network scale. Moreover, settings with a
specific disaster relief mobility model were evaluated. As a result, we have shown that
our Clustered Pastry provides reliable results in settings with 50 nodes when using
those specific mobility patterns. Furthermore, settings with background traffic were
analyzed. As a result we were able to show that Clustered Pastry provides reliable
services even when the overall traffic is strongly increased by other applications such
as, e.g., voice communication or data transmissions.
Concludingly, we were able to show that our system provides reliable services even
when considering background traffic or settings with up to 200 nodes. Clustered
Pastry can easily adapt to the requirements of different networks by modifying the
systems parameters, e.g., the cluster level when considering large or small scale
scenarios or the threshold area to adapt to node mobility.

5
M A L I C I O U S B E H AV I O R I N M O B I L E P E E R - T O - P E E R S Y S T E M S
»Distrust and caution are the parents of security.«
— Benjamin Franklin
In the previous chapters, the Clustered Pastry system has been introduced and eval-uated. This system provides reliable services despite the limited bandwidth and
the highly dynamic topology of the MANET underlay. However, a benign behavior of
all nodes that participate in the Clustered Pastry network was assumed by now.
Yet, nodes may get damaged due to the though environment of a disaster relief
scenario. As a result, those nodes may fail to provide services that were requested
by the network. In contrast to this unintentional malicious behavior, new challenges
arise when nodes behave intentional maliciously. For example, malicious nodes may
collude in order to achieve their goals. Those goals include selfish behavior. Selfish
nodes benefit from services provided by the network, but are not willing to provide
services to the network on their own. Furthermore, nodes may attempt to increase
their gain at the expense of benign nodes or behave destructively in order to deny the
network’s services. In this thesis, we assume malicious, colluding nodes that behave
destructively as a worst case scenario.
When introducing malicious nodes to the network, the availability of the services
provided by the system cannot anymore be ensured. Therefore, vulnerabilities of
MP2P systems are discussed in the first part of this chapter. In the second part, we
focus on a subset of attacks, which have been identified as open challenges, and
analyze the impact of these on our Clustered Pastry system [40].
5.1 security threats in mobile-peer-to-peer systems
MP2P systems combine a P2P overlay with a MANET underlay. Therefore, attacks
that were designed to affect those underlying networks can be used to attack an MP2P
system as well. Plenty of attacks on those architectures have been identified in the last
decade. In this section, the relevance of those attacks in the light of MP2P is briefly
discussed. Furthermore, existing security mechanisms suggested by related work are
considered in order to identify open challenges for the MP2P systems robustness.
5.1.1 Malicious Behavior in the Underlay
As mentioned previously, MP2P systems as our Clustered Pastry harness a MANET
underlay. This architecture introduces several challenges concerning the networks
security including a wireless channel, mobile nodes, and a decentralized structure.
MANETs are based on transmitting data via a wireless channel and, therefore,
malicious nodes are able to eavesdrop on transmissions. Those passive attacks are
hard to detect and information gathered by eavesdropping can be exploited to
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prepare other attacks like spoofing attacks [117]. Furthermore, wireless transmissions
provide only limited resources in terms of bandwidth [31]. This limitation has to
be considered when designing security mechanisms. Moreover, due to the nodes’
mobility, permanently changing geographical neighbors have to be assumed [31]. This
introduces challenges in the area of trust management [68]. MANETs also have to
rely on intermediate nodes in order to communicate with nodes that are not within
the transmission range. These characteristics of the decentralized, mobile system
introduce several challenges for MANET and, therefore, MP2P security.
Several attacks on MANETs have been discussed in the related work. Yet, also
plenty of security mechanisms have been developed to prevent or reduce the effects
of those attacks on the network in the last decade. However, mechanisms have been
proposed to ensure that the security goals are adhered to by, e.g., using cryptography
[53] [93] [119], or harnessing an IDS or an Intrusion Response System (IRS) [63] [72].
Most MANETs and, therefore, most security mechanisms proposed for this architec-
ture were not developed for a specific application. As a result, we assume that most
of the security mechanisms developed for MANETs can also be used to ensure the
robustness of the MP2P systems underlay. Therefore, we assume that the underlay of
our MP2P system is secured by state of the art mechanisms and, therefore, provides
reliable services.
5.1.2 Malicious Behavior in the Overlay
DHTs as Pastry are vulnerable against a wide range of attacks due to their decentral-
ized and cooperative characteristics. In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss
those security challenges that also have to be considered in the context of MP2P
system.
The decentralized structure of P2P systems introduces challenges such as pro-
viding a reliable access control or authentication mechanism [67], especially when
considering scenarios where no central entity is available. Furthermore, malicious
behavior such as Sybil attacks [24] are hard to detect in a decentralized overlay. By
performing a Sybil attack, a malicious nodes bootstraps multiple times in the same
network. Therefore, this single Sybil node is able to control multiple virtual overlay
nodes. As a result, a malicious node is able to strongly increase the impact on the
network when performing an attack. Furthermore, DHTs have to rely on other nodes
that are located within the network to resolve lookups, to store and retrieve objects,
and to update routing tables. During routing, intermediate nodes are required to
forward the request to the destination. Due to malicious behavior or as a result of
a node failure, those request messages may be dropped or redirected. Furthermore,
root nodes are required to store objects and are contacted whenever this object is
requested. A malicious behavior of those root nodes may result in a denial of each
locally object stored.
However, multiple security mechanisms were developed for P2P systems in the last
decade. This includes decentralized access control and authentication mechanisms.
Those mechanisms are based, e.g., on threshold cryptography [97]. Threshold cryp-
tography can be used to generate signatures in a decentralized way and has been
adapted for admission control in P2P networks [64]. Furthermore, mechanisms were
introduced by the related work to increase the robustness against Sybil attacks. Those
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mechanisms proposed for DHTs are mostly based on introducing high costs for the
generation of an overlay identity, e.g., by using crypto puzzles [17]. As a result, the
number of Sybil identities a node is able to generate were limited by the available
resources of the malicious node. Moreover, security mechanisms introduced for P2P
systems that considers the security and robustness of the routing mechanisms are
mostly based on introducing redundancy.
Even though most security challenges have been widely discussed and multiple
security mechanisms have been proposed in the recent years, limitations introduced
by the MANET underlay to the overlay were not considered. Therefore, some of these
mechanisms cannot be used efficiently in MP2P scenarios.
5.1.3 Related Work and Open Challenges in the Field of Mobile Peer-to-Peer Security
In Chapter 2.2.1, we discussed the six basic security goals as defined by the related
work. These goals include the confidentiality, the integrity, the availability, the authenti-
cation, the non repudiation, and the privacy of a system and the services provided by
this system, respectively. We harness those security goals to identify open challenges
in MP2P security. Therefore, we discuss the security mechanisms that have been de-
veloped for MP2P systems (see also Chapter 2.2.6) and mechanisms introduced in the
previous paragraphs in the light of those security goals in the following paragraphs.
These approaches focuses on access control, replication distribution mechanisms,
or privacy issues and are summarized as follows. Both, Cˇapkun et al. [112] as well as
Fenkam et al. [26] introduce access control mechanisms that can be used in the light
of MP2P scenarios. These mechanisms are required to ensure that only authorized
nodes access data provided by the network (confidentiality). Privacy issues in MP2P
networks have been studied by Maniulus [71] as well as Han and Liu [43]. Even
though privacy is not required in order to ensure the reliable functionality of the MP2P
system, it may be important in disaster relief scenarios as, e.g., medical informations of
causalities may be stored in the network. Furthermore, a basic replication mechanism
has been introduced by Mondal et al. [75] [76] in the context of MP2P systems. Yet,
this approach is based on super-peers. As Clustered Pastry does not provide super-peers
due to the structure of the overlay and due to the requirements of the scenario, this
replication mechanism cannot be used. However, a replication mechanism is required
to ensure the availability of the services provided by the overlay [62] [86].
Certain types of attacks can be performed on both, the underlay as well as the
overlay. For example, the Sybil attack affect MANETs and P2P networks. Multiple
security mechanisms have been proposed for both architectures. However, it suffices
to identify such an attack on one of the underlying architectures. Therefore, the
most efficient security mechanism proposed for either MANET or P2P networks
is harnessed to detect and/or prevent those types of attacks. In the case of Sybil
attacks, promising approaches have been introduced for MANETs that are based
analyzing overheard messages [78] [81]. Due to this fact, we assume that Sybil attacks
can be identified by existing underlay mechanisms and, therefore, are neglected in
the context of this thesis.
By now, basic mechanisms to ensure confidentiality and privacy have been introduced
in the related work. Furthermore, cryptographic mechanisms can be used to authenti-
cate peers. Those cryptographic mechanisms can also be used to sign stored objects
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and update messages. As a result, the non repudiation as well as the integrity of the
MP2P system can be ensured. Therefore, a decentralized cryptographic mechanism as
the previously mentioned threshold cryptography can be used to generate asymmetric
keys for newly booted nodes. Another promising approach is based on identity based
encryption [98]. By harnessing this approach private keys may be generated by a
central entity based on a given public key. As a result, the static suffix of the nodes
overlay identifier may be used as public key and the private key may be generated by
this central instance in prior to the disaster relief operation. However, a large set of
cryptographic algorithms are readily available and, therefore, not the focus of this
thesis.
All of those mechanisms (except the mentioned replication mechanism) neglected
the availability of the services of the network. Yet, this security goal is essential when
considering a disaster relief scenario as mentioned earlier. Therefore, attacks on the
availability of the networks services is discussed in the rest of this chapter. This
includes a malicious behavior of the root of an object and routing attacks on the
overlay. Both of these attacks have an high impact on the availability of the service
provided by the system.
5.1.4 Summary of the Open Challenges in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Security
MP2P systems are vulnerable against multiple attacks as discussed in this section.
However, on one hand, some security mechanisms have already been developed
for MP2P systems that cover a part of the discussed security challenges. On the
other hand, some mechanisms can be inherited from the underlying architectures, in
particular mechanisms that have been developed for MANET systems.
However, attacks on the overlays routing mechanism have been identified as a
major challenge. Those attacks have been neglected in the context of MP2P systems.
Furthermore, security mechanisms developed for static DHTs are based on introduc-
ing redundancy [6] [17] [51] [58] [101] or harness assumptions that do not apply to
MP2P scenarios [17] [30] [114]. Due to limited bandwidth, redundancy introduced by
the security mechanism must be minimized. Apart from routing attacks, maliciously
behaving root nodes are also discussed in this thesis. The impact of the resulting
attacks can only be minimized by using replicas. Even though plenty of replication
schemes for overlay and underlay systems have been developed recently, we assume
that an replication mechanism, which has been adapted to the characteristics of
the MP2P scenario, is more efficient. Yet, existing adapted approaches are based on
superpeers. As no superpeers are provided by DHTs, novel replication mechanisms
are required.
5.2 affecting the availability of mobile peer-to-peer services
Each node in a DHT is a supplier and consumer of services. MP2P systems, as
considered in this thesis, provide storage and retrieval services in a decentralized way.
Until now, benign behavior of each node that participates in the network is assumed.
Therefore, a lookup may only fail as a result of collisions, due to fading effects in the
wireless underlay, or when the requested object is not available at the root node.
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However, in a realistic scenario, malicious behavior has to be considered. As
discussed in the previous section, multiple mechanisms have already been proposed
for MP2P by the related work to ensure the confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and non
repudiation of MP2P systems. Yet, the availability of services has been mostly neglected
by now. Therefore, attacks on the availability of objects are highly relevant for this
thesis. In the rest of this section, these attacks on the services of MP2P systems will
be discussed in detail. Moreover, we provide analytic models to determine the impact
of those attacks on the network.
5.2.1 Storage and Retrieval Attack
Whenever a node wants to store an object in the MP2P network, the root node of this
object is determined via a lookup operation. Thereafter, either a link to the node that
provides this object or the object itself is locally stored at the root node. When this
object is requested by any other node in the network, the root node is contacted and
the object is retrieved thereafter.
However, a benignly behaving root node is assumed that is willing to store and to
supply objects on demand. Yet, malicious root nodes may not provide these services
or, at least, may not provide these services to every node in the network. A maliciously
behaving root node may either deny stored objects or reply a faulty object when a
request is received. As a result, those Storage and Retrieval Attacks [99] are able to
strongly affect the reliability of an MP2P system.
analytic evaluation
The impact of this attack obviously depends directly on the fraction of malicious
nodes that participate in the network (f). Therefore, when losses due to the networks
characteristics are neglected, the probability of a successful lookup (σSARA) can be
derived as shown in Equation 5.1.
σSARA = 1− f (5.1)
Even though no data object can be retrieved due to the malicious behavior of the
root, a complete overlay routing has to be performed. Due to this fact, the introduced
traffic in terms of sent messages (mSARA) and the required number of overlay hops
(hSARA) is similar to a successful lookup (h) (as shown in Equation 5.2). When the
malicious node does not deny the object but transmit a fault copy, transmission related
traffic is also generated by this attack.
h = hSARA = mSARA (5.2)
storage and retrieval attacks in mobile peer-to-peer systems
The Storage and Retrieval Attack [99] is a simple and efficient attack. The services
provided by the MP2P system are strongly affected when requested objects are denied
by maliciously behaving root nodes. Furthermore, the source of such a request is not
able to detect whether the root node behaves maliciously, the object is unavailable in
the network or a faulty object has been stored.
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Yet, a high amount of nodes have to perform the Storage and Retrieval Attack in
order to introduce a strongly increased number of failed lookups. However, when
combined with other attacks as the Sybil attack, the impact of this attack can be
strongly increased. Furthermore, when nodes are able to select their node identifier
and, therefore, the identifier space they are responsible for, Storage and Retrieval Attacks
can be used to deny specific objects. Moreover, as only a limited number of nodes are
assumed in MP2P scenarios, the probability that a malicious node that tries to deny a
specific object is responsible for this object is quite high compared to a static scenario
based on the Internet as underlay with more than 10,000 nodes.
5.2.2 Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
Nodes in a DHT have to rely on the benign behavior of other participants in the
P2P network during a lookup. The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack, which has been
introduced by Sit and Morris [99], exploits this requirement to deny the services
provided by the DHT. As a result of this attack, route requests are dropped or
redirected by malicious intermediate overlay nodes. While dropping requests is a
straightforward approach, redirecting messages to other malicious nodes is less
conspicuous and harder to detect by countermeasures. Nevertheless, most DHTs are
unable to detect either kind of this attack and, therefore, we focus on the packet
dropping variant of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack in this chapter. This attack is
most probable more efficient in terms of the number of failed lookups and, moreover,
less complex as no colluding nodes are required. In the following paragraphs, the
impact of this attack is evaluated by theoretical means and discussed in both, a P2P
as well as an MP2P context.
analytic evaluation
Most DHT routing algorithms are based on a recursive approach. Requests are, in
each overlay hop, forwarded by intermediate nodes to a node closer to the destination
regarding the virtual distance in the overlay identifier space until the destination is
reached. This algorithm is very efficient regarding the overhead generated due to a
lookup. Yet, this approach does not result in a robust lookup mechanism when under
attack. Castro et al. [17] derived an equation to estimate the probability of a successful
lookup process σILR. This equation is based on the average number of overlay hops h
and the fraction of malicious nodes f as shown in Equation 5.3.
σILR = (1− f)
h−1 (5.3)
The number of the average overlay hops that are required to complete a lookup
is defined by the specific P2P routing algorithm. As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3
Pastry introduces an average hop count (hPastry) that is a logarithmic function of the
network size (N) and the parameter b as shown in Equation 5.4.
hPastry = log(2b)(N) (5.4)
5.2 affecting the availability of mobile peer-to-peer services 87
Our Clustered Pastry MP2P approach on the other hand has a hop count (hCP)
that based on the number of overall clusters and on the parameter b as shown in
Equation 5.5.
hCP = 1+ log(2b)(C) ∗ (1−
1
2b
) (5.5)
Besides the fraction of lost requests, the number of sent messages (mILR) per
request and, therefore, the number of required hops must be considered. Those two
metrics correlate and can also be used to estimate the introduced traffic per request.
Furthermore, we have to differentiate between the number of average hops of a
successful request (h) and the number of an average hops (hILR) that also includes
failed requests. In a recursive scenario without any security mechanisms, the average
number of sent lookup messages (mILR) is equal to the number of hops that includes
the failed requests hILR as shown in Equation 5.6.
hILR = mILR =
h−1∑
i=0
(1− f)i−1 (5.6)
discussion
Due to the misbehavior of intermediate nodes, the availability of objects and services,
provided by the MP2P system can be strongly affected. Only a limited number of
malicious nodes suffice to affect the reliability of the recursive routing algorithm
strongly, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, the source of a lookup
is unable to detect the maliciously behaving node due to the recursive structure of
the lookup algorithm. Hence, a second request message may be dropped by the very
same malicious node.
The effect of this attack can further be increased when combined with other attacks
that increase the probability that a lookup message is routed via a malicious node.
Therefore, Sybil attacks as well as a manipulation of routing tables can be performed in
prior of the attack to increase the overall impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack.
5.2.3 Forging Reply Messages
In order to retrieve an object from a DHT, the source of this lookup has to hash the
requested objects name to obtain the objects overlay identifier. Thereafter, a lookup for
this overlay identifier has to be initiated in order to determine the root of this object.
In most cases intermediate overlay nodes are required to forward this request to the
root node. Therefore, the routing tables are used to determine a link to the node that is
logically closest to the overlay identifier in order to forward the request towards its
destination until the root node receives this request.
However, this mechanism introduces a major drawback. The source of the lookup
is unaware of the root node’s overlay identifier but only is aware of the object’s
overlay identifier. By forwarding the request to the virtually closest known node, each
intermediate node may claim to be the root of the object and submit a reply message.
Instead of replying the requested object, this malicious intermediate node may either
provide a faulty object or claim that this object is not available in the network.
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analytic evaluation
This attack affects the network in a very similar way as the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack. Both attacks are initiated by malicious intermediate nodes. Furthermore, a
single intermediate node suffices to result in a failed lookup. Due to this fact, the
same analytic models can be used to determine the impact of this attack (Equation
5.3 and 5.6).
Yet, those attacks differ in the way a maliciously behaving node reacts on an
incoming request message. The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack results in failed lookup
due to the dropped request message. By forging a reply message, the source node
assumes that the lookup has not failed, but the requested object is faulty or not
available in the network.
discussion
Forging reply messages results in a denial of the lookup functionality. Yet, as the
request message is not simply dropped by the malicious node, but a reply message
is sent, it is hard to differ for the source of the request whether a lookup has been
successfully completed but the object is unavailable or if the reply message has been
forged.
This behavior may as well be a result of faulty or stale routing tables. Due to this,
not always a malicious behavior has to be assumed. Furthermore, the impact of this
attack can be increased in a similar way as introduced for the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack.
5.2.4 Summary of Routing Attacks and Maliciously Behaving Root Nodes
Three attacks have been introduced in this section that are able to strongly affect the
availability of the networks services. The first attack is based on denying requested
objects. As a result, this Storage and Retrieval Attack does not respond to received
lookup request or replies a fault object. Thus, only root nodes are able to perform
this attack. Both, the second and the third attack, which have been discussed in
this section, are based on maliciously behaving intermediate nodes. Due to the
structure of the routing tables of a DHT, intermediate nodes are required whenever a
lookup is initiated. Those intermediate nodes have to forward the lookup towards
the destination. Yet, maliciously behaving nodes exploit this requirement to deny
the networks services. Thus, whenever a lookup request is received by a maliciously
behaving node this message is either dropped (Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack) or a
forged reply message is sent (Forging Reply Messages). However, those two strongly
differs on the outcome of this attack. The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack results in a
failed lookup as no reply message is received by the source node. Yet, when forging a
reply message, the source node assumes that the lookup has been successful but the
object is not available in the network.
5.3 evaluation
In this section, the previously discussed attacks are analyzed and evaluated in the
context of our Clustered Pastry system. After analyzing the impact of each of the
previously discussed attacks, the effects of a combination of these attacks is evaluated.
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The evaluation of the maliciously behaving nodes is based on the already introduced
analytic models, on simulation and, in the case of a combined attack, on testbed
results.
5.3.1 Evaluation Settings and Metrics
In the following paragraphs, the evaluation goals are defined and the evaluation
metrics are introduced. Furthermore, evaluation settings as well as used evaluation
methods are discussed.
goal of the evaluation
Our first goal of this evaluation is to determine the impact of the previously dis-
cussed attacks on our Clustered Pastry system. Therefore, we simulate settings with
maliciously behaving intermediate nodes, root nodes and a combination of both.
The analytical models provide a initial indication of how maliciously behaving
nodes may affect the availability of the network’s services. Yet, those models were
developed for static wireless scenarios and do not consider packet loss due to the
wireless characteristics of the MANET underlay. Therefore, our second goal is to
validate these models in the context of MP2P scenarios.
Moreover, the update mechanism of Pastry’s routing table may introduce a vulner-
ability, which may be exploited by maliciously behaving nodes. Clustered Pastry
may inherit this weakness as the overlay is based on the Pastry DHT. Therefore, this
vulnerability should be revealed as our third evaluation goal in this chapter.
evaluation metrics
The Storage and Retrieval Attack, the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack and the Forging
of Reply Messages share a common goal. All of these attacks affect the availability of
the storage and retrieval services provided by the MP2P system. Those maliciously
behaving nodes either exploit the vulnerabilities of the lookup mechanism or deny
stored objects. Due to this fact, we harness the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) as
a basic metric to determine the availability of stored objects in the network.
Moreover, the maliciously behaving nodes that perform the Forging of Reply Messages
or the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack affect the routing algorithm of Clustered Pastry.
Therefore, we analyze the traffic (T ) generated by the MP2P system, in particular
the data amount transmitted during simulation and the average number of underlay
hops per lookup (T ). Those metrics are used to identify the impact of the attacks on
the lookup mechanism.
parameters and settings of the simulation based evaluation
In order to evaluate the impact of maliciously behaving nodes on the Clustered
Pastry system, the OMNeT++ [111] simulator as introduced in Chapter 4.1.3 is used.
Moreover, we implemented the three previously discussed attacks. The maliciously
behaving nodes are selected randomly and perform the selected attack only. For
example, a malicious node that performs the Storage and Retrieval Attack behave
benignly during routing and when a object has to be stored locally, but behaves
malicious when any stored object is requested by any node in the network.
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If not stating otherwise, we use default parameters for the Clustered Pastry system
and the simulated environment as defined in Chapter 4.1.4. Furthermore, traffic
reduction mechanisms are used as proposed in Chapter 3.5.3. We further varied the
fraction of malicious nodes from 0% up to 50% during the evaluation of the routing
attacks.
parameters and settings of the testbed-based evaluation
The combined attack has also been evaluated by two wired Testbeds in order to
determine the characteristics of the overlay in a realistic scenario free from the
influences of the wireless channel. Therefore, the FreePastry [88] implementation of
the Pastry P2P system is used as Clustered Pastry is based on this DHT and, therefore,
those two systems maintain similar routing tables, and use the same routing algorithm.
Default settings of this FreePastry (parameter b = 4, leaf set size of 32 nodes) has been
used to evaluate the combined attack. To provide storage and maintenance services
to the network, FreePastry was extended by the PAST [89] application.
PlanetLab1 is a worldwide testbed for development and deployment of prototypes
in a real-world environment. Larry Peterson (Princeton) and David Culler (UC
Berkeley and Intel Research) initiated this project in 2002. Today, PlanetLab consists
of more than 1150 nodes distributed around the world on nearly 550 sites. While
the hardware and the load of every node differ widely, the PlanetLab software used
to manage access to the testbed and the operating system (Linux Fedora based) is
homogeneous.
The G-Lab2 project started in 2008 and ended in 2012. The major objective of this
project, which was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF), was to create a national network to develop and evaluate future Internet
technologies. More than 150 nodes distributed over Germany at multiple universities
(including Berlin, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, Munich, Kaiserslautern, Würzburg) were
online. These nodes were equipped with homogeneous hardware and the overall load
was low. For management, the PlanetLab software was deployed such that experiments
designed for PlanetLab could be conducted on G-Lab without adaptations.
5.3.2 Evaluation of the Storage and Retrieval Attack
Maliciously behaving nodes are able to deny the access to each object that is stored
locally. In the following paragraphs, we analyze the impact of the Storage and Retrieval
Attack according to our first evaluation goal. Moreover, evaluation results are com-
pared to the previously discussed analytic model to meet the requirements of our
second goal.
The Storage and Retrieval Attack can only be performed by root nodes. Therefore,
we assume a benign behavior of the source and each intermediate node in following
evaluation. Maliciously behaving root nodes reply faulty objects whenever they receive
a lookup request. Those faulty objects have the same size as the original objects but
differ in the provided data.
1 http://www.planet-lab.org/
2 http://www.german-lab.de/
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Figure 32: Influence of the Storage and Retrieval attack on the fraction of failed lookups
In order to evaluate the Storage and Retrieval Attack, three metrics are used: The
fraction of failed lookups (flookup), the overall traffic generated by the Clustered
Pastry system (Toverall) and the average number of underlay hops (Thops).
results of the storage and retrieval attack evaluation
As long as the object and node identifiers are equally distributed in the overlay
identifier-space, the average fraction of failed lookups (flookup) due to this attack
converges to the overall fraction of malicious nodes in the network as depicted in
Equation 5.1. However, the simulation results introduces a slightly increased loss due
to the characteristics of the wireless MP2P network as shown in Figure 32. Apart from
that, simulation based results validate the analytic model discussed previously.
The traffic (T ) introduced to the network by the Storage and Retrieval Attack strongly
depends on the specific implementation of this attack. When malicious nodes drop
request messages or reply that the requested object is not available, the overall traffic
(Toverall) is reduced as no object is transmitted. Yet, when the root node replies a
faulty object the overall traffic is comparable to a benign scenario, even though the
requested object has not been received. Due to this fact, the overall traffic is not
affected by the Storage and Retrieval Attack as we assume that maliciously behaving
root nodes reply fault objects in our scenarios. Moreover, the average number of
overlay and underlay hops (Thops) per lookup is also not affected as the routing
process itself is not influenced by this attack as predicted by the analytic model.
summary of the storage and retrieval attack
We have evaluated the impact of Storage and Retrieval Attack on our Clustered Pastry
system as demanded by our first evaluation goal. Moreover, we were able to validate
the analytic models of this attack, which have been introduced previously, according
to our second goal.
However, as long as no replicas are distributed in the network, all objects that are
stored at a maliciously behaving root node are unavailable for each participant in the
Clustered Pastry network. Thus, the Storage and Retrieval Attack is a very challenging
attack, even though a high fraction of malicious nodes is required in order to deny
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most of the lookup requests initiated in the Clustered Pastry system. The impact of
the Storage and Retrieval Attack can further be strongly increased when performing this
attack in combination with, e.g., the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Therefore, it is
highly recommended to use replication mechanisms in order to introduce robustness
against attacks of maliciously behaving root nodes.
5.3.3 Evaluation of the Impact of Maliciously Behaving Intermediate Nodes
Both, the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack as well as Forging Reply Messages are per-
formed by intermediate nodes during the routing process. Sender and destination
of the request message are assumed as benignly behaving nodes. As a result of both
attacks, the routing request fails. Hence, both attacks affect the network in a similar
way even though these attacks differ regarding the outcome of the lookup. However,
due to these similarities, both attacks are evaluated together in the following para-
graphs in order to satisfy the requirements of our first evaluation goal. According to
our second goal, we will further harness the results of this evaluation to validate the
analytic models of those attacks.
We assume that the impact of those attacks strongly depend on the average number
of overlay hops as mentioned earlier. As the number of overlay hops is a function
of the number of clusters, we vary this parameter during the following evaluation.
Furthermore, we use the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) and the average number
of underlay hops (Thops) as metric to determine the impact of those attacks on our
Clustered Pastry system.
results of the evaluation of maliciously behaving intermediate nodes
The results of the evaluation of maliciously behaving intermediate nodes confirm
our assumption regarding the dependency of the impact of these attacks and the
number of clusters in the network (see also Chapter 5.2.2). As shown in Figure 33a,
the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) in scenarios with two clusters is low com-
pared to the outcomes of scenarios with an increased number of clusters as shown in
Figure 33b and Figure 33c. Especially scenarios with 16 clusters are strongly affected.
For example, approximately 40% of all lookups fail in a scenario where 20% of the
participating nodes behave maliciously. The evaluation results only slightly differ
from the predicted fraction of failed lookups as the models neglect the characteristics
of the lossy wireless channel. However, the number of clusters cannot be chosen
freely but depends on the number of participants as shown in Chapter 4.5. As a
result, networks with an increased number of participants are highly vulnerable to
maliciously behaving intermediate nodes.
As request messages are intercepted by maliciously behaving intermediate nodes
in this scenario, the overall number of overlay and underlay hops (Thops) is affected
by the fraction of malicious nodes. The overlay hop count behaves as predicted by
Equation 5.6. Yet, the number of underlay hops is only slightly decreased even in
scenarios with a high fraction of malicious nodes as shown in Figure 34. As mentioned
in Chapter 3.5, a lookup requested is routed with each hop geographically closer to
the root node of the requested object. As a result, the number of underlay hops that
is required per overlay hop is reduced with each subsequent routing step. Due to this
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(c) 16 Clusters
Figure 33: Impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack on the Clustered Pastry system
as a function of the number of clusters
fact, the number of underlay hops is, therefore, only slightly decreased as a result of
the attack.
summary of the maliciously behaving intermediate nodes
We discussed the evaluation of maliciously behaving intermediate nodes as required
by our first evaluation goal. Attacks initiated by intermediate nodes as the Incorrect
Lookup Routing Attack and the Forging Reply Messages have a high impact on scenarios
with many participants and, therefore, a large number of clusters. Furthermore, the
overall traffic of a network under attack has not been considerably reduced due to the
structure of the Clustered Pastry system. The outcomes of the evaluation moreover
validates the analytical models as required by our second evaluation goal. However,
both of these attacks can further be combined with the Storage and Retrieval Attack as
will be discussed in the following section.
5.3.4 Evaluation of the Combined Attack
By combining two of the previously introduced attacks we assume that we are able
to increase the overall impact of the maliciously behaving nodes. Therefore, we
evaluate a scenario where malicious nodes perform both, the Incorrect Lookup Routing
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Figure 34: Influence of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack on the average number of
underlay hops
Attack and Storage and Retrieval Attack according to our first evaluation goal. As a
result, intermediate and root nodes behave maliciously and drop lookup messages
or reply faulty objects, respectively. Due to this fact, we assume a reduced fraction
of successfully performed lookups (σC) as predicted by Equation 5.7. This fraction
of successfully performed lookups is a function of the average number of required
overlay hops (h) and the fraction of malicious nodes (f). However, the average number
of overlay hops can be assumed as predicted in Equation 5.6. We will validate this
analytic model according to our second goal, in the following evaluation.
σC = (1− f)
h (5.7)
The combined attack was further evaluated by a wired testbed using Pastry [35].
This testbed evaluation of Pastry has been harnessed to analyze the effect of these
attacks on the proximity metric. Therefore, a FreePastry implementation has been
deployed on two different testbeds. Those two testbeds, PlanetLab and G-Lab, strongly
differ according to their characteristics, as discussed earlier.
In order to evaluate the combined attack, 100 nodes have been selected from each
testbed randomly and 5 virtual Pastry peers have been set up on each physical testbed
node. Thus, an overall network size of 500 nodes per testbed could be achieved. The
fraction of maliciously behaving peers had been varied from 0% up to 50% of the
overall number of peers and each setting has been evaluated for 30 minutes. For this
experiment, 10 iterations per setting were used and, furthermore, the maliciously
behaving peers were changed each time, thus equalizing the occasionally strong
impact of single peers as described in the following paragraphs. The testbed based
evaluation is used to identify vulnerabilities of Pastry’s algorithms as required by our
last evaluation goal.
The evaluation of the combined attack is based on two metrics, the fraction of failed
lookups (flookup) and the average number of underlay hops (Thops), to analyze the
attack. Furthermore, default parameters as defined in Chapter 4.1.4 are used.
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(a) Fraction of failed lookups
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(b) Number of underlay hops
Figure 35: Evaluation results of the combined attack on a Clustered Pastry system
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(b) Impact of boot order
Figure 36: Results of the testbed analysis of the combined attack
results of the evaluation of combined attacks
The overall fraction of failed lookups (flookup) of the combined attack is strongly
increased when compared to the outcomes of the evaluations of the underlying
attacks, as predicted by the analytic model. As shown in Figure 35a, even a small
fraction of malicious nodes is able to strongly affect the lookup mechanism of the
Clustered Pastry system. As assumed earlier, the average number of underlay hops
(Thops) is comparable to scenarios that are under attack of the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack only as shown in Figure 35b.
testbed analysis
The averaged results of both testbeds are very similar as shown in Figure 36a. As
Equation 5.4 provides only an upper bound for the hop length, the theoretical packet
delivery rate predicted by Equation 5.3 is lower compared to the testbed results. The
gap between the averaged testbed and theoretical results increases further when the
fraction of malicious nodes increases. Yet, the average results of the testbeds are
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reasonably close to the predicted results by the mathematical model proposed by
Castro et al. [17].
On the other hand, analyzing single scenarios reveals effects that are not considered
in that mathematical model. We discuss the scenario with 10% malicious peers in
which we analyzed the impact of the distribution of malicious peers with respect
to the order with which they join the DHT. In Figure 36b the packet loss ratio is
shown according to the setting number. In the first setting, the first 50 nodes that
join the network behave maliciously (nodes 1 to 50 in the boot order). In the second
scenario, nodes 51 to 100 behave maliciously and so on. The results of the two testbeds
vary significantly. As nodes in PlanetLab differ strongly in network load and link
quality, Pastry’s Round Trip Time (RTT) based proximity metric that determines
which nodes are listed in the routing table strongly affects the impact of the routing
attack: malicious peers with a good connection are included in routing tables with a
higher probability than benign peers with an average connection. However, in G-Lab,
nodes are homogenous regarding load and connectivity. Therefore, the RTT is mostly
equal. This results in an increased impact of malicious nodes which boot first during
the scenario. As those nodes were distributed in the routing tables at the beginning
and are not replaced by nodes that provide a better RTT, their impact on the lookup
process is increased.
The proximity metrics influence the distributions of links to nodes in the routing
tables. Yet, this can be exploited in order to increase the impact of routing attacks.
For example, a maliciously behaving node that plans to attack a specific node may
position itself geographically close in order to provide the best RTT. As a result,
this malicious node would be represented with a high probability in the victims
routing table and, therefore, is able to attack this node. Due to this reason and as a
proximity metric would result in an increased traffic overhead (see also Chapter 3.5.3),
no proximity metric has been used in context of Clustered Pastry.
summary of the combined attack
To sum it up, we have shown in the previous paragraphs the impact of a attack that
combines the Storage and Retrieval Attack with the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack as
required by our first evaluation goal. By combining those attacks, we were able to
increase the overall impact of the attack on the availability of services provided to
the Clustered Pastry system. Therefore, security mechanisms are required that are
able to collaborate in order to ensure the robustness of our Clustered Pastry system.
Moreover, we were able to validate the analytic model of the combined attack as
required by our second evaluation goal.
Furthermore, we harnessed a testbed evaluation of the combined attack to detect
vulnerabilities introduced by the overlay as required due to our third evaluation goal.
As a result, we have shown that the proximity metric strongly affects the impact of
the combined attack. Moreover, this metric can be exploited by maliciously behaving
nodes in order to increase the impact of their attacks. Therefore, no proximity metric
is used in the context of Clustered Pastry.
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5.4 chapter summary
After we have designed and evaluated the Clustered Pastry system in the previous
two chapters, security threats for the resulting MP2P system have been discussed in
this chapter. Therefore, existing attacks and security mechanisms on the underlying
architectures have been surveyed.
Security mechanisms, which have been proposed for MANETs, were mostly not
designed for a specific application. Therefore, we assume that the underlay of our
MP2P system can be secured by using these existing mechanisms. However, mech-
anisms developed for DHTs often require either a reliable transmission rate or an
increased amount of bandwidth. Due to this fact, we compared challenges introduced
by the overlay with the related work in the area of MP2P security. As a result, we
were able to identify open challenges in the area of routing attacks on the overlay’s
lookup functionality.
Based on this survey, three challenging attacks on the Clustered Pastry’s overlay
have been discussed and evaluated by an analytical approach, by simulation, and, in
case of a combined attack, based on testbed results. We further harnessed the results
simulation based evaluation in order to validate the analytic models. All of those
analyzed attacks are capable to affect the availability of the networks services in terms
of denying stored objects. Furthermore, the negative affect of a combined attack on
the proximity metric of a DHT has been validated.
To sum it up, security threats introduced by the overlay routing have been discussed
and analyzed. As a result, we were able to show that routing attacks and maliciously
behaving root nodes have a high impact on MP2P systems as our Clustered Pastry.
This impact on the network can even be increased by combining two attacks. As a
result, security mechanisms are highly required to provide robustness against those
attacks and to ensure reliable services of MP2P systems.
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S E C U R I T Y M E C H A N I S M S F O R M O B I L E P E E R - T O - P E E R
A R C H I T E C T U R E S
»Security is about preventing adverse consequences from
the intentional and unwarranted actions of others.«
— Bruce Schneier
In Chapter 3 Clustered Pastry, a mobile, wireless system has been introduced thatis able to store data in a decentralized way. By using the location awareness of
the participating nodes during routing, services can be provided efficiently and in a
reliable way by this clustered approach.
The characteristics of this system introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited in
order to attack the Clustered Pastry system as discussed in the previous chapter. This
includes routing attacks as well as malicious behavior of root nodes. Therefore, three
prominent and challenging attacks have been discussed extensively in the previous
chapter. In order to ensure a reliable operation of the Clustered Pastry system, security
mechanisms are required to provide robustness against those attacks.
To provide robustness to the Storage and Retrieval Attack, replication mechanisms
are discussed in the first part of this chapter. However, MP2P systems benefit from
replicas beyond security issues. Thus, we survey existing replication mechanisms that
have been proposed for MANET and P2P systems in the light of MP2P scenarios and
discuss their shortcomings in this chapter. Moreover, we introduce replication mecha-
nisms that have been adapted to the characteristics of our Clustered Pastry system in
the context of this thesis. In the second part of this chapter, security mechanisms are
discussed that ensures that lookup requests are not dropped or misrouted by mali-
ciously behaving intermediate nodes. Thus, two mechanisms that have been proposed
for DHTs are analyzed in MP2P scenarios. Moreover, our Overlay WatchDog [36] is
proposed to provide robustness against the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Therefore,
the characteristics of a wireless transmission are exploited to detect maliciously be-
having nodes. The last part of this chapter discusses validation mechanisms to detect
Forged Reply messages. Thus, two new validation mechanisms are developed [40]
and compared to an approach that has been proposed by Castro et al. [17].
6.1 replication mechanism
MP2P systems, as assumed in this thesis provide services in terms of the storage
and retrieval of data objects. The availability of these services is essential as discussed
in the previous chapter. However, even when considering a benign behavior of
all participating nodes during the routing of a root node, those services may be
unavailable due to multiple reasons as long as these objects are stored at a single
node only. For example, a root node may deny the object or may have left the network.
Therefore, a replication mechanism is required in order to increase the availability of
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the stored objects in the network. In the following paragraphs, we survey challenges
that can only be addressed by replication.
ensure basic functionality
Objects may get lost due to churn in P2P [116] and, even more, in Clustered Pastry
systems as additional churn has to be considered due to nodes that change the cluster.
Whenever a node leaves the network unexpectedly, e.g., due to node failure, objects
maintained by this node may become unavailable [115]. Therefore, a basic replication
mechanism has already been introduced in Chapter 3.6.1.
In addition, replicas can be used to increase the probability that a lookup is
performed successfully and, furthermore, reduce the overhead generated due to the
retrieval of an object. By distributing replicas in the network, each node that initiates a
lookup is able to retrieve the requested object from the root of a replica that is located
geographically closest.
provision of robustness against attacks
As discussed in the previous chapter, the availability of objects can be strongly affected
by maliciously behaving nodes. Distributing replicas in the network can be harnessed
to increase the robustness against multiple attacks including routing attacks and, in
particular, the Storage and Retrieval Attack. Even though other mechanisms can be used
to decrease the impact of routing attacks, only replicas can be used to improve the
network’s robustness against maliciously behaving root nodes.
object availability in partitioned networks
In MP2P scenarios, a single node or a group of nodes may be temporarily disconnected
from the rest of the network. This may be a result of the nodes limited transmission
range, the mobility, and the resulting highly dynamic structure of the network. Due
to this fact, objects that are solely stored at those disconnected nodes are no longer
available to the rest of the network. By harnessing replicas, data loss as a result of
network partitioning can be reduced.
6.1.1 Challenges in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
We assume that several challenges have to be considered when developing a repli-
cation mechanism due to the characteristics introduced by the MP2P system. Once
again, the strongly limited resources have to be taken into account, in particular the
available bandwidth. Due to this fact, the number of replicas as well as the distribution
mechanism has to be designed carefully. Storing only few replicas may result in a low
robustness to maliciously behaving nodes. Yet, a high number of replicas results in a
high traffic overhead due to uploading and updating those replicas. Earlier attempts
to distribute replicas in MANETs further assumed that the mobile devices are strongly
limited in their local memory [12]. Yet, we consider only small scale objects in the
context of this thesis as defined by our disaster relief scenario (see also Chapter
3.1). Furthermore, most modern mobile devices provide a large memory nowadays
(often more than 1 GB). Therefore, storage limitations are neglected in the context of
this thesis. Besides limited resources, the dynamic topology introduces challenges
for the replication mechanism [79]. Objects have to be redistributed frequently due
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to cluster-based churn. Furthermore, objects may be unavailable due to network
partitioning [79].
To sum it up, a replication mechanism has to balance the costs of replication
regarding bandwidth with the resulting benefits as the increased robustness of the
network.
existing replication mechanisms in the light of mobile peer-to-peer
As discussed in Chapter 2, several replication mechanisms have been developed
for MANETs and P2P systems. Even though those mechanisms can be deployed
in MP2P scenarios as well, harnessing Clustered Pastry’s structure to increase the
benefits for the replication of objects is assumed to be more promising as we are able
distribute the replicas more efficiently.
Replication mechanisms that were introduced for DHTs are mostly highly struc-
tured due to the characteristics of the overlay [48][10][90]. Those mechanisms harness
the virtual identities of objects to replicate them on a specific set of nodes. Due to
this fact, objects can be stored, retrieved, and updated at root nodes with a low effort
in terms of maintenance costs. For example, replication mechanisms proposed by
Rowstron et al. [89] and Castro et al. [17] store replicas at the virtual neighbors of the
root node of an object. Though, most overlay based replication mechanism does not
consider the geographical location of the root nodes during the replica allocation. As
mentioned earlier, this may be essential to increase the availability of objects under
the light of network partitioning. Furthermore, when considering the geographical
location of nodes during the distribution of the replicas, the number of required
messages can be reduced.
On the other hand, mechanisms developed for the MANET underlay are often
based on the geographical distribution of objects [46][45][47][69]. However, those
mechanisms are, in most cases, uncoordinated and use a flooding based allocation
mechanism to distribute or update the replicas. Yet, only few coordinated allocation
mechanisms have been introduced in related work. A coordination mechanism is
required to organize the replicas in the MANET. However, this mechanism introduces
traffic overhead that should be avoided in the context of MP2P systems.
By combining the benefits of MANET and DHT replication mechanisms, we may
be able to overcome the previously discussed challenges. As a result, we propose a
structured and location aware replication mechanism that has been developed for the
Clustered Pastry system.
6.1.2 Basic Replication
Clustered Pastry uses a basic replication mechanism in order to avoid data loss due
to churn as already discussed in Chapter 3.6.1. The basic replicas (hereinafter to be
referred to as local replicas) are locally replicated at the virtual neighbors of the root
node as shown in Figure 37. These virtual neighbors are located within the same
cluster due to the Clustered Pastry’s structure.
However, those objects are not used during routing but only to redistribute the ob-
jects when nodes leave a cluster. Therefore, they cannot be used to provide robustness
against maliciously behaving nodes. Furthermore, the replicas are stored within the
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Figure 37: An example for the distributing secondary replicas on virtual neighbors
same cluster at virtual neighbors. Due to this fact, local replicas are located in the
same geographical area. As a result, we assume that this basic replication mechanism
offers only a limited robustness against network partitioning as all replicas may
become unavailable when a single node group is disconnected from the Clustered
Pastry network.
6.1.3 Inter-Cluster Replication
Our Clustered Pastry system uses clusters to provide a location-aware distribution of
the overlay identifier as discussed in Chapter 3. This awareness of the geographical
location of the nodes can further be harnessed to optimize the distribution of replicas.
Thus, we developed the Inter-Cluster Replication (ICR) mechanism.
Three major requirements have been previously identified that have to be satis-
fied by an MP2P replication mechanism. The basic replication scheme ensures the
availability of stored objects even during churn. The remaining goals, which include
the robustness against maliciously behaving root nodes and network partitioning,
have to be met by the adapted replica mechanism that is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
We propose to distribute the replicas among the clusters. For example, in a setting
with four clusters, a replica is stored at each cluster as shown in Figure 38. Thus,
this approach is based on the geographically separation of clusters. As described by
Equation 6.1, the identifier of the replicas (IDreplica) can be easily determined as long
as the identifier of the requested object (IDobject) and the number of global replicas
(k) is known. Furthermore, the highest identifier in the identifier space (IDmax) is
used to derive the identifiers of the stored objects. However, the number of global
replicas including the original object (k+ 1) has to be smaller than the overall number
of clusters. Whenever a higher ratio of replicas stored in a single cluster is required,
the number of local replicas has to be increased. Furthermore, k is defined as a
non-negative integer to the power of 2.
ID
j
replica = (IDobject +
(IDmax + 1) ∗ j
k+ 1
)mod(IDmax + 1), j = 1,..,k (6.1)
Due to this distribution mechanism, we can assure that replicas are stored at ge-
ographically separated nodes. Therefore, we assume a high availability of objects
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Figure 38: An example for an Inter Cluster Replication
even when the network is split due to, e.g., node mobility. As a result, this approach
provides a high degree of robustness against data loss due to network partitioning.
Furthermore, distributing nodes equally in the deployment area increases the ro-
bustness against maliciously behaving nodes. As mentioned earlier, Sybil attacks can
increase the impact of, e.g., Storage and Retrieval Attacks as a single malicious node
is able to generate multiple virtual identities. Though, when replicas are used, a
malicious node has to get hold of each replica of the object it wants to deny. As the
replicas are distributed in different separated clusters when using the ICR mechanism,
a Sybil attack cannot be used in order to obtain each replica as the physical Sybil node
and, therefore, each virtual identity is located in a single cluster. However, threshold
areas can be exploited in order to generate virtual identities in adjacent clusters.
This replication mechanism is further similar to the approach introduced by Harvesf
and Blough [48][49]. Yet, this approach only distributes the replicas equally in the
namespace of the overlay identifier and not in the deployment area.
This replication mechanism further results in an increased traffic overhead due to
uploading or updating objects as the replicas are stored at geographically separated
parts of the network. Furthermore, the overall number of clusters limits the maximum
number of replicas as there never should be more than a single global replica of the
same object within a cluster.
storage of objects
Whenever an object has to be stored in the network, the object identifier has to be
determined as already discussed in Chapter 3.5.4. Thereafter, the identifiers of the
global replicas are derived based on the objects identifier. The ICR mechanism uses
the object provider to distribute the object and the global replicas in the network.
However, if a lookup for a root node fails, no global replica will be stored in this
cluster. Subsequently, local replicas are distributed locally in the cluster by the root
nodes of the object and the global replicas. Those local replicas are required in order
to ensure that neither objects nor replicas get lost due to churn. Considering this
distribution algorithm, the overall number of global replicas including the original
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object (kreal) depends on the fraction of successful lookups (σ) and can be derived as
shown in Equation 6.2.
kreal =
k∑
j=1
σj (6.2)
retrieval of objects
When requesting an object, the source of the lookup determines the geographically
closest replica. Thereafter, a lookup is initiated and, after receiving the appropriate
reply message, the requested object is retrieved. Yet, whenever no reply message or
object is received or when a faulty object is retrieved, a lookup for another replica is
initiated. This procedure is repeated until either the object is retrieved successfully or
all root nodes of global replicas have been contacted.
The fraction of successfully retrieved objects (p) is a function of the number of
distributed objects in the network (kreal), the fraction of successful lookups (σ) and
the fraction of malicious nodes that performs Storage and Retrieval Attacks in the
network (f) as shown in Equation 6.3. Routing attacks as the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack are not directly considered in this equation but are included in the fraction of
successful lookups (σ).
p = 1− (1− σ(1− f))kreal (6.3)
discussion
By harnessing this replication mechanism, replicas are distributed equally in the
deployment area. This mechanism distributes an average number of overall replicas
(roverall) that is based on the number of correctly allocated global replicas kreal and
the number of local replicas per global replica (rlocal) as shown in Equation 6.4.
roverall = kreal ∗ rlocal (6.4)
The ICR mechanism introduces multiple benefits. Due to the equally distributed
replicas, the robustness against data loss due to network partitioning and Storage and
Retrieval Attacks is provided (see also Chapter 6.2.2 and Chapter 6.2.4). Furthermore,
the fraction of successfully received objects can be improved due to the replicas.
Moreover, overhead due looking up an object can be reduced by retrieving objects
by a geographically close replica. However, distributing and updating these replicas
introduces overhead in terms of traffic. Furthermore, a high amount of traffic is
generated locally whenever a node shares an object. This may effect the efficiency of
the ICR replication mechanism.
6.1.4 Cyclic Replica Allocation
The ICR mechanism introduces multiple benefits to a location aware MP2P system as
Clustered Pastry. However, ICR’s replica distribution mechanism of the is not optimal.
A high amount of traffic is introduced locally by the content provider. This node has
to centrally lookup the root of the original object as well as the root nodes of the global
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Figure 39: An example for the Cyclic Replica Allocation scheme
replicas. Thereafter, all of these objects and replicas have to be uploaded by the content
provider. Furthermore, overhead is generated as objects have to be transmitted to
distant nodes. The Cyclic Replica Allocation (CRA) harnesses a different distribution
scheme. The content provider uploads the object to the geographically closest root
node only. Thereafter, this object is forwarded by this root node to another logically
close root node. As a result, objects are not distributed by a single node but by a set
of root nodes.
The CRA shares characteristics with the ICR, which has been discussed in the
previous section. Both replication mechanisms benefit from the location-dependent
overlay identifier. Furthermore, both mechanisms distribute the replicas equally in
the identifier namespace and harness the same retrieval algorithm. Yet, they differ
with reference to the replica allocation scheme.
storage of objects
The CRA does not differentiate between the original object and the global replicas.
Due to this fact, both, the global replicas and the original object are hereinafter
referred to as global replica. Whenever, an object has to be stored in the Clustered
Pastry system, the set of global replicas is determined as shown in Equation 6.1.
Based on this set, a replication order is defined. Therefore, Pastry’s ring structure is
harnessed as discussed in Chapter 2.1.3. The global replicas are ordered according to
their virtual clockwise distance to the content provider on this ring structure. However,
a global replica that is located in the same cluster as the content provider is always
prioritized in the replication order regardless of the virtual distance between those
nodes.
After defining the replication order, the content provider initiates a lookup process
for the root node of the first global replica. Thereafter, the new object is transmitted
to the root node and is stored locally. This root node distributes local replicas as
discussed in Chapter 6.1.2 and initiates a lookup process for the second root node
according to the replication order. The object is forwarded by each root node until the
last root node receives the object as shown in Figure 39.
This distribution scheme affects the overall number of stored global replicas in-
cluding the original object (kCRAreal ) as described in Equation 6.5. Whenever a lookup
process for a root node fails, also all subsequent replicas cannot be allocated due to
the recursive propagation of global replicas. However, considering a fraction of 95%
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Figure 40: An example for the Optimized Cyclic Replica Allocation
of successfully performed lookups in a setting with 4 replicas, more than 3.5 replicas
are actually stored in the network on average.
kCRAreal =
k∑
j=1
σj (6.5)
discussion
The CRA introduces an improved distribution mechanism and ensures that replicas
are distributed efficiently with a high probability when considering a network with
a reasonable fraction of successful lookup operations. Furthermore, the traffic of an
upload is not anymore generated by a single node but is divided among a set of
nodes, which are distributed in the deployment area. This may be essential especially
when considering that some few nodes may provide a large fraction of the networks
content. Moreover, as the global replicas are not distributed by a single node but by
several root nodes and due to the dedicated replication order, the average distance in
terms of underlay hops between the distributing node and the target root node can
be reduced.
Yet, maliciously behaving nodes may further not be willing to forward an object
correctly to the root node. As a result, the number of correctly distributed replicas in
the network is strongly decreased as shown in Equation 6.6. For example, a fraction
of 25% maliciously behaving nodes would reduce the number of available replicas by
50% on average in a setting with 4 global replicas.
kCRAreal−mal =
k∑
j=1
(σjj ∗ (1− f)j) (6.6)
6.1.5 Optimized Cyclic Replica Allocation
The CRA mechanism introduces a vulnerability to malicious behavior as discussed in
the previous paragraph. Therefore, the Optimized Cyclic Replica Allocation (OCRA)
mechanism has been developed to overcome this weakness. By using two different
replication paths to distribute the global replicas, the average fraction of successfully
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Content provider
Root of object / global replica
Replication path
Figure 41: An example for the Cyclic Replica Allocation in a scenario with 16 clusters
distributed replicas can be strongly improved. Even when considering malicious
behavior, a reliable distribution of objects can be assured.
OCRA, CRA and ICR harness the same algorithm to select the root nodes and to
retrieve replicas. Yet, they differ on how the replicas are distributed in the network.
storage of objects
As shown in Figure 40, one copy of the object is forwarded to the root node that is
located in the same cluster. A second copy of the object is forwarded to the next root
node that is located counter clockwise in the virtual name space. Thereafter, both root
nodes that received the object store it locally as global replica and forward this object.
Therefore, those objects are forwarded clockwise and counter clockwise, respectively.
As a result, redundancy is introduced due to the two replication paths. However, an
increased overhead is introduced as at least one redundant lookup message has to be
sent (indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 40).
Due to the OCRA mechanism, the number of successfully distributed replicas
(kOCRAreal ) can be increased. As a result of the redundant replication paths, an increased
fraction of replicas can be correctly distributed as shown in Equation 6.7.
kOCRAreal =
k∑
j=1
[
σj + (1− σj) ∗ σ1+k−j] (6.7)
discussion
The OCRA mechanism is able to improve the availability of replicas in an MP2P
network as shown in Equation 6.8. Furthermore, the allocation of objects is more
reliable than either the ICR or CRA mechanism when considering a setting without
maliciously behaving nodes (considering a scenario with 4 replicas and a fraction
of successfully uploaded replicas of 95%). However, an increased number of sent
lookup messages are introduced by the OCRA mechanism and, therefore, an increased
amount of traffic overhead is generated due to the distribution of the global replicas.
kOCRAreal−mal =
k∑
j=1
[
σj ∗ (1− f)j + (1− σj) ∗ σ1+k−j ∗ (1− f)1+k−j] (6.8)
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Figure 42: An example for the Delegate Replica Allocation
6.1.6 Delegate Replica Allocation
The previously discussed CRA mechanisms provide efficient services as long as
settings with a limited amount of clusters are assumed. Yet, considering settings
with 16 or more clusters, the cyclic distribution mechanisms replicate objects in an
inefficient way. Global replicas are distributed on a zigzag route due to the structure
of the clusters in the network and as a result of the CRA and the OCRA distribution
scheme, as shown in Figure 41. As a result, an overhead is introduced due to the
resulting replication paths.
We thus propose the Delegate Replica Allocation (DRA) mechanism to overcome
this challenge and to distribute replicas more efficiently in a network with a high
number of clusters. Therefore, aspects of the cluster allocation and the structure
of the routing table of Clustered Pastry have been taken into consideration during
the development of this replication mechanism. As a result, a highly structured
dissemination of replicas can be achieved.
The DRA mechanism shares several characteristics of the previously introduced
replication mechanisms. Thus, objects can be retrieved in a similar way. Yet, those
mechanisms differ on how to determine the identifier of the next replica (IDreplica)
that has to be stored. This identifier is a function objects identifier (idobject) and
the cluster prefix of the given target cluster (idprefix). Furthermore, a simple bit
concatenation is required as shown in Equation 6.9
IDDRAreplica = idprefix, idobject[l− lprefix − 1 : 0] (6.9)
storage of objects
Whenever an object has to be stored in the network, the content provider determines
the overlay identifier of all root nodes. Thereafter, the object is forwarded to the root
node that is either located in the same cluster or that is the virtually close to the
content provider. This first root node compares the list of replicas with the entries
of its routing table. As a result, a lookup for each root node is initiated where a
routing table entry is available that link to a node that is located in the same cluster.
After determining the second set of root nodes, a copy of the object is transmitted.
Afterwards, those root nodes use their routing table to determine the third set of root
nodes locally. Therefore, the routing table entries are used but entries that differ on
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the first prefix are neglected. The replicas are distributed in this way until all root
nodes, which could be determined by a lookup, received a replica as shown in Figure
42. Moreover, with each subsequent set of root nodes, the number of neglected prefix
digits is increased.
As a result, the number of correctly allocated replicas depends on the structure of
Clustered Pastry and, therefore, on the number of clusters (C). The resulting number
of replicas is shown in Equation 6.10.
kDRAreal = σ ∗ (1+ σ)(log2(C)) (6.10)
discussion
The DRA algorithm harnesses the structure of Clustered Pastry in order to distribute
the replicas in a more efficient way. Therefore, the average number of underlay hops
that is required to distribute replicas can be reduced. Moreover, this results in a
increased fraction of correctly allocated replicas. However, this also results in a highly
specialized replication mechanism. Thus, DRA can only be used efficiently in the
context of the Clustered Pastry system.
6.1.7 Conclusions on the Replication Mechanisms
As discussed in this section, replicas are required in MP2P systems due to multiple
reasons. Replicas can be harnessed to prevent churn and to reduce the impact of a net-
work partitioning. Furthermore, a replication mechanism can be used to increase the
networks robustness to maliciously behaving root nodes. In the previous paragraphs,
we introduced and discussed five replication mechanisms.
The basic replication mechanism ensures the availability of objects even when
nodes leave the network unexpectedly by distributing local replicas in the cluster
of the object’s root node. As a result, this mechanism provides robustness against
churn. This basic mechanism is furthermore included in each of the other replication
mechanisms. The four other replication mechanisms distribute global replicas equally
in the identifier namespace and, due to the structure of Clustered Pastry, in the
deployment areas. As a result, objects are only lost due to a network partitioning when
multiple nodes that are located in different parts of the deployment area disconnect at
the same time from the network. Moreover, robustness against maliciously behaving
root nodes is introduced by those replication mechanisms (as will be proved in the
next section).
The remaining four replication mechanisms share multiple characteristics but differ
on the distribution mechanism. ICR uses the content provider to distribute the replicas
while CRA distributes the replicas via the root nodes. OCRA is based on a similar
algorithm as CRA but introduces redundancy in order to increase the number of
correctly allocated replicas. Moreover, we developed the DRA to harness the structure
of Clustered Pastry to optimize the distribution mechanism.
6.2 evaluation of the replication mechanisms
Besides the basic replication mechanism, four replication mechanisms have been
introduced in the previous section. These mechanisms differ in their replica alloca-
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tion algorithms. In the following paragraphs, the efficiency of those mechanisms is
evaluated by means of simulation.
6.2.1 Evaluation Goals, Metrics, and Methods
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the goals of the evaluation. Moreover, we
define the metrics that are harnessed to determine the efficiency of the replication
mechanisms and introduce the evaluation tools.
evaluation goals
We harness replicas in order to increase the robustness against maliciously behaving
root nodes and to minimize data loss due to unavailable nodes. Thus, the goals of the
following evaluation are based on those two areas of application.
We introduced multiple replication mechanisms in the previous section. Thus,
we have to evaluate the compare the efficiency of those mechanisms, as our first
evaluation goal. This also includes the robustness provided by these mechanisms
to maliciously behaving root nodes. Moreover, we introduced DRA as a replication
mechanism, that is adapted to the structure of Clustered Pastry. Therefore, we have
to compare the efficiency of the allocation algorithm of DRA with a non-adapted
mechanism as our second evaluation goal.
Due to node mobility, groups of nodes may get disconnected from the MP2P
network especially when considering sparse networks in terms of networks with a
low node coverage. As a result, the availability of objects that are stored at these
nodes may be affected. However, we assume that replicas can be used to increase
the networks robustness against network partitioning. Thus, we have to validate the
influence of replicas in networks with a low node density as our third evaluation goal.
evaluation metrics
We use three evaluation metrics in order to evaluate the efficiency of the replication
mechanisms: The fraction of failed lookups (flookup), the traffic introduced by the
Clustered Pastry system (T ) and the fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate).
The fraction of failed lookups (flookup) is used to indicate the availability of the
data objects stored in the network. Therefore, we are able to determine the robustness
of our replication mechanisms against attacks as the Storage and Retrieval Attack based
on this metric. As we assume an increased traffic due to the distribution of the replicas,
the overall traffic introduced by the Clustered Pastry system (T ) is used as our second
metric. As the bandwidth is limited due to the wireless underlay, the traffic overhead
generated by the replication mechanisms has to be minimized. As the last metric, we
harness the fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate) to indicate whether the
replicas are distributed correctly in the network.
evaluation methods
We evaluate our replication mechanisms by the means of simulation. Therefore, we
use our Clustered Pastry model that has been developed for the OMNeT++ simulator,
which has been described in Chapter 4.1.3. Moreover, replication mechanisms as dis-
cussed in the previous section have been implemented. We assume default parameters
of the Clustered Pastry model as defined in Chapter 4.1.4.
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Figure 43: The impact of the Storage and Retrieval Attack on settings with and without
replication mechanism
6.2.2 Comparison of Replica Distribution Mechanisms
In the previous section, multiple replication mechanisms have been introduced. Those
mechanisms differ mostly on the how the replicas are distributed in the deployment
area. When using the ICR mechanism, all replicas are distributed by the content
provider, while the CRA and the OCRA only use the content provider to initiate the
distribution of the replicas in the network. Thereafter, the distribution of the replicas
is handled by the root nodes. We assume that this affects the overall traffic introduced
by the Clustered Pastry system as well as the fraction of correctly allocated replicas.
However, in the following evaluation, we directly compare our replication mecha-
nisms when under attack. Therefore, up to 50% of the root nodes behave maliciously
and deny requested objects (Storage and Retrieval Attack). We use the three previ-
ously introduced metrics (flookup, T , fallocate) to determine the efficiency of each
replication mechanism.
results of the comparison of replica distribution mechanisms
The replication mechanisms distribute a global replica in each of the clusters. Yet,
those mechanisms differ in the way the replicas are allocated and, therefore, in the
fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate). The ICR mechanism harness the
content provider to distribute the replica directly. Thus, a large amount of traffic is
generated by the content provider due to this mechanism. Moreover, the geographical
distance between a root node and the content provider may be high. As a result, only
60% of the replicas are allocated in the network on average. The CRA mechanism has
been developed to overcome this drawback. CRA harness the root nodes to distribute
the replicas in the network. The content provider only has to forward the object to
the geographically closest root node. Thereafter, the object is forwarded from this
root node to another root node that is located in the adjacent cluster. The objects
are forwarded by the root nodes until all replicas are correctly distributed. Thus,
the objects always have only to be forwarded to the next cluster. Yet, when a single
lookup fails, no further replicas can be distributed. However, the fraction of correctly
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Figure 44: The impact of the Storage and Retrieval Attack on settings with and without
replication mechanism
allocated replicas (fallocate) introduced by the CRA mechanism is increased to 88%.
Though, we were able to improve the fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate)
by introducing a second replication path by the OCRA mechanism. As a result, we
were able to ensure that 95% of all replicas were allocated correctly.
All of our proposed replication mechanisms are able to increase the robustness
against the Storage and Retrieval Attack. The ICR and CRA mechanism are able to re-
duce the impact of those maliciously behaving nodes by providing replicas. Therefore,
the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) can be strongly reduced as shown in Figure
43. However, as OCRA is able to allocate replicas in a more reliable way due to the
redundancy introduced by the allocation algorithm, also the fraction of failed lookups
can be slightly improved compared to results provided by ICR or CRA.
Yet, all of those replication mechanisms introduce an increased traffic (T ). As we
propose to distribute the replicas in different clusters, the overall traffic is increased
by up to 40% as shown in Figure 44. ICR introduces the lowest traffic overhead of 10%
due to the reduced number of correctly allocated replicas. CRA introduces a traffic,
that is increased by nearly 38%. Due to the redundant allocation algorithm of OCRA
a slightly higher traffic is introduced by this replication mechanism. On average the
overall traffic of the Clustered Pastry system is increased by 40% when using OCRA
mechanism compared to a setting without any replication mechanism.
summary of the comparison of replica distribution mechanisms
ICR, CRA, and OCRA are all able to increase Clustered Pastry’s robustness against
maliciously behaving root nodes. Yet, ICR introduces only a low fraction of correctly
allocated replicas (fallocation) as discussed previously. Thus, CRA provides better
results when considering the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) and the fraction
of correctly allocated (fallocation) replicas. However, by introducing redundancy to
the replication mechanism, OCRA performs even better as CRA but on the cost of a
slightly increased traffic.
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(a) Fraction of failed lookups
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(b) Correctly allocated replicas
Figure 45: Comparison of 4 and 16 cluster settings with OCRA and DRA
6.2.3 Replication in Settings with a High Number of Clusters
Both, CRA and OCRA have been optimized for settings with either 2 or 4 clusters. As
discussed in the previous section, we assume that the efficiency of those mechanisms
is degraded in settings with an increased number of clusters. Yet, an increased number
of clusters is required in large scale settings with a high number of participating
nodes. Therefore, we developed the DRA mechanism, which harnesses the structure of
Clustered Pastry to allocate the replicas. In the following paragraphs we evaluate this
replication mechanisms in settings with 4 and 16 clusters and compare the outcomes
to the results provided by the OCRA mechanism.
results for settings with a high number of clusters
Both replication mechanisms provide reliable results when considering the fraction of
failed lookups (flookup) as shown in Figure 45a. Yet, when considering the results of
settings with 16 clusters, the fraction of failed lookups is slightly increased compared
to a settings without replication as a high traffic overhead is generated due to the
high number of replicas that are distributed in a relatively small field.
Though, both replication mechanisms differ in the fraction of correctly allocated
replicas (fallocation) in setting with a high number of clusters. As shown in Figure
45b, OCRA is not able to allocate the replicas reliable when considering a setting
with 16 clusters as a result of the distribution order of the replicas. However, as our
DRA mechanism is adapted to the structure of Clustered Pastry, the replicas can
be allocated in a far more reliable way. Thus, the average number of underlay hops
that is required to allocate the replicas can be reduced and, therefore, replicas can be
allocated with a higher probability.
Moreover, both replication mechanisms introduce the same traffic (T ) due to the
replication of objects in settings with 4 clusters. However, when increasing the number
of clusters, DRA introduces a higher amount of traffic as a result of the higher amount
of correctly replicated objects.
summary of the replication in settings with a high number of clus-
ters
Both, OCRA and DRA allocate replicas with a very high probability in settings with 4
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Setting Nodes Deployment area Connectivity
A 100 1100m x 1100m 99.2%
B 100 14000m x 1400m 94.5%
C 100 1600m x 1600m 87.5%
D 100 1700m x 1700m 80.5%
E 100 1800m x 1800m 72.5%
Table 6: Deployment area in settings with sparse networks
clusters. Yet, when considering an increased number of clusters, the OCRA mecha-
nism fails to distribute replicas in an efficient way due to long replication paths. DRA
is adapted to the structure of the Clustered Pastry system and, therefore, the average
distance between the node that distributes the replica and the root node in terms
of underlay hops is reduced. As a result, replicas are allocated in a more reliable
way. However, in order to use DRA in combination with any other MP2P system, the
allocation algorithm of DRA has to be adapted in order to ensure the efficiency of
this approach.
6.2.4 Replication Mechanisms in Sparse Settings
MP2P systems as Clustered Pastry are based on a wireless, mobile underlay. Thus,
single nodes or a group of nodes may be disconnected from the rest of the network
due to the dynamic topology of the underlay. As a result, objects that were stored
at the disconnected nodes are not anymore available for the rest of the network. By
distributing replicas in the network, the availability of the objects can be improved as
multiple root nodes have to disconnect at the same time from the network in order
result in a lost object.
However, we assume that the specific allocation of the replicas affects the efficiency
against data loss due to network partitioning. Replication mechanisms developed for
DHTs often harness the overlay identifier to allocate replicas. Thus, the distribution
mechanism proposed by Castro et al. [17] uses virtual neighbors of the root node
to store the replicas is used as reference model. In the following paragraphs, we
compare the impact of sparse settings with a replication mechanism that harness
the virtual neighbors as proposed by Castro et al. with our OCRA mechanism. As
shown in Chapter 6.2.2, OCRA provides the best results in settings with 4 clusters
and considers the geographical position of the nodes during replication. Thus, objects
are distributed equally in the deployment area.
Five settings were evaluated that differ in the size of the deployment area as
shown in Table 6. While setting A is our default setting for a 100 node simulation as
defined in Chapter 4.1.4, the subsequent settings are based on an increased size of the
deployment area. We used the ANSim [50] tool to determine the resulting probability
for two random nodes in the network to establish a connection between each other.
As shown in the table, this connectivity strongly decreases when increasing the size
of the deployment area. Moreover, each of the replication mechanisms stores four
replicas in the network. In order to evaluate this scenario, all three of the previously
mentioned metrics are used (flookup, T , fallocate).
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Figure 46: The impact of the Storage and Retrieval Attack on settings with and without
replication mechanism, measured as the fraction of failed lookups
results for the replication mechanisms in sparse settings
When increasing the field size, the probability of a network partitioning increases.
Thus, nodes or groups of nodes may be disconnected from the rest of the MP2P
network. This results in an increased fraction of failed lookups (flookup) as shown
in Figure 46. Settings that are based on the approach proposed by Castro et al. [17]
introduce a higher vulnerability compared to our OCRA mechanism. As Castro’s
replication mechanism harnesses the virtual neighbors of the root node to replicate
the object, those replicas are located in the same cluster and, therefore, in the same
geographical area. As a result, the probability increases that all root nodes that
provide a replica of the same object are disconnected from the network due to a
network partitioning at the same time. Thus, while setting A provides a fraction of
failed lookups of about 5%, this fraction is increased up to 30% in setting E. However,
our proposed OCRA replication mechanism distributes the replicas equally in the
deployment area. As a result, a higher robustness against data loss due to a network
partitioning can be provided. Yet, even though OCRA provides a reduced fraction of
failed lookups, the results of the settings clearly indicate that approximately 20% of
all lookups fail in the setting E.
However, considering the fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate) by the
OCRA, simulation results show a mostly static distribution rate of about 95% in the
settings A to C. Therefore, we assume that most of the objects were correctly stored
in the network. Based on this result, the increased fraction of failed lookups is mostly
a result of disconnected nodes that initiates a lookup. Thus, nodes that are connected
to the MP2P network are still able to retrieve the most of the objects correctly. Yet, in
setting D and E the fraction of correctly allocated replicas is reduced to 85%. This
indicates that an increased amount of nodes are disconnected from the MP2P network
and, therefore, multiple objects may be unavailable.
OCRA introduces an overall traffic (T ) that is increased by 24% when compared to
the Castro et al.’s approach. This is a result of the structure of Clustered Pastry. OCRA
stores replicas in each of the networks clusters and, therefore, in different geographical
areas. Castro’s replication mechanism stores the replicas at virtual neighbors of the
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object’s root node and, therefore in the same cluster. As a result, those objects are
replicated in the same geographically area and introduce a reduced amount of traffic
during the allocation of the replicas.
summary on the replication mechanisms in sparse settings
In sparse networks, the availability of the services provided by Clustered Pastry is
affected due to network partitioning. In the previous paragraphs, we have shown that
replication mechanisms, which distribute the replicas equally in the deployment area,
can be used in order to increase the availability of the objects stored in the network.
Furthermore, we have shown, that our replication mechanism provides better results
than a mechanism based on replicating objects at virtual neighbors as proposed by
Castro et al. [17].
6.2.5 Conclusions on the Evaluation of the Replication Mechanisms
In this section, we evaluated the replication mechanisms proposed previously. Thus,
we evaluated our proposed replication mechanisms in the light of maliciously be-
having nodes performing the Storage and Retrieval Attack as required by our first
evaluation goal. All of these mechanisms are able to improve the networks robustness
against malicious root nodes. However, even though the OCRA replication mechanism
introduces the highest traffic overhead, this mechanism also provides the best results
in terms of the fraction of correctly allocated replicas (fallocate) and the fraction of
failed lookups (flookup). Therefore, we propose to use this replication mechanism in
settings with up to 4 clusters.
Finally, we evaluated our fifth replication mechanism. As DRA has been developed
for settings with an increased number of clusters, we compared this mechanism with
OCRA in settings with 4 and 16 clusters as required by our second evaluation goal.
We were able to show that DRA distributes replicas more efficiently as OCRA in
networks with 16 clusters. Thus, we propose to use DRA whenever a higher amount
of clusters is required.
As shown, replicas can be used to reduce the affects introduced by network par-
titioning in settings with a low node density. By distributing the replicas in the
deployment area, the probability has been increased that at least one of the replicas
is available when a root node or a set of nodes are disconnected from the network.
Therefore, we were able to confirm our assumption as requested by our last evaluation
goal.
In conclusion, replication as proposed by our mechanisms is highly recommended
for MP2P systems as Clustered Pastry. Replicas increase strongly the robustness
against maliciously behaving root nodes that perform the Storage and Retrieval Attack
but also improve the availability of objects in sparse networks. We have further shown
that adapting the replication mechanism to the structure of the specific MP2P system
can be beneficial. Yet, the basic structure of our replication mechanisms can be easily
mapped on the structure of other clustered or location aware MP2P systems like
MADPastry [118].
6.3 secure message forwarding 117
6.3 secure message forwarding
Besides maliciously behaving root nodes, intermediate nodes may behave maliciously
as well. Intermediate nodes are required in order to forward lookup messages towards
the destination node. As a result, those nodes are able to affect the lookup functionality
of an MP2P system, as discussed in Chapter 5.2.2. When a network is under the
Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack, lookup messages are not forwarded correctly by
intermediate nodes but are dropped or misrouted. Thus, the availability of the
network services is affected.
Multiple mechanisms have been introduced to provide robustness against those
attacks for P2P systems. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2.2.3, those approaches are
mostly based on introducing redundancy to the lookup mechanism. Yet, this does not
seem promising in the context of a wireless mobile environment with strongly limited
resources in terms of bandwidth. Therefore, we discuss existing security mechanisms
in the light of MP2P systems in this section. Moreover, a new approach is introduced
that harnesses the characteristics of the wireless channel to detect malicious behavior.
Thus, by overhearing messages sent by the geographical neighbors, this mechanism
is able to monitor the route of a lookup request and, therefore, to detect dropped or
rerouted requests.
6.3.1 Challenges in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack exploits the characteristics of the DHT in order to
deny the lookup services provided by the network. Therefore, we have to consider
the challenges introduced by the overlay, in particular the decentralized routing
mechanism and the required trust on intermediate nodes during a lookup. As the
lookup is not coordinated by a central instance, malicious behavior is hard to detect.
This is even more challenging as the recursive lookup mechanism, which is used
by Clustered Pastry, is based on intermediate nodes that forward lookup request
messages.
However, further challenges arise due to the MANET underlay. On one hand, we
have to consider limited bandwidth when designing a security mechanism. This is
very challenging especially as most existing mechanisms that have been developed
for DHTs based on the Internet as underlay are based on introducing redundancy. On
the other hand, an increased fraction of lost messages is introduced by the wireless
channels, e.g., due to collisions during the transmission of two messages.
6.3.2 Existing Security Mechanisms in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks
As already discussed in Chapter 2.2.3, several security mechanisms have been devel-
oped in the last decade to improve the robustness of a DHT to the Incorrect Lookup
Routing Attack. Most of these mechanisms either introduce redundancy to the lookup
process or provide feedback to a coordinating instance during routing and are, there-
fore, based on the Redundant Routing [17] or the Iterative Routing [99] approach. Thus,
we will focus on those two mechanisms in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 47: An example of a lookup with the Redundant Routing mechanism
redundant routing
The Redundant Routing mechanism has been proposed by Castro et al. and is based
on introducing redundancy to the lookup mechanism. Therefore, multiple request
messages are sent in parallel whenever a lookup is initiated as shown in Figure 47. As
a result, a lookup only fails when all of these request messages are dropped. However,
in order to operate reliably, disjoint routing paths are required. Otherwise, a single
malicious node is able to drop all of the request messages.
The robustness introduced by this mechanism can be displayed in terms of the
fraction of failed lookups (σRedundant). This metric is a function of the fraction of
malicious nodes (f), the average number of required overlay hops per lookup (h), and
the number of requests that have been sent in parallel (s) as described by Equation
6.11
σRedundant = 1− (1− (1− f)
h−1)s (6.11)
As each of the request messages is routed recursively, the average number of overlay
hops (hRedundant) is equal to the one of a recursive routing mechanism (hRecursive).
Thus, the average number of overlay hops (hRedundant) is a function of the fraction
of malicious nodes in the network (f) and the number of average hops of a successful
request (h) as described by Equation 6.12.
hILR =
h−1∑
i=0
(1− f)i−1 (6.12)
Also the average delay introduced by a lookup is not affected by the Redundant Rout-
ing mechanism. Yet, the average number of sent messages per lookup (mRedundant) is
increased by the factor s due to request messages that are sent in parallel as described
by Equation 6.13.
mRedundant = hRecursive ∗ s (6.13)
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Figure 48: An example of a lookup with the Iterative Routing mechanism
iterative routing
The Iterative Routing [99] mechanism is based on a coordinating instance. This instance
receives feedback during the lookup process and, therefore, is able to detect whenever
a node behaves maliciously. Sit and Morris proposed to harness the source of the
lookup as coordinating instance. Whenever a node receives a request message, this
request message is not forwarded but a reply message has to be sent to the source
node is shown in Figure 48. This reply message includes a set of next hop addresses.
As a result, the source node is able to coordinate the lookup and whenever no reply
message is received, the request can be forwarded to any other node that has been
listed in the last received reply message.
The fraction of failed lookups introduced by an Iterative Routing mechanism
(σIterative) is a function of the fraction of malicious nodes (f) and the average
number of overlay hops (h). Moreover, the number of next hop addresses provided by
each reply message (r) affects the robustness provided by this mechanism as described
by Equation 6.14.
σIterative = (1− f
r)h−1 (6.14)
Due to the feedback that is required to coordinate the lookup, the average number
of messages sent per lookup (mIterative) and the average number of overlay hops
per lookup (hIterative) is at least twice as high compared to a recursive approach.
The precise number of hops and messages is described by Equation 6.15. Moreover,
the delay is increased as the request messages are not directly forwarded by the
intermediate nodes, but are sent to the source node first.
mIterative = hIterative =
h−2∑
i=0
(
r∑
j=0
fj(1− f))i ∗ (
r∑
k=0
fk + fk ∗ (1− f)) (6.15)
discussion
Both mechanisms that have been discussed previously can be used to increase the
networks robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. However, both of these
mechanisms introduce overhead in terms of traffic. The Redundant Routing mechanism
generates traffic due to the request messages that are sent in parallel, while the
Iterative Routing mechanism introduces traffic as a result of the feedback functionality.
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However, as the bandwidth is limited by the mobile, wireless underlay, overhead
introduced by the routing mechanism should be minimized (as discussed in the
previous section).
Moreover, both introduced mechanisms have a major drawback. The Redundant
Routing requires disjoint routing paths in order to sent multiple request messages in
parallel. Yet, this requirement is hard to satisfy as all parallel lookups are forwarded
to the very same destination. The iterative approach on the other hand, is based on
providing feedback to the source node. Yet, this approach is contrary to our Clustered
Pastry approach, where the lookup distance is reduced with each hop in order to
reduce overhead and the probability of collisions.
6.3.3 Overlay WatchDog
As shown in the previous paragraphs, existing security mechanisms that provide
robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack are based on introducing redundancy
and, therefore, traffic overhead. Thus, they are not efficient in the context of a wireless
MP2P system with a strongly limited bandwidth.
Therefore, we propose a new security mechanism that has been developed in the
context of a MP2P system. Thus, this mechanism is able to meet the challenges
discussed previously. Our approach benefits from the characteristics of wireless
transmission to detect dropped and misrouted request messages. In the following
section, we discuss our new Overlay WatchDog mechanism. Therefore, we introduce
the requirements that arise from this mechanism. Thereafter, we define the detection
and response algorithm of our Overlay WatchDog.
assumptions and requirements
Our Overlay WatchDog mechanism is based on a set of requirements that have to
be met in order to ensure a reliable operation of the security mechanism. These
requirements are surveyed in the following list.
• Each node that in part of the MANET has to participate in the MP2P network.
This assumption is satisfied in disaster relief scenarios, where each device is
preinstalled and, therefore, uses the same software.
• Each node has to be able to overhear messages sent by geographical neighbors.
Thus, the participating nodes have to operate in the promiscuous mode. How-
ever, passive monitoring systems can be used to sniff packets in an efficient way
[96].
• Each node has to monitor the quality of links to geographical neighbors. Based
on this information, a node is aware of nodes that leave the transmission range.
However, several MANET routing algorithms provide this information including
the OLSR ETX protocol that is used by our Clustered Pastry system.
• Each node has to be able to identify lookup request messages at the underlay.
Moreover, the IP address of the next underlay hop and the overlay identifier of
the next overlay hop have to be determined at the underlay. While the IP address
of the next underlay hop is provided by the routing table of the MANET, the
overlay identifier of the next overlay hop has to be extracted from the request
message.
6.3 secure message forwarding 121
detection of malicious behavior
Due to the structure of the DHT overlay, multiple overlay hops are required to resolve
a lookup as discussed in Chapter 2.1.3. Each of these overlay hops corresponds to a
complete underlay route.
An example for a lookup is shown in Figure 49. Node A is the source of the lookup
request. Node B is an intermediate overlay hop and node C is the destination of
this lookup. The nodes a, b, c, and d are intermediate underlay hops. When node
A initiates a lookup for node C, the routing table of A provides the IP-address and
overlay identifier of node B. Therefore, a request message is sent to node B. However,
as node B is not within a transmission range of node A, a route via node a and b
is established by the MANET underlay. Yet, neither node a nor node b participate
in the overlay routing but only forward the message to the next underlay hop until
the underlay destination is reached. After receiving the lookup request, node B
determines the next overlay hop and forwards the lookup. Once again, the next
overlay hop is not within transmission range and intermediate underlay hops are
required. After forwarding the request via node c and d to the next overlay hop C, the
lookup is received by the destination node. However, when considering the Incorrect
Lookup Routing Attack, the lookup request can be dropped by an intermediate overlay
node. However, as node A is the source and node C the destination of the lookup in
our example, only node B may behave maliciously and drop the lookup.
Marti et al. introduced the WatchDog IDS in order to detect maliciously behaving
nodes in a MANET. Whenever a message is forwarded in the MANET, this IDS is
used to monitor the behavior of the next hop node. If this next hop node does not
forward the message and is not the destination of this message, a malicious behavior
is detected by the WatchDog IDS. For example considering the route between node A
and node B. When node A forwards a message to node a, node A is aware that a is
not the destination of this message but only an intermediate underlay node. Therefore,
node A monitors the messages send by node a until the message is forwarded to node
b. Thereafter, node a has to monitor messages sent by node b. As a result, malicious
behavior can be detected in the underlay without introducing traffic overhead.
However, WatchDog can only be used to detect maliciously behaving interme-
diate underlay nodes as only the underlay route can be monitored by WatchDog.
For example, when node b forwards the request message to node B, this node is
identified as the destination of the message due to the IP-address of node B. Yet,
when considering the lookup process, node B is not the destination of the lookup but
only an intermediate overlay hop.
Therefore, we propose the Overlay WatchDog that is based on WatchDog but also
considers overlay information to detect maliciously behaving overlay nodes. Each
node has to be able to identify request messages at the underlay. Whenever a request
message is detected, the Overlay WatchDog checks whether the next hop node is
the destination of this underlay route. If so, the next hop node must be involved
into the overlay routing and, therefore, has either to forward the request to a node
that is logically closer to the destination or send a reply message. This can be
monitored by the last underlay hop. However, in order to be able to detect misrouted
request messages, this intermediate underlay node has to extract the identifier of
the destination of the lookup from the lookup request and compare this identifier
with the identifier of the overlay node and the next overlay hop. For example, let us
consider node b forwards the request to node B. As node B is the destination of the
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Figure 49: An example of an Mobile Peer-to-Peer lookup
underlay route, node B has to be involved in the overlay routing. As a intermediate
overlay node, node B has to forward the lookup request to node C. This message can
be detected by node b. However, when node B drops or misroutes the request, node
b is able to detect this misbehavior.
However, we also have to consider colluding maliciously behaving nodes. Therefore,
we have to address a case where an intermediate underlay node does not report a
malicious behavior of the next hop overlay node. Yet, all nodes that are in transmission
range of the colluding nodes are able to detect the malicious behavior as well. Thus,
we can use those nodes as well in settings with colluding maliciously behaving nodes.
Let us assume that both, node b and node B behave maliciously. As a result, node b
cannot be used to detect messages that have been dropped by node B. Yet, node x is
within transmission range of node b and node B and, therefore, is able to detect that
a request message has been forwarded by node b but dropped at node B.
reaction to malicious behavior
When a node detects a dropped or misrouted lookup message, action must be taken
to ensure that the lookup does not fail due to this malicious behavior. Initially, the
node that responds to this malicious behavior has to be chosen. Thereafter, we have
to define how this node responds to a dropped or redirected request message.
Each message that is dropped or misrouted by maliciously behaving intermediate
overlay node can be detected by the underlay node, which has forwarded this message
to the malicious node. Thus, we prefer this node to respond to this malicious behavior.
Yet, as we assume malicious colluding nodes, we have to consider a malicious
behavior of this previous underlay hop node as well. Therefore, also nodes have
to be considered that are within transmission range of the maliciously behaving node
and the previous underlay hop node and, therefore, are also able to detect dropped
or misrouted messages. Thus, whenever the previous underlay hop node does not
respond to a detected malicious behavior, these other nodes have to respond.
After the responding node has been selected, this node has to forward the lookup
request. As this node is geographical close to the maliciously behaving node, it is
most probable a virtual neighbor of the malicious intermediate node as well. Due
to this fact, both nodes provide a similar set of routing table entries. As a result, the
responding node is able to determine the next overlay hop node and to forward the
lookup request efficiently to this node without introducing a high traffic overhead.
Furthermore, the node that has been dropped the request message is avoided in the
subsequent routing steps.
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discussion
Our Overlay WatchDog security mechanism uses overheard request messages that are
sent by the geographical neighbors to detect dropped or misrouted messages. Thus,
only a low traffic overhead is introduced by this approach. Whenever a message is
dropped or misrouted, a new request message is sent by the node that has detected
this malicious behavior.
As described by Equation 6.16, the mechanism provides robustness to the Incorrect
Lookup Routing Attack and, therefore, the fraction of failed lookups (σOW) is strongly
reduced. However, this fraction is a function of the average number of overlay hops
(h), the fraction of malicious nodes (f), and the number of stored addresses per
routing table entry (r).
σOW = (1− f) ∗ (
r∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
fj ∗ (1− f))i ∗ (1− f) + (1− f))h−1 (6.16)
The average number of overlay hops of the Overlay WatchDog (hOW) is equal to
the average number of overlay hops of a recursive routing mechanism in a setting
without maliciously behaving nodes. The same applies for the average number of sent
messages (mOW) and the delay. Yet, when increasing the fraction of malicious nodes
(f), all of these three metrics are affected. As described by Equation 6.17, the number
average hops is slightly increased when introducing maliciously behaving nodes.
mOW = hOW =
h−2∑
i=0
(
r∑
k=1
(
n∑
l=1
fl)k ∗ (1− f)k + 1− f)i∗
(
r∑
k=1
(
n∑
j=1
fj ∗ (1− f))k ∗ (1− f) + (1− f))h−1
(6.17)
6.3.4 Conclusions on Secure Message Forwarding
In this section, we discussed the efficiency of security mechanisms that provide
robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack in MP2P scenarios. Therefore, we
analyzed the Iterative Routing and the Redundant Routing mechanism under the light
of a limited bandwidth and a wireless transmission channel. As a result, we were
able to identify drawbacks introduced by these approaches that limit the usability of
these security mechanisms in settings based on a MP2P system like Clustered Pastry.
Thus, we developed a new security mechanism for MP2P systems, which benefits
from the characteristics of the wireless data transmission. This Overlay WatchDog
uses overheard messages to detect dropped or misrouted messages and, therefore,
introduces an overall low overhead in terms of traffic.
6.4 evaluation of the overlay watchdog mechanism
In the previous section, we have discussed three different security mechanisms
that can be used to introduce robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. The
Redundant Routing and the Iterative Routing mechanism have been proposed for P2P
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systems that are based on a static underlay as the Internet. The third approach has
been developed in the context of this thesis and is based on the characteristics of an
MP2P system. However, like most DHTs Pastry and, therefore, Clustered Pastry is not
able to provide the disjoint routing paths that are required by the Redundant Routing
mechanism. Therefore, and as the other mechanisms provided better results in the
analytic evaluation, we do not consider the Redundant Routing in the context of this
simulative evaluation
In the following section, we evaluate the Iterative Routing mechanism and our
Overlay WatchDog in MP2P settings.
6.4.1 Evaluation Goals, Metrics, and Methods
In the next paragraphs we define our basic evaluation goal and introduce the used
metrics for the following evaluation. Moreover, we discuss our evaluation methods.
evaluation goals
Two evaluation goals have to be satisfied in the following evaluation in order to
determine the efficiency of the security mechanisms. On one hand, those security
mechanism have to be able to operate in an MP2P network efficiently. Therefore, we
have to analyze the impact of these mechanisms on MP2P systems with different
scale. On the other hand, the robustness against the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
that is provided by the security mechanism has to be determined.
evaluation metrics
The following evaluation is based on two metrics. The first metric is the fraction
of failed lookups (flookup) and is used to introduce the efficiency of our security
mechanism and the impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Thus, we further use
this metric to analyze the robustness provided by the security mechanism. Moreover,
we harness the overall traffic (T ) generated by the MP2P system in order to determine
the overhead and, therefore, the costs introduced by the security mechanism.
evaluation methods
We used our Clustered Pastry model, which has been implemented for the OMNeT++
simulator, to evaluate our Overlay WatchDog. Therefore, we implemented our new
security mechanism as discussed in the previous section. Moreover, we deployed the
Iterative Routing mechanism provided by the OverSim framework as reference model
to our Overlay WatchDog mechanism. During the evaluation, the basic parameters as
defined in Chapter 4.1.4 are used.
6.4.2 Comparison of Security Mechanisms
In this first part of the evaluation we analyze the efficiency of the Iterative Routing
mechanisms and the Overlay WatchDog in the light of MP2P systems. Thus, we
simulate and discuss settings without maliciously behaving nodes but with a different
network size in the following paragraphs.
We simulate settings with 25 to 100 nodes with 2 and 4 clusters in order to show
the influence of those scenarios on both security mechanisms. Moreover, the outcome
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Figure 50: Usability of the Iterative Routing and Overlay WatchDog mechanism in
Clustered Pastry
of these simulations are compared to the results provided by a setting without any
security mechanisms that is based on the recursive routing mechanism only. We
evaluate the efficiency of these mechanisms based on the fraction of failed lookups
(flookup).
results of the comparison of security mechanisms
The recursive routing mechanism provides reliable results in settings without ma-
liciously behaving nodes as discussed in Chapter 4.5. Thus, more than 95% of all
lookups can be performed successfully. However, as our Overlay WatchDog is only
triggered by dropped or rerouted lookup messages, a very similar result is provided
in settings with 2 or 4 clusters as shown in Figure 50a and 50b.
The Iterative Routing mechanism on the other hand is strongly affected by the
number of clusters and the field size. This security mechanism uses the source node
to coordinate lookups. Thus, request messages are not forwarded by intermediate
nodes but reply messages are sent to the source node during each lookup step. As
a result, the number of required lookup messages is doubled and, furthermore, the
distance between the sender and the next overlay hop is increased on average with
each hop. This increases the probability of failed lookup messages due to the wireless
underlay (e.g., as a result of collisions). Due to this fact, the fraction of failed lookups
is increased when we increase the network size as this affects the average distance
between the source and destination. Moreover, by increasing the number of clusters,
the reliability is reduced as well, as the clustering level defines the average number of
hops.
summary of the comparison of the security mechanisms
In the previous evaluation we were able to show that our Overlay WatchDog does not
affect Clustered Pastry’s lookup mechanism in settings without maliciously behaving
nodes. Yet, the Iterative Routing approach is strongly affected by both the size of the
setting in terms of the field size and the number of participating nodes, and the
number of clusters. Thus, the fraction of failed lookups increases when either the
average geographical distance between the source and destination node or the average
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Figure 51: Robustness provided by the Overlay WatchDog to the Incorrect Lookup Rout-
ing Attack
number of required overlay hops is increased. Therefore, we were able to show that
an Iterative Routing mechanism is not able to provide efficient results in a location
aware MP2P system as Clustered Pastry.
6.4.3 Robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
Maliciously behaving nodes that drop or reroute lookup messages are able to affect
the reliability of the services provided by the MP2P system. Therefore, a security
mechanism is required to increase the networks robustness to this Incorrect Lookup
Routing Attack.
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the Overlay WatchDog in settings with
maliciously behaving nodes. Therefore, the fraction of failed lookups (flookup) and
the overall traffic (T ) are used as evaluation metric.
results of the robustness evaluation against the incorrect lookup
routing attack
The Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack has an high impact on the reliability of the lookup
mechanism as already discussed in the Chapter 5.2.2. However, the Overlay WatchDog
is able to strongly reduce the fraction of failed lookups that is introduced by the
maliciously behaving nodes as shown in Figure 51. For example, when considering
a setting with 40% of maliciously behaving nodes, the fraction of failed loss can be
reduced from a loss rate of 39% to less than 12% by using the Overlay WatchDog
mechanism.
Moreover, only a small amount of overhead is introduced by our Overlay WatchDog
as shown in Figure 52. In setting without maliciously behaving nodes, the traffic (T )
is increased by less than 6% due to messages that have been dropped as a result
of the wireless underlay and have been retransmitted by our Overlay WatchDog.
However, the traffic of the recursive unsecured mechanisms decreases slightly when
the fraction of malicious nodes is increased due to the increased number of failed
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Figure 52: Traffic introduced by the Overlay WatchDog compared to the traffic of an
unsecured network
lookups. Yet, our Overlay WatchDog introduces even an increased amount of traffic
in settings with a high fraction of maliciously nodes due to the resulting increased
number of retransmissions. Though, even in settings where every second node behaves
maliciously the traffic is not increased by more than 9.2%.
summary of the robustness against the incorrect lookup routing at-
tack
As shown in this subsection, our Overlay WatchDog is able to strongly decrease the
impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Moreover, our Overlay WatchDog in-
creases the overall traffic only by 6% when considering a setting without maliciously
behaving nodes. As a result, we were able to show that our security mechanism
provides robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack and introduces a traffic
overhead of less than 10%.
6.4.4 Summary of the Overlay WatchDog Evaluation
In this section, we discussed the shortcomings of existing security mechanisms that
provide robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Therefore, two mechanism,
most other security mechanisms are based on, were surveyed and reviewed in the
light of our Clustered Pastry system. The first approach requires disjoint paths in
order to ensure reliable services. Though, disjoint routing paths are not provided
by our Clustered Pastry system in settings without replicas. The second approach
harness the source of the lookup to coordinate the route of the lookup request. Yet,
this source based routing introduces overhead as lookup messages have to be replied
to the source after each hop. This results in an increased fraction of failed lookups,
especially in settings with an increased network size, as shown in our evaluation.
However, we further evaluated our Overlay WatchDog. Our new approach was able to
provide robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attacks, as shown in our evaluation.
Moreover, only a small traffic overhead has been introduced by our mechanism. As
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a result, we propose to use our Overlay WatchDog in the context with our Clustered
Pastry system in order to provide robustness to the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack.
6.5 validating the root node
Whenever a malicious node receives a lookup request, this node may either drop
or redirect this request or forge a reply message. The Overlay WatchDog mechanism
that has been introduced in Chapter 6.3.3 is able to detect dropped and redirected
messages but fails to detect forged reply messages. Therefore, a mechanism is required
in order to validate received reply messages.
6.5.1 Challenges in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Systems
Due to the wireless underlay and the characteristics of the disaster relief scenarios, four
challenges for validation mechanisms arise. The first three challenges are introduced
by most MP2P systems. However, the fourth challenge has only to be considered in
context with location aware MP2P systems as Clustered Pastry or MADPastry [118].
These challenges are as follows:
I No highly available or static entity may be assumed in MP2P systems. Therefore,
no static entities that keep track on the virtual identifiers of the nodes in the
network are available in the scenario considered in this thesis.
II The mobile underlay of an MP2P system introduces a strongly limited bandwidth.
Therefore, the traffic introduced by security mechanisms has to be minimized.
III Due to limited bandwidth, the routing tables of most MP2P systems are truncated
in order to reduce the traffic introduced by the update mechanism of the routing
tables. As a result, only a strongly limited number of virtual neighbors and
distant nodes is stored at the systems routing tables.
IV Location aware MP2P systems determine the node identifiers from the geographi-
cal position of the node. As a result, overlay identifiers of nodes are not uniformly
distributed in the identifier namespace.
6.5.2 Existing Validation Mechanisms in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Scenarios
In Chapter 2.2.4, three approaches to validate a reply messages have been discussed,
which have been proposed by the related work in the context of DHTs. The security
mechanisms introduced by Wang et al. [114] and Ganesh and Zaho [30] are both
based on a highly available instance (I) and, therefore, cannot be used in the context of
our disaster relief scenario. The third approach has been proposed by Castro et al. [17]
and does not require central or highly available entities but is based on assumptions
that cannot be satisfied in the discussed disaster relief scenario. However, we will
discuss this approach in depth in the following paragraphs.
routing failure test
Castro et al. introduced the Routing Failure Test, which is based on the following
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Figure 53: Example for the derived node density in a Routing Failure Test
assumptions. The overlay identifiers of the nodes have been generated randomly and
are, therefore, uniformly distributed in the identifier space. Each node has to maintain
links to a set of virtual neighbors. Moreover, replicas have to be stored at the virtual
neighbors of the root.
Per default, a reply message only contains the address of the root node. Castro
proposed to expand the reply message by the addresses of the virtual neighbors
of this root node, as those neighbors maintain the replicas of the requested object
as stated above. This resulting set of nodes is called the root set. An example for a
root set of a requested object is shown in Figure 53a. As long as malicious nodes
do not collude, malicious behavior can be detected with little effort. Whenever a
malicious behavior is assumed by the sender of the request, this node has to contact
another node of the root set. When this root set node is responsible for a replica of
the requested object, the result is validated. In any other case, a malicious behavior
can be assumed.
However, malicious nodes may collude in order to provide a root set that consists of
maliciously behaving nodes only, as shown in Figure 53b. To detect such a malicious
root set, Castro proposes to compare the average virtual distance of the root set
with the average virtual distance of the sender’s virtual neighbors. When assuming
uniformly distributed overlay identifiers of the nodes, the average virtual distance
between nodes in those two identifier sets should be equal. Otherwise, a malicious
behavior is assumed. Castro evaluated this approach analytically in a setting with
100,000 nodes, 32 replicas, and a set of 32 virtual neighbors stored in the routing
table of each node. As a result, the Routing Failure Test is able to detect forged reply
message with a probability of more than 99%.
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Yet, the requirements for the Routing Failure Test are contrary to the previously
discussed challenges and limitations of MP2P systems. Thus, we cannot assume that
the node identifiers are uniformly distributed in the namespace (IV). Moreover, a
high number of overall nodes, replicas (III), or routing table entires that provide links
to a large set of virtual neighbors (II) cannot be considered in an MP2P system. Thus,
the Routing Failure Test can most probable not be used efficiently in the context of a
MP2P system.
6.5.3 Adapted Routing Failure Test
Resources as bandwidth are strongly limited in MP2P systems. Therefore, only a
limited number of replicas can be maintained in such a wireless, mobile network.
Otherwise the efficiency of the lookup mechanism would suffer due to congestion
generated by uploading and updating the replicas.
Nevertheless, harnessing the node density to detect forged reply messages seems
to be a promising approach at first glance. When no replica set is available or when
the replicas are not stored at the virtual neighbors, the virtual distance between
the object identifier and the identifier of the root node can be compared with the
average distance of the virtual neighbors of the requesting node. An example for
correct and a forged reply message is shown in Figure 54a and Figure 54b. The virtual
distance between the root node and the object is rather short as compared to the
virtual distance between the closest malicious node and the object. Thus, malicious
behavior can also be identified in a setting without replicas.
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However, this approach still does not satisfy all of the previously introduced
challenges of MP2P systems. The Adapted Routing Failure Test still requires a large
set of virtual neighbors (III) in order to derive a reliable average distance between
the nodes. Furthermore, the overlay identifier of the nodes have to be uniformly
distributed (VI).
6.5.4 Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism
As mentioned earlier, multiple MP2P systems including Clustered Pastry harness
the geographical location of nodes in order to determine the node identifiers. As a
result, virtual neighbors of a node are geographically arranged around this node. This
improves the efficiency of both, the lookup mechanism and the update mechanism of
the MP2P system. Furthermore, the detection of incorrect and forged reply messages
can also benefit from the correlation of the geographical and virtual location of the
MP2P nodes.
Due to the structure of the DHT-based overlay, each node is aware of the objects a
virtual neighbor is responsible for. Thus, each virtual neighbor of a node that claims
to be the root of an object is able to validate this claim. As the MANET underlay uses
a wireless channel, messages may be overheard by the geographical neighbors of the
senders of these messages. Due to this fact, a reply message can be received by at
least a fraction of the virtual neighbors of the replying node in a Clustered Pastry
network. Therefore, those neighbors are able to validate overheard reply messages.
When a forged reply message is detected, a notification message has to be sent to the
requesting node. This reply message may include a proposed next hop address in
order to enable the requesting node to complete the lookup correctly.
An example for this Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism is shown in Figure 55. The
replying node has seven virtual neighbors that are geographically arranged around
this node due to the location aware distribution of the overlay identifiers. However,
only those nodes that are within the transmission range of the replying node or that
are located along the route back to the requesting node receive this reply message.
As a result, only a subset of the virtual neighbors can be used for the detection of a
forged reply messages. However, still five nodes would be able to notify the sender in
the case of a malicious behavior in our example.
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6.5.5 Conclusions on the Validation of Reply Messages
Forged reply messages can be used to deny the services provided by the MP2P system.
Thus, mechanisms are required to validate received reply messages. As discussed in
this section, existing mechanisms that have been proposed to validate reply messages
in the context of DHT systems that are based on the Internet as underlay do not
suffice the requirements of our scenario. Therefore, we developed the Adapted Routing
Failure Mechanism that is able to handle most of the challenges introduced by MP2P
systems. Moreover, we proposed the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism that uses the
location awareness of nodes provided by systems as our Clustered Pastry. Based on
this validation mechanism, we are able to detect forged reply messages in settings
where node identifiers are not generated randomly but are a function or, e.g., the
geographical location of the node.
6.6 evaluation of the destination validation mechanisms
In the previous paragraphs, three different validation mechanisms have been dis-
cussed. Two of these approaches, the Routing Failure Test proposed by Castro et al.
and our adapted version of this test, harness the density of the uniformly distributed
overlay identifiers in the MP2P system to detect forged or faulty reply messages.
The Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism uses overheard messages and the geographical
clustering of the overlay identifiers in order to detect forged reply messages in location
aware MP2P systems.
In this section, we evaluate all three mechanisms in the light of MP2P systems.
6.6.1 Evaluation Goals, Metrics, and Methods
In the following paragraphs, we define the evaluation goal and discuss the metrics,
which are harnessed to evaluate the validation mechanisms. Moreover, the evaluation
methods are introduced.
evaluation goals
Our major evaluation goal is to analyze and compare the efficiency of the previously
discussed validation mechanisms in an MP2P scenario. Therefore, limitations and
characteristics of MP2P systems have to be considered. Moreover, we have to consider
the trade-off between the fraction of correctly detected malicious and falsely accused
benign nodes.
evaluation metrics
The detection ratio is harnessed as metric to determine the efficiency of the three
security mechanisms. Therefore, on one hand, the true positives ratio (fTP) is used
to determine the efficiency of the validation mechanism. The true positives are the
fraction of the correctly detected malicious behavior to the overall number of forged
reply messages. Furthermore, the false positives ratio (fFP) is used to indicate the
fraction of valid reply messages that are detected as malicious by the validation
mechanisms.
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evaluation methods
We implemented the discussed mechanisms in order to evaluate their efficiency
regarding the detection of forged reply messages by means of simulation. Yet, our
Clustered Pastry system does not satisfy the assumptions of the Routing Failure Test
and the Adapted Routing Failure Test regarding the distribution of node identifiers.
Therefore, our Clustered Pastry model, as described in Section 3 cannot be used for
the evaluation of these two approaches. Thus, we do not use the OMNeT++ simulator,
but we implemented an abstract simulator to evaluate the two versions of the Routing
Failure Test.
This simulator is based on the algorithms of the Pastry DHT. During each simulation
run, a set of nodes with randomly distributed overlay identifiers is generated. Based
on this set of nodes, the leaf set of each node is determined. In a second step, objects
are generated and stored at the appropriate root node or the set of root nodes,
respectively. Moreover, nodes may be marked as malicious. During each simulation
run, two settings are analyzed. After randomly selecting a requesting node and an
object, which has to be retrieved, a benign and a malicious setting are simulated.
For the benign setting, the average virtual distance of the leaf set is compared to the
average virtual distance of the root set or with the distance between the object and
the root node, respectively. This setting is used to determine the false positives (fFP).
For the second setting the average virtual distance of the leaf set is compared to the
average virtual distance of the malicious root set or with the distance between the
object and the malicious node that is logically closest to the object, respectively. This
second set is used to determine the true positive rate (fTP). Moreover, we introduce
a factor x that introduces a tolerance for the variance of the node identifiers density.
Thus, a reply message is assumed as malicious when the average distance of the
replied (malicious) root set or the distance between the (malicious) root node and
the object exceeds the average distance of the leaf set multiplied with x. As a result,
this factor can be used to reduce the fraction of falsely accused nodes (fFP). However,
this also affects the fraction of correctly detected malicious nodes (fTP). Moreover,
the results provided by this simulator matches the results of Castro et al.’s analytical
evaluation.
During the evaluation of the Routing Failure Test an x of 1.7 is assumed as proposed
by Castro et al. [17]. However, as we assume a reduced accuracy of the Adapted Routing
Failure Test, the factor x is increased to 1.9 during the evaluation of this detection
mechanism. However, a setting with 100 nodes is simulated. Furthermore, we vary
the leaf set size (L) as the number of virtual neighbors, the number of replicas (R) and
the fraction of malicious nodes during the evaluation of the Routing Failure Test and
our Adapted Routing Failure Test.
In order to evaluate the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism, the OMNeT++ implemen-
tation of the Clustered Pastry system as introduced in Chapter 3 is used. Moreover,
we implemented a maliciously behaving nodes that forge reply messages whenever
they receive a lookup request. Again, default parameters as defined in Chapter 4.1.4
are used.
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Figure 56: Results of the evaluation of the original routing failure test
6.6.2 Evaluation of the Routing Failure Test
The Routing Failure Test as introduced by Castro et al. [17] has been proposed to
validate received reply messages. This approach is based on equally distributed node
overlay identifiers. Moreover, a set of replicas, that are stored at virtual neighbors
of the root node and links to a large set of virtual neighbors are required by this
validation mechanism.
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the Routing Failure Test in a set of different
settings with a leaf set size and a number of replicas that is varied between 2 and
32. We use the fraction of falsely accused nodes (fFP) and the fraction of correctly
detected malicious nodes (fTP) as metric to evaluate the efficiency of this mechanism.
results of the routing failure test evaluation
The Routing Failure Test provides reliable results as long as the number of nodes in the
leaf set (L) and the number of replicas (R) is high (e.g., R = L = 32). Malicious behavior
can be detected correctly (fTP) with a very high probability of more than 97% even
when considering settings with up to 40% of maliciously behaving nodes, as shown in
Figure 56a. However, when the number of leaf set nodes and stored replicas is reduced,
the efficiency of the Routing Failure Test strongly degrades. For example, considering
a setting with a leaf set size of 4 and 4 replicas, only 53% of the forged reply messages
are detected by the validation mechanism when we consider a fraction of malicious
nodes of 40%.
Also the fraction of benign nodes that are accused to behave maliciously is affected
by the leaf set size and the number of replicas. As shown in Figure 56b, the false
positive rate (fFP) increases strongly when either of these two parameters is decreased.
For example, in scenarios with 4 or less replicas, the false positive rate is increased
beyond 10%.
summary of the routing failure test evaluation
The Routing Failure Test has been developed for settings with a high amount of nodes
and a high bandwidth. Thus, a reliable detection of malicious nodes can be achieved
in settings with 32 known virtual neighbors and high number of distributed replicas.
These are required to avoid high variances in derived node density. As a result, the
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Figure 57: Results of the evaluation of the adapted routing failure test
reliability of the Routing Failure Test degrades strongly when reducing either of those
two parameters. However, most MP2P systems provide only a limited amount of
replicas and links to virtual neighbors. Thus, the Routing Failure Test does not suffice
the requirements introduced by MP2P systems.
6.6.3 Evaluation of the Adapted Routing Failure Test
The Adapted Routing Failure Test is based on the Routing Failure Test and, therefore,
harness the density of overlay identifiers to detect forged reply messages. Yet, this
adapted approach does not require replicas but harness the virtual distance between
the object identifier and the overlay identifier of the root node to detect forged reply
messages.
We analyze the efficiency of this Adapted Routing Failure Test in settings with a
leaf set size (L) between 2 and 32. Moreover we use the true positive (fTP) and false
positive rate (fFP) to determine the efficiency of this approach.
results of the adapted routing failure test evaluation
In contrary to the Routing Failure Test the leaf set size has nearly no influence on the
true positive rate (fTP) of the Adapted Routing Failure Test as shown in Figure 57a.
Thus, better results can be achieved in settings with a small leaf set when we compare
the results of Adapted Routing Failure Test with the Routing Failure Test. Though, still a
high fraction of the forged reply messages is not detected correctly. For example, in a
scenario with leaf set size of 4, only 65% of all forged reply message has been detected
when considering a fraction of 40% of maliciously behaving nodes.
While the leaf set size has only a minor impact on the true positive rate (fTP), the
false positive rate is strongly affected by the number of virtual neighbors. Thus, the
fraction of false positives is strongly increased in settings with a small leaf set as
shown in Figure 57b. Even though the Adapted Routing Failure Test provides a lower
false positive rate than the Routing Failure Test in settings with a low leaf set size, the
false positive rate is quite high. For example, in a setting with leaf set size of 4, 6% of
the correct reply messages are detected as forged messages.
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Figure 58: Results of the evaluation of the cross layer validation of reply messages
summary of the adapted routing failure test evaluation
The adapted approach is less efficient compared to Castro et al.’s Routing Failure Test
when considering settings with a high number of replicas and a large leaf set. Yet, this
approach performs better in settings with a small number of replicas or a small leaf
set size as assumed in most of the MP2P scenarios. However, in settings with a high
fraction of malicious nodes, the fraction of true positives degrades strongly.
6.6.4 Evaluation of the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism
As both of the previously evaluated mechanisms require equally distributed node
identifiers, these mechanisms cannot be used in the context of a location aware MP2P
system as our Clustered Pastry. Therefore, we proposed a cross-layered mechanism
that is able to detect forged reply messages based on overheard messages as discussed
in Chapter 6.5.4.
In the following paragraphs, we evaluate this approach in combination with our
Clustered Pastry system. Therefore, we use OMNeT++ to simulate settings with up
to 50% of maliciously behaving nodes. As this approach requires virtual neighbors to
detect maliciously behaving nodes, we use a setting with 50 nodes and 4 clusters to
evaluate this validation mechanism as this result in a low number of virtual neighbors
(12.5 virtual neighbors on average). As a result, we are able to ensure that the Cross-
Layer Validation Mechanism operates efficient in a worst case scenario. Once again we
use the true positive ratio (fTP) and the false positive ratio (fFP) to determine the
efficacy of our approach.
results of the cross-layer validation mechanism evaluation
Our Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism harnesses the virtual neighbors of the replying
node to detect forged reply messages. Thus, only a single benignly behaving virtual
neighbor that is within transmission range of the reply route suffices to detect a
forged message. During the simulation, we assumed that all maliciously behaving
nodes collude and, therefore, do not notify the sender of the request when a malicious
behavior is detected. However, our cross-layered validation mechanism is able to
detect forged reply messages with a probability of more than 98% in a setting where
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40% of all nodes behaves maliciously as show in Figure 58a. Thus, our Cross-Layer
Validation Mechanism is able to provide better results as both versions of the Routing
Failure Test in a comparable setting (no replicas, 12.5 virtual neighbors).
Moreover, the cross-layer approach provides a very low percentage of falsely
accused nodes. Thus, the false positive ratio (fFP) is below 0.6% as shown in Figure
58b. False positives are a result of stale routing tables and occur whenever a virtual
neighbor has a faulty or outdated routing table entry that provides a links to a node
that is virtually closer to the requested object than the root node.
summary of the cross-layer validation evaluation
Our cross-layered validation mechanism is able to detect forged reply messages with
a very high probability even in settings with a high fraction of malicious nodes.
Furthermore, the false positive ratio (fFP) is very low. Yet, this approach can only be
used by location aware MP2P systems as MADPastry or Clustered Pastry.
6.6.5 Conclusions on the Validation of the Request Destination
Maliciously behaving nodes are able to forge reply messages and, therefore, deny
objects that are stored in the network. Therefore, a validation mechanism is required
to detect forged reply messages and to ensure the availability of the networks services.
In the last section, we evaluated the efficiency of three validation mechanisms in a
MP2P scenario.
The Routing Failure Test has been proposed by Castro et al. [17] and compares the
density of the virtual neighbors of the requesting node with the virtual distance
between the set of root nodes in order to validate incoming reply messages. Yet, this
approach provides only reliable results in settings with a large leaf set and a high
number of replicas as shown by the results of our evaluation. Whenever either of
those two parameters is reduced, as requested by the requirements of our scenario,
the efficiency of this mechanism degrades.
Therefore, we proposed the Adapted Routing Failure Test to overcome at least a part
of the restrictions of Castro et al.’s approach. Thus, replicas are no longer required for
this adapted approach. Yet, this comes at the cost of degraded results in scenarios
with a large leaf set. However, our Adapted Routing Failure Test provides better results
than the Routing Failure Test in settings with either a small leaf set or a low number of
replicas.
The Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism has been developed for location aware MP2P
systems as Clustered Pastry. By using overheard reply messages to detect malicious
nodes, a very reliable detection of forged reply messages can be ensured. As a result,
the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism provides better results than both mechanisms,
the Routing Failure Test and the Adapted Routing Failure Test when considering a setting
with an average of 12.5 virtual neighbors and without replication.
As a result of this evaluation we propose to use the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism
in the context of our Clustered Pastry system. However, when a MP2P system is
deployed that does not provide location awareness, we propose to use the Adapted
Routing Failure Test. This validation mechanism provides at least a moderate detection
of forged reply messages.
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6.7 chapter summary
In the last decade, multiple MP2P systems have been proposed that are able to store
data in a decentralized way in a mobile environment. Yet, by now multiple security
challenges have been neglected as discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter,
we proposed new security mechanisms in order to improve the network’s robustness
against malicious behavior of root and intermediate nodes.
In the first part of this chapter, we discussed the influence of replicas on a MP2P
system in general and on Clustered Pastry in particular. We were able to identify three
challenges that can be met by replicas in MP2P systems. (I) Replicas are required
to ensure the availability of objects. By storing objects, robustness against data loss
due to churn can be ensured. Moreover, (II) by distributing replicas equally in the
deployment area, we were able to increase the robustness against data loss in settings
with a low node density. Due to these replicas, the probability could be improved that
at least a single copy of an object is available even when an increased fraction of the
participating nodes is disconnected from the network. Moreover, (III) replicas can be
used to increase the robustness against maliciously behaving root nodes (Storage and
Retrieval Attacks).
To meet these challenges, five replication schemes have been proposed in the
context of this thesis. Our first basic replication scheme ensures that objects do not
get lost due to churn by using replicas stored at the virtual neighbors of the root node
(I). Moreover, we introduced three replication mechanisms that provide robustness
against both, network partitioning (II), and maliciously behaving root nodes (III).
Those mechanisms distribute replicas equally in the deployment area and differ on
the way, the replicas are allocated. ICR uses the content provider to distribute the
replicas while CRA and OCRA harnesses the root node to distribute the replicated
objects. Though, OCRA provides a more reliable distribution of the replicas due to
redundancy that is introduced by this approach. As a result, reliable services are
provided by OCRA when considering the fraction of successful lookups and the
fraction of successfully allocated objects in settings with maliciously behaving nodes
or a low node density. However, our fourth replication mechanism DRA has been
adapted in order to benefit from the structure of our Clustered Pastry system. Thus,
DRA distributes replicas more reliable than the OCRA mechanism in settings with
a high number of clusters. As a result we propose to use the OCRA mechanism
in settings with up to 4 clusters and DRA whenever a high number of clusters is
required.
The second part of this chapter discusses mechanisms to increase the robustness
against the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack. Therefore, we discussed existing security
mechanisms that can be harnessed to either detect or provide robustness to maliciously
behaving nodes that drop or misroute received lookup requests instead of forwarding
them correctly. Yet, outcomes of this chapter have shown that those mechanisms
cannot be used efficiently in the context of our Clustered Pastry system. Thus, we
developed a mechanism that harness overheard messages in order to ensure that
request messages are routed correctly to the destination of the request. This Overlay
WatchDog is able to detect maliciously behaving nodes and ensures that dropped
requests are rerouted. As a result, the impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
can be strongly decreased by applying this mechanism.
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At the end of this chapter, we discussed validation mechanisms, which can be
used in order to detect forged reply messages. Most of the mechanisms that have
been proposed in the recent years require a centralized entity or a large leaf set and
a set of replicas stored at virtual neighbors of the root node. The most promising
approach was proposed by Castro et al. and uses the node density to detect forged
reply messages. Yet, as shown in our evaluation, this Routing Failure Test does not
provide reliable results in MP2P scenarios. As a result, we have developed an Adapted
Routing Failure Test to overcome the drawbacks of the Routing Failure Test. This adapted
validation mechanisms was able to provide better results in MP2P scenarios. Yet,
this approach still requires equally distributed overlay identifiers and is not usable
in location aware MP2P systems as Clustered Pastry. Therefore, we developed the
Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism, that is adapted to the structure of Clustered Pastry.
This mechanism harnesses the clustering of virtual neighbors and overheard messages
in order to validate reply messages. As a result, the Cross-Layer Validation Mechanism
is able to detect forged reply messages with a very high probability.
In summary, we proposed security mechanisms that can be used to match the
security challenges that have been introduced in the previous chapter. Moreover, we
were able to show that existing security mechanisms cannot be used in the context of
MP2P scenarios or, at least, are not as efficient as our adapted mechanisms.

7
C O N C L U S I O N S
»I seldom end up were I wanted to go,
but almost always end up where I need to be.«
— Douglas Adams
MP2P systems can be used to provide reliable and, decentralized services in a
mobile network. As a result, MP2P systems can be deployed efficiently in a disaster
relief scenario. Yet, they also introduce new scientific challenges that have to be
considered during the development of an MP2P system. This includes the dynamic
topology and the wireless channel of the underlay and the decentralized structure
of the overlay. Moreover, security challenges have to be considered as these MP2P
systems are vulnerable to multiple attacks.
7.1 summary and conclusions
The major objective of this thesis was to develop an MP2P system that harnesses state-
of-the-art technology to provide efficient and reliable storage and retrieval services
in a disaster relief scenario. Therefore, our first goal was to develop a decentralized
MP2P system that meet the challenges introduced by the disaster relief scenario.
Based on this MP2P system, security threats had to be analyzed as our second goal.
Thus, open security challenges were identified. In order to meet those open security
challenges, security mechanisms had to be developed to ensure the availability of the
storage and retrieval services provided by our MP2P system as our last goal.
As our first contribution and to satisfy the first goal of this thesis, we developed
the Clustered Pastry system. This decentralized MP2P system provides storage
and retrieval operations of small data items in a disaster relief scenario where no
communication infrastructure is available. We deployed a combination of a MANET
underlay with a DHT overlay in order to meet challenges that arose in a disaster
relief scenario. These challenges include a dynamic topology due to the mobility of
the participants, a decentralized characteristic of the network and a strongly limited
bandwidth. Therefore, we harnessed the geographical position of the participants to
cluster nodes in order to optimize the efficiency of the routing mechanism. Moreover, a
reduced number of routing table entries was used to minimize the traffic overhead due
to routing table updates. In order to ensure a reliable operation of the overlay’s lookup
mechanism, periodical updates of the routing tables have further been introduced.
As shown in our evaluation, these adaptations were essential in order to ensure the
availability of the network’s services.
Furthermore, we have introduced mechanisms to optimize our Clustered Pastry
system. This includes on one hand, mechanisms that reduce the traffic introduced
by the update mechanisms of the routing tables. Due to those traffic reduction
mechanisms, the overall traffic has been reduced by approximately 60%. On the other
hand, by harnessing threshold areas, we were able to stabilize the system and to
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reduce traffic generated by a node that changes the cluster. Those threshold areas are
located between the clusters and delay the adaptation of the overlay identifier of a
node due to its mobility pattern. We were able to show that those threshold areas
reduce the average number of cluster changes by more than 10% and, therefore, the
traffic generated by this cluster-based churn.
Our second contribution considers the vulnerability of MP2P systems in general.
Therefore, we analyzed security threats for MP2P due to maliciously behaving partici-
pants and, in particular, routing attacks as required by our second goal. We discussed
security challenges in the underlying architectures. After taking existing security
mechanisms into account, we identified open challenges in MP2P. Therefore, three
attacks that are able to strongly affect the availability of the services provided by the
MP2P system have been analyzed in depth. Those attacks exploit the required cooper-
ation of the participating nodes in MP2P systems. Thus, nodes do not provide locally
stored objects but deny them due to the Storage and Retrieval Attack. Moreover, lookup
requests are not forwarded by the intermediate nodes but dropped (Incorrect Lookup
Routing Attack) or a forged reply message is generated (Forging of Reply Messages). In
the context of this thesis, we evaluated the impact of those attacks by the means of
simulations based on our Clustered Pastry simulation model. As a result, we were
able to show that these attacks are also able to threaten the availability of services of
MP2P systems.
In our third contribution, we proposed novel security mechanisms for MP2P system
based on the results of the survey of security threats. In order to satisfy our last goal,
we surveyed and evaluated existing security mechanisms that have been developed
for the underlying architectures. However, as those mechanisms were not adapted
to the challenges introduced by the MP2P system, these mechanisms either perform
poorly or introduce a high overhead in MP2P scenarios. As a result, we developed
three security mechanisms that were adapted to the characteristics of MP2P and,
in particular, to Clustered Pastry systems to ensure robustness to the previously
mentioned attacks.
In order to ensure the availability of the objects stored in the networks object
replication is required. Therefore, we introduced replication mechanisms that are
based on distributing replicas not only in the virtual overlay identifier space, but
also in the deployment area. Thus, those replicas do not only ensure the robustness
against the Storage and Retrieval Attack, but further are able reduce the impact of a
network partitioning as shown in our evaluation. Moreover, we introduced replica
allocation mechanisms that were able to distribute the replicas efficiently in an MP2P
system. As a result of replication, the fraction of failed lookups has been reduced by
nearly 35%.
During the lookup of an object, intermediate nodes are required to forward the
lookup request towards its destination. However, when those intermediate nodes
do not forward but drop the requests, services provided by the MP2P system may
become unavailable. Existing security mechanisms that have been proposed for P2P
systems to increase the networks robustness to this Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack are
based on introducing redundancy. As the bandwidth in MP2P systems is strongly
limited due to the wireless underlay, those mechanisms should be avoided. Thus, we
introduced a new approach that is based on overhearing received messages and cross-
layering, which provides robust services but without introducing a high overhead as
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shown in our evaluation. Moreover, the impact of the Incorrect Lookup Routing Attack
in terms of fraction of failed lookups has been reduced by more than 28%.
When an intermediate node does not drop a received lookup message but forge
a reply message, new challenges arise. As the source node assumes that the lookup
has been successful, security mechanisms developed for the Incorrect Lookup Routing
Attack cannot be deployed. However, existing security mechanisms developed for P2P
systems are based on requirements that cannot be met in MP2P scenarios. Therefore,
we introduced an adapted mechanism that harnesses the geographical neighbors to
validate reply messages. This mechanism ensures that forged reply message can be
detected in a reliable way as shown in the evaluation.
In conclusion, we have developed Clustered Pastry, a location-aware and efficient
MP2P architecture. In order to ensure reliable services even in settings with faulty
or malicious nodes, we identified open challenges in MP2P systems and developed
adapted security mechanisms to provide robustness to those attacks.
7.2 outlook
In this thesis, an MP2P system has been developed and optimized in order to be used
in the context with a disaster relief scenario. Moreover, security challenges introduced
by those MP2P systems have been discussed. Naturally, new research topics for future
work arise based on the outcomes of this thesis.
• Clustered Pastry has been designed in the context of a disaster relief scenario.
Yet, MP2P can be deployed in a large set of scenarios including vehicular net-
works and military operations. Thus, our system can be analyzed and optimized
for other application scenarios as disaster relief.
• In this thesis we assume a fixed number of nodes and clusters. Yet, the number
of participants in a disaster relief scenario may vary and, therefore, a dynamic
cluster size may be beneficial to coordinate these scenarios. Thus, an algorithm
that provides a dynamic number of clusters as a function of the number of
participants would be an interesting topic for future work.
• In this thesis, the vulnerabilities of MP2P systems have been discussed. As a
result, we considered that the network’s robustness to multiple attacks is covered
by existing security mechanism. For example, multiple security mechanisms
have been proposed to detect a Sybil attack. The evaluation of those security
mechanisms and, furthermore, optimization of these systems in the context of
MP2P systems is also a topic for future work.
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A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 default parameters
In this section, default parameters are defined as used by our simulation based
evaluation.
a.1.1 Field Size and Basic Parameters
Field size
Nodes Deployment area
25 500m x 500m
50 800m x 800m
75 900m x 900m
100 1100m x 1100m
150 1400m x 1400m
200 1550m x 1550m
Basic parameters
Nodes 100
Mobility model Random waypoint
Node speed 0-1 m/s
Node placement Equally distributed
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a.1.2 Overlay
Pastry
Basic protocol Pastry
Routing algorithm semi-recursive
Leaf set size dynamic
ID size 32 bit
Parameter b 1
Retransmissions 2
Number of local replicas 2
Routing table update frequency 10 s
Traffic generator
Request frequency 10 s (global)
Objects 50
Life time of Objects 250 s
Object size 2 kbyte - 10 kbyte
a.1.3 Underlay
Underlay
Carrier frequency 2.4 GHz
Propagation model FreeSpaceModel
Transmission range 200m
MANET parameters
Basic protocol OLSR
Routing metric ETX
Frequency Hello messages 2 s
Willingness 3
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a.1.4 Clustered Pastry
Clustered Pastry
Threshold area 40m
Cluster 4
Leaf Set update frequency 2 s
Traffic reduction mechanism
Update interval of the data sets 6s
Data set size 6 bytes
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